A SECOND GLIMPSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY ON DECREE - LAW 36/2025
Court of Mantua
By Coco Ruggeri - November 3, 2025
On October 23, 2025, the Ordinary Court of Mantua referred to the Constitutional Court a new challenge against the latest amendments to Italian citizenship law, specifically Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, introduced by Decree-Law No. 36/2025 and later converted into Law No. 74/2025.
The case stems from a denied request to record the birth certificate of a child born abroad to an Italian mother. Under the previous legal framework, the child would have automatically acquired Italian citizenship at birth. However, the new law introduces retroactive restrictions, requiring formal applications to be submitted by a fixed deadline—even for individuals born before the law came into effect.
The Court raised serious concerns about the constitutional legitimacy of these retroactive limitations, which effectively strip citizenship rights from individuals who had already acquired them by birth.
The panel of judges emphasized that the legislation may violate multiple constitutional principles, including the protection of acquired rights, equal treatment, and access to justice. The matter is now pending before the Constitutional Court, which will evaluate whether the new rules unjustly deprive thousands of descendants of Italian citizens—many of whom reside abroad—of their status as Italian nationals.
Civil Division
This Court, sitting as a panel composed of the following judges:
Presiding Judge
Judge
Reporting Judge
in the proceedings pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000 (Case No. /2025, General Docket), initiated by , in their capacity as legal guardians of the minor, represented jointly and severally by Professor and Attorney and Attorney
against
THE ACTING MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANNETO SULL’OGLIO (Tax Code 81001310200), in their capacity as Civil Registrar, and the MUNICIPALITY OF CANNETO SULL’OGLIO (Tax Code 81001310200, VAT number 00603980202), represented by its acting Mayor;
has issued the following
ORDER
pursuant to Art. 1 of Law No. 1 of February 9, 1948 and Art. 23 of Law No. 87 of March 1, 1953
1. The applicants filed an appeal pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000 against the decision of the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Canneto sull’Oglio rejecting their request to record the birth certificate of their minor son, , born in Brazil to a mother who is an Italian citizen jure sanguinis, born and residing abroad, as recognized by Judgment No. /2024, issued on April 11, 2025, by the Ordinary Court of Brescia and now final, as certified by the Court on June 18, 2025.
In particular, the applicants claimed that the minor was automatically granted Italian citizenship by operation of law (ope legis) pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 91 of 1992, since the constitutive element of citizenship status is the mere fact of being born to an Italian parent. Consequently, from the standpoint of substantive law, any formal, administrative, or judicial procedure is irrelevant.
According to the applicants’ argument, the transcription of the birth certificate is likewise irrelevant, as it is merely declaratory in nature and not constitutive. The child’s right to Italian citizenship exists from birth (ab origine), by virtue of a complete and self-executing legal provision, and therefore does not require any procedure or application, since the law provides for no condition precedent or additional manifestation of intent for its attribution.
The applicants therefore challenged the lawfulness of the refusal issued by the Civil Registrar, arguing that Law No. 74 of 2025, relied upon by the Registrar in denying the transcription of the minor’s birth certificate, is not applicable ratione temporis to the present case. Moreover, that Law does not establish any ground for the automatic loss of citizenship — a necessary prerequisite for the application of any provision limiting citizenship status — since citizenship, once acquired as an original right, remains vested in the individual and cannot be automatically or retroactively revoked or denied.
Alternatively, they requested that a question of constitutional legitimacy be raised concerning Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis, and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025 (converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, which introduced Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992), for violation of Articles 1(2), 2, 3, 22, 24, 29, 56, 58, 72, 77, and 117(1) of the Constitution.
2. The Public Prosecutor expressed an opinion against granting the appeal, considering the refusal to record the birth certificate to be lawful under the legislation currently in force.
3. The Acting Mayor of the Municipality of Canneto sull’Oglio submitted written observations, providing a reconstruction of the facts and of the applicable legal framework, and argued that the refusal to record the minor’s birth certificate was issued following the determination that the child did not meet all the requirements set forth in Article 1, paragraph 1(a), in conjunction with Article 3-bis, paragraph 1(c) and (d), of Law No. 91 of 1992, for the acquisition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis.
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4. On the jurisdiction of the Court of Mantua
4.1. As a preliminary matter, the Panel notes that the Court of Mantua has jurisdiction over the present dispute, since the proceeding was initiated pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000, which provides that any person wishing to challenge a refusal by the Civil Registrar to perform a registration must file an application with the court having jurisdiction over the district in which the Office of the Civil Registrar holding, or requested to execute, the relevant record is located.
4.2.Since, in this case, the record is to be registered with the Municipality of Canneto sull’Oglio (Province of Mantua), the Court properly has jurisdiction over the matter.
5. On the Relevance of the Constitutional Question Raised by the Applicants
5.1.On the merits, the constitutional question raised by the applicants must be considered relevant, since, under the legal framework in force prior to the entry into effect of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted into Law No. 74 of 2025, the applicants’ claim would have been well-founded.
5.2.On the one hand, it is established that the minor, , was born in Brazil and holds Brazilian citizenship. It is also proven, on the basis of the documentation submitted by the applicants, that he descends, through the maternal line, from an Italian citizen (see Exhibit 3 – Judgment No. /2024 declaring that his mother is an Italian citizen; Exhibit 4 – certificate of final judgment dated June 18, 2025; Exhibit 5 – full birth certificate of the minor, with certified translation and apostille).
It is therefore undisputed that, under the previous legal framework and pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 91 of 1992, he would have acquired Italian citizenship jure sanguinis at birth, since his mother had been declared an Italian citizen by a final judgment.
5.3.On the other hand, it is equally undisputed that, in light of the plain wording of the law, the legislation applicable to the present case is that enacted after the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, which introduced Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992. Accordingly, in the present case, it is not possible to apply the previous legal framework, as primarily requested by the applicants.
5.4.The afore-mentioned Article 3-bis (Transitional Provisions on the Acquisition of Citizenship by Birth) provides as follows:
1. By way of derogation from Articles 1, 2, 3, 14 and 20 of this Law, Article 5 of Law No. 123 of April 21, 1983, Articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 12 and 19 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912, as well as Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the Civil Code approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, any person born abroad, even prior to the date of entry into force of this Article, and who holds another citizenship, shall be considered as never having acquired Italian citizenship, unless one of the following conditions is met:
a) the individual’s status as an Italian citizen is recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, following an application accompanied by the necessary documentation and submitted to the competent consular office or mayor no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on that same date;
a-bis) the individual’s status as an Italian citizen is recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, following an application accompanied by the necessary documentation and submitted to the competent consular office or mayor on the day indicated by an appointment communicated to the applicant by the competent office no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on March 27, 2025;
b) the individual’s status as an Italian citizen is judicially recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, pursuant to a petition filed no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on that same date;
c) a first- or second-degree ascendant holds, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship;
d) a parent or adoptive parent has been resident in Italy for at least two consecutive years following the acquisition of Italian citizenship and prior to the child’s birth or adoption.
By express decision of the legislator, the provision — being an exception to the general rule — also applies to individuals born abroad prior to its entry into force, as is the case here.
5.5.Given the clarity of the statutory language, the provision cannot be interpreted in any other way, not even in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
5.6.Pursuant to the new legislative framework introduced by Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, it must be held that the minor never acquired Italian citizenship, as he does not fall within any of the exceptional clauses provided by the law, given that: no application was filed, either administratively or judicially, before 11:59 p.m. on March 27, 2025; there is no evidence that the minor’s ascendants resided in Italy for two years prior to the child’s birth; and the minor’s ascendants did not hold exclusively Italian citizenship.
6. On the Non-Manifest Unfoundedness of the Constitutional Question Raised by the Applicants
6.1.The constitutional question does not appear to be manifestly unfounded, at least with respect to the aspects raised by the applicants, as further detailed below.
The Panel considers that there are well-founded grounds to doubt the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, insofar as it retroactively restricts the rules governing the automatic acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis, including for those who had already been born at the time the provision entered into force, and, moreover, retroactively establishes a special regime for the acquisition of citizenship by a minor who is a foreign national or stateless person, through a declaration of intent made by the parent or legal guardian.
Upon closer examination, the provision entails a restriction of the right to the recognition of Italian citizenship, introducing a special rule that derogates from the ordinary criteria governing the recognition of Italian citizenship, including for individuals born prior to its entry into force and who had therefore already acquired Italian citizenship automatically and from birth.
6.2.In this regard, it is useful to recall the recent ruling of the Joint Sections of the Court of Cassation (Judgment No. 25318 of 2022), which retraced the fundamental principles established by Law No. 91 of 1992 for determining the right to Italian citizenship, reaffirming that citizenship is a legal status conferred by law, denoting an individual’s belonging to a State and entailing a set of corresponding rights and duties.
The aforementioned ruling, in particular, states as follows:
[…] the Italian legal system has traditionally maintained a conservative approach, with no substantial changes to the prevailing criterion of acquisition based on jure sanguinis, a principle that has remained virtually unchanged since the Civil Code of 1865 and was subsequently inherited by Law No. 555 of 1912 and, later, by the current Law No. 91 of 1992. Citizenship is fundamentally acquired by birth, as an original entitlement. Until 1992 this was equivalent to saying that an Italian citizen is one who is the child of a citizen father, or, when the father is unknown (or stateless), one who is the child of a citizen mother. Such a framework has, in substance, characterized the national legislation throughout the historical evolution relevant to this matter — namely, Articles 4 and 7 of the Civil Code of 1865 and Article 1 of Law No. 555 of 1912. The framework changed with Law No. 91 of 1992, as a result of a supervening constitutional maturity, but simply in the sense that a citizen by birth nowadays is the child of a citizen father or mother, or anyone born in the territory of the Republic if both parents are unknown or stateless […]. It may be observed that the emphasis placed on blood ties — that is, iure sanguinis — as opposed to other indicators of connection between the individual and the territory (such as iure loci, or as it is more commonly known, iure soli, whether or not subject to additional requirements or conditions), has historically justified — and still partly justifies, under Law No. 91 of 1992 — a significant restriction on the possibility of acquiring citizenship for those who do not have Italian ancestry. At the same time, and due to the inherent contradiction that such an approach would otherwise entail, it has also led to a correspondingly strict limitation on the possibility of establishing cases in which Italian citizens residing abroad may lose their citizenship. It is an absolutely obvious fact, from this last point of view, that the loss of Italian citizenship can depend only on national legislation, according to the provisions found therein pro tempore, and never, on the other hand, on decisions implemented in a foreign legal framework. It is precisely from this rationale that the recognition of dual citizenship phenomena has arisen: these developments that are, moreover, consistent with the evolution of international law. Such cases, in fact, are addressed by the current legal framework (as set forth in the aforementioned Law No. 91 of 1992), which seeks primarily to resolve any resulting conflicts that may arise from dual nationality. t is worth underlying that the significance of these phenomena was acknowledged even at the time, including — as often recalled — in the well-known 1907 judgment of the Court of Cassation sitting in Naples. […] The outcome of such a framework is quite straightforward. Citizenship by birth is acquired as an original entitlement. Citizenship status, once acquired, is permanent and imprescriptible. It is justiciable at any time on the basis of simple proof of the acquisitive fact integrated by birth as an Italian citizen. Hence the proof is in the transmission line. Only extinction by waiver remains unaffected (see already Cass. Sec. U No. 4466-09). It follows that, provided that there is no change in the legislation, where citizenship is claimed by a descendant, he is expected to prove only as follows: that he is indeed a descendant of an Italian citizen. It is responsibility of the other party, who has taken exception to this, to prove the interruptive event of the transmission line. (As stated by the Joint Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation in Judgment No. 25318 of 2022, consistent with Joint Sections Judgment No. 4466 of 2009, which reaffirmed the principles established by the Constitutional Court in Judgments No. 87 of 1975 and No. 30 of 1983.)
6.3.In application of the so-called "living law" therefore, it must be concluded that – at least in the regime prior to Decree-Law No. 36/2025 – foreign-born individuals who could prove their uninterrupted descent from an Italian citizen for this reason were only Italian citizens, as "Italian citizen" would mean an “essential quality of the person, characterized by absoluteness, originality, inalienability, and exemption from any statute of limitations” (Joint Sessions of the Court of Cassation, Order No. 4466/2009).
The fact that such individuals had, or had not, brought legal action for the formal recognition of their citizenship status constituted merely a factual circumstance, irrelevant for the purposes of recognizing that right. It cannot be regarded as a "progressively formed" legal relationship, but rather as a perfect subjective right arising at birth, since the lack of judicial ascertainment of a subjective right does not extinguish its existence (see Joint Sections, Court of Cassation, Judgment No. 29459 of 2019, concerning the distinct issue of the retroactive application of restrictive provisions on humanitarian protection introduced by the 2020 amendment).
6.4.An alternative interpretation, however, would conflict with the interpretative approach adopted by well-established case law, as well as with the declaratory — rather than constitutive — nature, universally recognized to judgments determining citizenship jure sanguinis (unlike cases of citizenship acquired through so-called "naturalization"), which merely ascertain or declare a status already acquired at birth.
6.5.In light of the foregoing, the doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of the challenged provision are evident, since it introduces a form of deprivation of citizenship status already acquired by an individual born abroad to an Italian mother.
Indeed, although in the Explanatory Report accompanying the bill for the conversion into law of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025 the legislature specified that the provision introduced by the new Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 (added by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025) “is placed after Article 3 of the Law, since it does not concern a further case of loss of Italian citizenship in addition to those provided for by Article 13, but rather a preclusion, operating with retroactive effect (ex tunc), to the automatic acquisition of citizenship,” thereby establishing “a case of non-acquisition ex tunc of citizenship and not of loss thereof” (see pp. 24–25), the Panel nevertheless finds it evident that the provision effectively determines the non-acquisition ab origine of a status which, in fact, had already been acquired at birth.
Thus, in practical terms, the provision results in an automatic ex tunc loss of citizenship, or rather in a form of implicit revocation of citizenship, affecting all those who, having been born before the entry into force of the decree in question, had already acquired, by virtue of birth from an Italian citizen, the substantive entitlement to status civitatis, although they had not yet proceeded to the formal recognition of such entitlement through an express declaration of intent.
6.6.That being said, the provision appears to be in conflict with Articles 1, 2, 3, 22, 24, 56, and 58 of the Constitution, as well as with Articles 72, 77, and 117(1) thereof.
7. Grounds of Conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution
7.1.First of all, the provision appears to be manifestly in conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution, which provides that “No one may be deprived, for political reasons, of legal capacity, citizenship, or name.”
7.2.A systematic interpretation of the constitutional provision leads, in fact, to the conclusion that each citizen’s right to the preservation of his or her status civitatis cannot be sacrificed for reasons connected to the public interests of the community.
In this regard, the Panel observes that Article 22 of the Constitution cannot be interpreted solely as prohibiting the deprivation of citizenship as a means of repressing dissent, but must also be understood as encompassing any reason linked to “political” interests in a broad sense — that is, both those of the political forces in power at a given historical moment and those regarded as representing the interests of the national community as a whole.
Otherwise, the provision would be deprived of its meaning, being reduced to a mere repetition of other constitutional principles, since the prohibition against depriving a person of citizenship on account of his or her beliefs could already be inferred from the principles of democracy, equality, and non-discrimination.
Moreover, the very placement of the provision among the guarantees of civil rights, rather than among those relating to the "founding elements" of the State, underscores the link between citizenship and the protection of constitutional freedoms, suggesting that these essential aspects of personal identity cannot be sacrificed solely on the grounds of public interests deemed to be overriding.
7.3.In violation of this constitutional principle, the provision under examination deprives of Italian citizenship those citizens jure sanguinis who were born before the entry into force of the decree in question, on the grounds of alleged overriding public interests — namely, in this case, the regulation of the flow of applications for the recognition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis submitted by descendants of Italian citizens who emigrated abroad.
7.4.Accordingly, while the acquisition of a particular citizenship cannot, in itself, be regarded as a right — given the broad discretion of the Legislature in determining who forms part of its citizenry and under what conditions citizenship may be granted — such discretion cannot extend to situations in which citizenship status has already been acquired. In that case, citizenship constitutes a fundamental right of the individual and an essential personal attribute, absolute, original, inalienable, and imprescriptible, and therefore enforceable at any time (See, to this effect, Court of Cassation, Joint Sections, Judgment No. 4466 of 2006; and, more recently, Joint Sections, Judgments Nos. 25317 and 25318 of 2022).
8. Grounds of Conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution
8.1.From this standpoint, the provision referred to the Court also appears to violate Article 3 of the Constitution, in two distinct aspects.
8.2.First of all, Article 3 of the Constitution embodies a principle of consistency, as an expression of legal certainty, and establishes the principle of legitimate expectation in the law, which operates as a limit on the legislature’s power to alter ongoing legal relationships.
8.3.It must first be noted that, under our legal system, although the principle of non-retroactivity of the law applies pursuant to Article 11 of the Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code, a retroactive civil law cannot be deemed per se unlawful, provided that the specific limits identified by statute and by the case-law of the Constitutional Court are observed.
On this point, constitutional case law has consistently recognized that the principle of legitimate expectation — which enjoys constitutional protection under Article 3 of the Constitution — does not preclude the Legislature from adopting provisions that unfavorably amend the regulation of legal relationships, “even when such relationships concern vested subjective rights.” However, this may occur only on the condition “that such provisions do not degenerate into irrational regulation, thereby frustrating, with regard to substantive situations based on prior legislation, citizens’ legitimate expectation of legal certainty, to be understood as a fundamental element of the rule of law.” (See, among many others, Constitutional Court Judgments No. 54 of 2019; Nos. 216 and 56 of 2015; Nos. 219 and 154 of 2014; Nos. 310 and 83 of 2013; Nos. 166 of 2012 and 302 of 2010; and Order No. 31 of 2011.)
The retroactive effect of legislation is therefore limited by the “principle of citizens’ legitimate expectation in the certainty of the legal system,” the violation of which results in unreasonableness and consequently entails the unconstitutionality of the retroactive provision (see Constitutional Court Judgment No. 69 of 2014, referring to Judgments Nos. 170 and 103 of 2013, Nos. 271 and 71 of 2011, and Nos. 236 and 206 of 2009, among others).
8.4.In the Panel’s view, the decision to act retroactively on the recognition of status civitatis, in light of the foregoing, has violated the legitimate expectation — supported by well-established case law — of those who, having been born before the entry into force of the legislation at issue, had already acquired Italian citizenship at birth, even though they had not (yet) requested its formal recognition.
As of March 27, 2025, these individuals were already to be regarded as Italian citizens for all purposes, since, although they had not exercised the rights deriving from their status, they nonetheless possessed the substantive entitlement thereto and relied on the possibility of obtaining its formal recognition.
This legitimate expectation was frustrated when the Legislature retroactively amended the regime set forth in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of Law No. 91 of 1992.
8.5.Secondly, the contested provision appears to violate the principle of substantive equality, which is likewise afforded constitutional protection under Article 3 of the Constitution.
In fact, Article 3-bis, paragraph 1, letters (a), (a-bis), and (b) of Law No. 91 of 1992 treats differently individuals who are in the same factual circumstances — namely, foreign nationals born to parents (or ascendants) who were Italian citizens prior to the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 34 of 2025 — by subjecting the recognition of citizenship to arbitrary conditions beyond the individual’s control, including, in particular, the date of submission of the documentation for obtaining citizenship to the competent consular office or mayor, or the date of filing a judicial petition for the determination of citizenship jure sanguinis.
8.6.It cannot be overlooked that, regardless of the will of the parties concerned, the practical possibility of submitting to the consular offices, to the mayor, or to the judicial authority the documentation suitable to prove the transmission of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis is uncertain in terms of timing, as it also depends on bureaucratic and procedural factors, preliminary to the filing of the application, which are entirely beyond the citizen’s control.
From this perspective, the difference in treatment between those who filed a judicial application or an application with the competent consular offices or the mayor before March 28, 2025, and those who did so thereafter, appears entirely arbitrary.
9. Grounds of Conflict with Article 2 of the Constitution
9.1.The Panel considers that the provision at issue, in its retroactive application to individuals born before its entry into force, also raises issues of violation of Article 2 of the Constitution, as it arbitrarily and unreasonably affects an inviolable human right.
9.2.As previously noted, the right to citizenship jure sanguinis, based on descent from an Italian citizen, does not arise from a concession by the State, but already exists in the individual, being an original, natural, and imprescriptible right.
Conversely, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 treats this right — even for those who had already acquired it by virtue of being born before the entry into force of the current legislation — as a benefit to be obtained upon application within a fixed deadline, thereby transforming a recognized right into a privilege to be claimed.
10. Grounds of Conflict with Article 24 of the Constitution
10.1. At the same time, the contested provisions violate Article 24 of the Constitution, insofar as they unreasonably hinder and restrict — including from a temporal standpoint — the access to judicial protection of the subjective right to citizenship for individuals who had already acquired Italian citizenship ab origine.
Indeed, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 fails to introduce any rules of intertemporal law, omitting to establish a reasonable period following the entry into force of the provision during which those concerned could act before the competent administrative or judicial authorities in order to obtain recognition of the citizenship already acquired jure sanguinis.
11. Grounds of Conflict with Articles 1 paragraph 2, 57 and 58 of the Constitution
12. Furthermore, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 — introduced by Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of 2025 — by retroactively excluding or limiting the recognition of Italian citizenship for foreign nationals who had already acquired it jure sanguinis, also conflicts with Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of popular sovereignty, as well as with Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution, which establish the right to vote reserved to citizens.
Indeed, Italian citizenship constitutes the indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of both active and passive political rights, in particular the right to vote for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic (Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution), as well as for referendums pursuant to Article 75 of the Constitution.
13. Grounds of Conflict with Articles 72 and 77 of the Constitution
13.1. Lastly, further doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of the contested provisions arise from the use of the emergency decree procedure (decretazione d’urgenza) for the enactment of the legislation at issue.
13.2. The Panel considers that the matter of citizenship is subject to a formal legislative reservation, or more precisely — from a procedural standpoint — to a reservation of parliamentary assembly, pursuant to Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution. Accordingly, it may be regulated only by an ordinary statute adopted by Parliament and not by other acts having the force of law, such as decree-laws.
13.3. Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution identifies specific matters whose legislative regulation must necessarily follow “the ordinary procedure of examination and direct approval by the chamber.”
The purpose of the parliamentary reservation of law is to ensure that certain bills of major political or institutional importance are debated in a forum that, by its very nature, guarantees public proceedings and the full representation of all political groups — safeguards that cannot be ensured elsewhere.
Therefore, if the connection between formal legislative reservation and parliamentary reservation were to be denied, the requirement of direct examination and approval by the assembly would lose its meaning, since it could be easily circumvented by simply altering the type of legislative act, thereby eluding even direct parliamentary involvement.
13.4. On this premise, it must be noted that the matters covered by the parliamentary reservation under Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution include “constitutional matters” and “electoral matters.”
Both categories are interpreted broadly: the former encompasses all bills of particular relevance concerning the institutional framework, while the latter covers every aspect of the regulation of the electoral function, including the conditions governing the attribution of active and passive electoral capacity.
13.5. On this basis, it may therefore be held that the subject matter concerning status civitatis falls within the scope of the parliamentary reservation (and, consequently, also within that of the formal legislative reservation), since it pertains to a field that can be subsumed both under constitutional matters and, in a broader sense, under electoral matters.
Indeed, the determination of who constitutes the people of a State directly affects a fundamental element of the State itself and the structure of political representation.
It is therefore evident that the legislation at issue, which concerns a matter defining the democratic form of the State, directly impacts the composition of the electorate and the nature of political representation, given that citizenship determines membership and participation in the political and social life of the community.
Italian citizenship, as previously noted, does not merely constitute an individual legal status, but rather represents the indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of active and passive political rights, in particular, the right to vote for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic (Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution), as well as for referendums pursuant to Article 75 of the Constitution.
Consequently, any legislative measure that modifies the conditions for acquiring citizenship jure sanguinis by retroactively restricting its criteria or excluding individuals previously entitled thereto, entails an implicit alteration of the electorate — that is, of the subjective base on which democratic sovereignty rests — and therefore requires recourse to the “ordinary” legislative procedure under Article 72 of the Constitution.
13.6. In any event, even assuming that the matter were to be considered outside the scope of those subject to a parliamentary reservation of law, it appears difficult to acknowledge, in the present case, the existence of the extraordinary necessity and urgency required by Article 77 of the Constitution that would allow the Government to act by means of a decree-law.
13.7. In this respect, the Panel observes that, according to the preamble of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, the Government’s stated objective was to contain “the continuous and exponential increase in the number of potential Italian citizens residing outside the national territory who, also due to their possession of one or more citizenships other than Italian, are primarily bound to other States by strong ties of culture, identity, and allegiance,” since “the absence of effective bonds with the Republic on the part of a growing number of citizens — a number that could equal or even exceed the resident population — constitutes a serious and current risk to national security and, by virtue of Italy’s membership in the European Union, also to the other Member States and to the Schengen Area.”
The Government therefore considered that extraordinary necessity and urgency existed “to avoid, pending the approval of an organic reform of citizenship law, an exceptional and uncontrolled influx of applications for the recognition of citizenship, such as to prevent the proper functioning of consular offices abroad, municipalities, and judicial offices.”
13.8. However, the issue of the excessive workload of courts and consular offices arising from applications for the recognition of citizenship by Italians residing abroad — even by those lacking genuine ties with the Italian Republic — is well known and long-standing.
This circumstance gives rise to serious doubts as to the existence of the actual conditions that could justify the use of the emergency decree procedure. While the need for a comprehensive and coherent legislative reform in this field cannot be denied — a need also emphasized by the Constitutional Court itself (see Judgment No. 142 of 2025, reasoning) — such a reform must necessarily involve both chambers of Parliament, given the scope and impact of the matter.
The Panel thus concludes that no real circumstances of extraordinariness, unpredictability, or urgency exist that could justify legislative intervention through a decree-law — particularly one introducing retroactive and more restrictive provisions affecting individuals who had already acquired Italian citizenship jure sanguinis by birth.
14. Grounds of Conflict with Article 117, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution
15. In light of all the foregoing, the provisions at issue are also in conflict with Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, in relation to Italy’s international obligations and to the observance of the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
16. Conclusions
16.1. For all the reasons set forth above, the ordinary legislation introduced by Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of 2025 — which inserted Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992 — appears constitutionally illegitimate insofar as it retroactively applies the restrictive effects on citizenship status to a time preceding the entry into force of the law itself. Specifically, by making the right to the recognition of Italian citizenship “by birth” conditional — under letters (a), (a-bis), and (b) of the aforementioned Article 3-bis — upon new requirements introduced ex novo, the legislation limits the exercise of a right previously recognized and constitutionally protected.
The legislative choice introduced by Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 must therefore be regarded, as extensively demonstrated, as amounting to a retroactive revocation of an acquired right, depriving individuals who must be deemed Italian citizens by birth of such status, without even providing for a reasonable period — running from the entry into force of the provision — within which an application for recognition of Italian citizenship could be submitted, upon the expiration of which the loss of citizenship status would be triggered.
16.2. Moreover, as already observed in Order No. 167 of 2025 of the Court of Turin (published in the Official Gazette No. 38 of September 17, 2025), in which the same provisions were challenged with reference to partially identical constitutional parameters, a declaration of partial unconstitutionality of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, on the grounds set forth above, would make it possible to preserve the useful effect of the legislative reform — namely, the implementation of the international principle of “genuine link,” recently reaffirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Judgment of April 29, 2025, Case C-181/23) — while at the same time eliminating the prejudicial consequences arising from the retroactive application (to all persons already born) of the new provisions.
By removing from Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 the passages expressly providing for retroactive application, a constitutionally consistent interpretation of the new citizenship provisions would remain possible — namely, the interpretation limiting the applicability of the said article solely to persons born after the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025. For all others, the general rule laid down in Article 11 of the Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code (preleggi) would continue to apply, according to which “the law has effect only for the future.”
FOR THESE REASONS
The Court of Mantua, sitting as a Panel, having regard to Article 134 of the Constitution, Article 1 of Constitutional Law No. 1 of February 9, 1948, and Article 23 of Law No. 87 of March 1, 1953, having found the relevance and non-manifest unfoundedness of the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New provisions on citizenship), introduced by Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis, and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent provisions on Italian citizenship), converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025, insofar as it provides that the provision shall apply “any person born abroad, even prior to the date of entry into force of this Article” and under the conditions laid down in letters (a), (a-bis), and (b), in reference to Articles 1, 2, 3, 22, 24, 56, 58, 72, 77, and 117 of the Constitution, the latter with reference to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
orders the suspension of the current proceedings;
orders the immediate transmission of the case file to the Constitutional Court;
orders that, under the responsibility of the Clerk’s Office, this order be served on the parties to the case and on the Prime Minister, and be communicated to the Presidents of both Houses of Parliament.
Thus decided in the Chamber of Council of the Civil Section of the Court of Mantua, on October 23, 2025.
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The case stems from a denied request to record the birth certificate of a child born abroad to an Italian mother. Under the previous legal framework, the child would have automatically acquired Italian citizenship at birth. However, the new law introduces retroactive restrictions, requiring formal applications to be submitted by a fixed deadline—even for individuals born before the law came into effect.
The Court raised serious concerns about the constitutional legitimacy of these retroactive limitations, which effectively strip citizenship rights from individuals who had already acquired them by birth.
The panel of judges emphasized that the legislation may violate multiple constitutional principles, including the protection of acquired rights, equal treatment, and access to justice. The matter is now pending before the Constitutional Court, which will evaluate whether the new rules unjustly deprive thousands of descendants of Italian citizens—many of whom reside abroad—of their status as Italian nationals.
Key Takeaways from the Judges’ Reasoning:
- Citizenship acquired at birth cannot be undone retroactively — the law cannot cancel the status of individuals who already met all legal conditions at the time of their birth.
- Citizenship is a right, not a privilege — it is imprescriptible and cannot depend on filing an application within a deadline arbitrarily imposed after the fact.
- The law creates unfair and arbitrary distinctions — people in identical situations are treated differently based solely on bureaucratic timing or procedural delays beyond their control.
Civil Division
This Court, sitting as a panel composed of the following judges:
Presiding Judge
Judge
Reporting Judge
in the proceedings pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000 (Case No. /2025, General Docket), initiated by , in their capacity as legal guardians of the minor, represented jointly and severally by Professor and Attorney and Attorney
against
THE ACTING MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANNETO SULL’OGLIO (Tax Code 81001310200), in their capacity as Civil Registrar, and the MUNICIPALITY OF CANNETO SULL’OGLIO (Tax Code 81001310200, VAT number 00603980202), represented by its acting Mayor;
has issued the following
ORDER
pursuant to Art. 1 of Law No. 1 of February 9, 1948 and Art. 23 of Law No. 87 of March 1, 1953
1. The applicants filed an appeal pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000 against the decision of the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Canneto sull’Oglio rejecting their request to record the birth certificate of their minor son, , born in Brazil to a mother who is an Italian citizen jure sanguinis, born and residing abroad, as recognized by Judgment No. /2024, issued on April 11, 2025, by the Ordinary Court of Brescia and now final, as certified by the Court on June 18, 2025.
In particular, the applicants claimed that the minor was automatically granted Italian citizenship by operation of law (ope legis) pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 91 of 1992, since the constitutive element of citizenship status is the mere fact of being born to an Italian parent. Consequently, from the standpoint of substantive law, any formal, administrative, or judicial procedure is irrelevant.
According to the applicants’ argument, the transcription of the birth certificate is likewise irrelevant, as it is merely declaratory in nature and not constitutive. The child’s right to Italian citizenship exists from birth (ab origine), by virtue of a complete and self-executing legal provision, and therefore does not require any procedure or application, since the law provides for no condition precedent or additional manifestation of intent for its attribution.
The applicants therefore challenged the lawfulness of the refusal issued by the Civil Registrar, arguing that Law No. 74 of 2025, relied upon by the Registrar in denying the transcription of the minor’s birth certificate, is not applicable ratione temporis to the present case. Moreover, that Law does not establish any ground for the automatic loss of citizenship — a necessary prerequisite for the application of any provision limiting citizenship status — since citizenship, once acquired as an original right, remains vested in the individual and cannot be automatically or retroactively revoked or denied.
Alternatively, they requested that a question of constitutional legitimacy be raised concerning Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis, and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025 (converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, which introduced Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992), for violation of Articles 1(2), 2, 3, 22, 24, 29, 56, 58, 72, 77, and 117(1) of the Constitution.
2. The Public Prosecutor expressed an opinion against granting the appeal, considering the refusal to record the birth certificate to be lawful under the legislation currently in force.
3. The Acting Mayor of the Municipality of Canneto sull’Oglio submitted written observations, providing a reconstruction of the facts and of the applicable legal framework, and argued that the refusal to record the minor’s birth certificate was issued following the determination that the child did not meet all the requirements set forth in Article 1, paragraph 1(a), in conjunction with Article 3-bis, paragraph 1(c) and (d), of Law No. 91 of 1992, for the acquisition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis.
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4. On the jurisdiction of the Court of Mantua
4.1. As a preliminary matter, the Panel notes that the Court of Mantua has jurisdiction over the present dispute, since the proceeding was initiated pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000, which provides that any person wishing to challenge a refusal by the Civil Registrar to perform a registration must file an application with the court having jurisdiction over the district in which the Office of the Civil Registrar holding, or requested to execute, the relevant record is located.
4.2.Since, in this case, the record is to be registered with the Municipality of Canneto sull’Oglio (Province of Mantua), the Court properly has jurisdiction over the matter.
5. On the Relevance of the Constitutional Question Raised by the Applicants
5.1.On the merits, the constitutional question raised by the applicants must be considered relevant, since, under the legal framework in force prior to the entry into effect of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted into Law No. 74 of 2025, the applicants’ claim would have been well-founded.
5.2.On the one hand, it is established that the minor, , was born in Brazil and holds Brazilian citizenship. It is also proven, on the basis of the documentation submitted by the applicants, that he descends, through the maternal line, from an Italian citizen (see Exhibit 3 – Judgment No. /2024 declaring that his mother is an Italian citizen; Exhibit 4 – certificate of final judgment dated June 18, 2025; Exhibit 5 – full birth certificate of the minor, with certified translation and apostille).
It is therefore undisputed that, under the previous legal framework and pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 91 of 1992, he would have acquired Italian citizenship jure sanguinis at birth, since his mother had been declared an Italian citizen by a final judgment.
5.3.On the other hand, it is equally undisputed that, in light of the plain wording of the law, the legislation applicable to the present case is that enacted after the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, which introduced Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992. Accordingly, in the present case, it is not possible to apply the previous legal framework, as primarily requested by the applicants.
5.4.The afore-mentioned Article 3-bis (Transitional Provisions on the Acquisition of Citizenship by Birth) provides as follows:
1. By way of derogation from Articles 1, 2, 3, 14 and 20 of this Law, Article 5 of Law No. 123 of April 21, 1983, Articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 12 and 19 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912, as well as Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the Civil Code approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, any person born abroad, even prior to the date of entry into force of this Article, and who holds another citizenship, shall be considered as never having acquired Italian citizenship, unless one of the following conditions is met:
a) the individual’s status as an Italian citizen is recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, following an application accompanied by the necessary documentation and submitted to the competent consular office or mayor no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on that same date;
a-bis) the individual’s status as an Italian citizen is recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, following an application accompanied by the necessary documentation and submitted to the competent consular office or mayor on the day indicated by an appointment communicated to the applicant by the competent office no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on March 27, 2025;
b) the individual’s status as an Italian citizen is judicially recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, pursuant to a petition filed no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on that same date;
c) a first- or second-degree ascendant holds, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship;
d) a parent or adoptive parent has been resident in Italy for at least two consecutive years following the acquisition of Italian citizenship and prior to the child’s birth or adoption.
By express decision of the legislator, the provision — being an exception to the general rule — also applies to individuals born abroad prior to its entry into force, as is the case here.
5.5.Given the clarity of the statutory language, the provision cannot be interpreted in any other way, not even in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
5.6.Pursuant to the new legislative framework introduced by Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, it must be held that the minor never acquired Italian citizenship, as he does not fall within any of the exceptional clauses provided by the law, given that: no application was filed, either administratively or judicially, before 11:59 p.m. on March 27, 2025; there is no evidence that the minor’s ascendants resided in Italy for two years prior to the child’s birth; and the minor’s ascendants did not hold exclusively Italian citizenship.
6. On the Non-Manifest Unfoundedness of the Constitutional Question Raised by the Applicants
6.1.The constitutional question does not appear to be manifestly unfounded, at least with respect to the aspects raised by the applicants, as further detailed below.
The Panel considers that there are well-founded grounds to doubt the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, insofar as it retroactively restricts the rules governing the automatic acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis, including for those who had already been born at the time the provision entered into force, and, moreover, retroactively establishes a special regime for the acquisition of citizenship by a minor who is a foreign national or stateless person, through a declaration of intent made by the parent or legal guardian.
Upon closer examination, the provision entails a restriction of the right to the recognition of Italian citizenship, introducing a special rule that derogates from the ordinary criteria governing the recognition of Italian citizenship, including for individuals born prior to its entry into force and who had therefore already acquired Italian citizenship automatically and from birth.
6.2.In this regard, it is useful to recall the recent ruling of the Joint Sections of the Court of Cassation (Judgment No. 25318 of 2022), which retraced the fundamental principles established by Law No. 91 of 1992 for determining the right to Italian citizenship, reaffirming that citizenship is a legal status conferred by law, denoting an individual’s belonging to a State and entailing a set of corresponding rights and duties.
The aforementioned ruling, in particular, states as follows:
[…] the Italian legal system has traditionally maintained a conservative approach, with no substantial changes to the prevailing criterion of acquisition based on jure sanguinis, a principle that has remained virtually unchanged since the Civil Code of 1865 and was subsequently inherited by Law No. 555 of 1912 and, later, by the current Law No. 91 of 1992. Citizenship is fundamentally acquired by birth, as an original entitlement. Until 1992 this was equivalent to saying that an Italian citizen is one who is the child of a citizen father, or, when the father is unknown (or stateless), one who is the child of a citizen mother. Such a framework has, in substance, characterized the national legislation throughout the historical evolution relevant to this matter — namely, Articles 4 and 7 of the Civil Code of 1865 and Article 1 of Law No. 555 of 1912. The framework changed with Law No. 91 of 1992, as a result of a supervening constitutional maturity, but simply in the sense that a citizen by birth nowadays is the child of a citizen father or mother, or anyone born in the territory of the Republic if both parents are unknown or stateless […]. It may be observed that the emphasis placed on blood ties — that is, iure sanguinis — as opposed to other indicators of connection between the individual and the territory (such as iure loci, or as it is more commonly known, iure soli, whether or not subject to additional requirements or conditions), has historically justified — and still partly justifies, under Law No. 91 of 1992 — a significant restriction on the possibility of acquiring citizenship for those who do not have Italian ancestry. At the same time, and due to the inherent contradiction that such an approach would otherwise entail, it has also led to a correspondingly strict limitation on the possibility of establishing cases in which Italian citizens residing abroad may lose their citizenship. It is an absolutely obvious fact, from this last point of view, that the loss of Italian citizenship can depend only on national legislation, according to the provisions found therein pro tempore, and never, on the other hand, on decisions implemented in a foreign legal framework. It is precisely from this rationale that the recognition of dual citizenship phenomena has arisen: these developments that are, moreover, consistent with the evolution of international law. Such cases, in fact, are addressed by the current legal framework (as set forth in the aforementioned Law No. 91 of 1992), which seeks primarily to resolve any resulting conflicts that may arise from dual nationality. t is worth underlying that the significance of these phenomena was acknowledged even at the time, including — as often recalled — in the well-known 1907 judgment of the Court of Cassation sitting in Naples. […] The outcome of such a framework is quite straightforward. Citizenship by birth is acquired as an original entitlement. Citizenship status, once acquired, is permanent and imprescriptible. It is justiciable at any time on the basis of simple proof of the acquisitive fact integrated by birth as an Italian citizen. Hence the proof is in the transmission line. Only extinction by waiver remains unaffected (see already Cass. Sec. U No. 4466-09). It follows that, provided that there is no change in the legislation, where citizenship is claimed by a descendant, he is expected to prove only as follows: that he is indeed a descendant of an Italian citizen. It is responsibility of the other party, who has taken exception to this, to prove the interruptive event of the transmission line. (As stated by the Joint Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation in Judgment No. 25318 of 2022, consistent with Joint Sections Judgment No. 4466 of 2009, which reaffirmed the principles established by the Constitutional Court in Judgments No. 87 of 1975 and No. 30 of 1983.)
6.3.In application of the so-called "living law" therefore, it must be concluded that – at least in the regime prior to Decree-Law No. 36/2025 – foreign-born individuals who could prove their uninterrupted descent from an Italian citizen for this reason were only Italian citizens, as "Italian citizen" would mean an “essential quality of the person, characterized by absoluteness, originality, inalienability, and exemption from any statute of limitations” (Joint Sessions of the Court of Cassation, Order No. 4466/2009).
The fact that such individuals had, or had not, brought legal action for the formal recognition of their citizenship status constituted merely a factual circumstance, irrelevant for the purposes of recognizing that right. It cannot be regarded as a "progressively formed" legal relationship, but rather as a perfect subjective right arising at birth, since the lack of judicial ascertainment of a subjective right does not extinguish its existence (see Joint Sections, Court of Cassation, Judgment No. 29459 of 2019, concerning the distinct issue of the retroactive application of restrictive provisions on humanitarian protection introduced by the 2020 amendment).
6.4.An alternative interpretation, however, would conflict with the interpretative approach adopted by well-established case law, as well as with the declaratory — rather than constitutive — nature, universally recognized to judgments determining citizenship jure sanguinis (unlike cases of citizenship acquired through so-called "naturalization"), which merely ascertain or declare a status already acquired at birth.
6.5.In light of the foregoing, the doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of the challenged provision are evident, since it introduces a form of deprivation of citizenship status already acquired by an individual born abroad to an Italian mother.
Indeed, although in the Explanatory Report accompanying the bill for the conversion into law of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025 the legislature specified that the provision introduced by the new Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 (added by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025) “is placed after Article 3 of the Law, since it does not concern a further case of loss of Italian citizenship in addition to those provided for by Article 13, but rather a preclusion, operating with retroactive effect (ex tunc), to the automatic acquisition of citizenship,” thereby establishing “a case of non-acquisition ex tunc of citizenship and not of loss thereof” (see pp. 24–25), the Panel nevertheless finds it evident that the provision effectively determines the non-acquisition ab origine of a status which, in fact, had already been acquired at birth.
Thus, in practical terms, the provision results in an automatic ex tunc loss of citizenship, or rather in a form of implicit revocation of citizenship, affecting all those who, having been born before the entry into force of the decree in question, had already acquired, by virtue of birth from an Italian citizen, the substantive entitlement to status civitatis, although they had not yet proceeded to the formal recognition of such entitlement through an express declaration of intent.
6.6.That being said, the provision appears to be in conflict with Articles 1, 2, 3, 22, 24, 56, and 58 of the Constitution, as well as with Articles 72, 77, and 117(1) thereof.
7. Grounds of Conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution
7.1.First of all, the provision appears to be manifestly in conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution, which provides that “No one may be deprived, for political reasons, of legal capacity, citizenship, or name.”
7.2.A systematic interpretation of the constitutional provision leads, in fact, to the conclusion that each citizen’s right to the preservation of his or her status civitatis cannot be sacrificed for reasons connected to the public interests of the community.
In this regard, the Panel observes that Article 22 of the Constitution cannot be interpreted solely as prohibiting the deprivation of citizenship as a means of repressing dissent, but must also be understood as encompassing any reason linked to “political” interests in a broad sense — that is, both those of the political forces in power at a given historical moment and those regarded as representing the interests of the national community as a whole.
Otherwise, the provision would be deprived of its meaning, being reduced to a mere repetition of other constitutional principles, since the prohibition against depriving a person of citizenship on account of his or her beliefs could already be inferred from the principles of democracy, equality, and non-discrimination.
Moreover, the very placement of the provision among the guarantees of civil rights, rather than among those relating to the "founding elements" of the State, underscores the link between citizenship and the protection of constitutional freedoms, suggesting that these essential aspects of personal identity cannot be sacrificed solely on the grounds of public interests deemed to be overriding.
7.3.In violation of this constitutional principle, the provision under examination deprives of Italian citizenship those citizens jure sanguinis who were born before the entry into force of the decree in question, on the grounds of alleged overriding public interests — namely, in this case, the regulation of the flow of applications for the recognition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis submitted by descendants of Italian citizens who emigrated abroad.
7.4.Accordingly, while the acquisition of a particular citizenship cannot, in itself, be regarded as a right — given the broad discretion of the Legislature in determining who forms part of its citizenry and under what conditions citizenship may be granted — such discretion cannot extend to situations in which citizenship status has already been acquired. In that case, citizenship constitutes a fundamental right of the individual and an essential personal attribute, absolute, original, inalienable, and imprescriptible, and therefore enforceable at any time (See, to this effect, Court of Cassation, Joint Sections, Judgment No. 4466 of 2006; and, more recently, Joint Sections, Judgments Nos. 25317 and 25318 of 2022).
8. Grounds of Conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution
8.1.From this standpoint, the provision referred to the Court also appears to violate Article 3 of the Constitution, in two distinct aspects.
8.2.First of all, Article 3 of the Constitution embodies a principle of consistency, as an expression of legal certainty, and establishes the principle of legitimate expectation in the law, which operates as a limit on the legislature’s power to alter ongoing legal relationships.
8.3.It must first be noted that, under our legal system, although the principle of non-retroactivity of the law applies pursuant to Article 11 of the Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code, a retroactive civil law cannot be deemed per se unlawful, provided that the specific limits identified by statute and by the case-law of the Constitutional Court are observed.
On this point, constitutional case law has consistently recognized that the principle of legitimate expectation — which enjoys constitutional protection under Article 3 of the Constitution — does not preclude the Legislature from adopting provisions that unfavorably amend the regulation of legal relationships, “even when such relationships concern vested subjective rights.” However, this may occur only on the condition “that such provisions do not degenerate into irrational regulation, thereby frustrating, with regard to substantive situations based on prior legislation, citizens’ legitimate expectation of legal certainty, to be understood as a fundamental element of the rule of law.” (See, among many others, Constitutional Court Judgments No. 54 of 2019; Nos. 216 and 56 of 2015; Nos. 219 and 154 of 2014; Nos. 310 and 83 of 2013; Nos. 166 of 2012 and 302 of 2010; and Order No. 31 of 2011.)
The retroactive effect of legislation is therefore limited by the “principle of citizens’ legitimate expectation in the certainty of the legal system,” the violation of which results in unreasonableness and consequently entails the unconstitutionality of the retroactive provision (see Constitutional Court Judgment No. 69 of 2014, referring to Judgments Nos. 170 and 103 of 2013, Nos. 271 and 71 of 2011, and Nos. 236 and 206 of 2009, among others).
8.4.In the Panel’s view, the decision to act retroactively on the recognition of status civitatis, in light of the foregoing, has violated the legitimate expectation — supported by well-established case law — of those who, having been born before the entry into force of the legislation at issue, had already acquired Italian citizenship at birth, even though they had not (yet) requested its formal recognition.
As of March 27, 2025, these individuals were already to be regarded as Italian citizens for all purposes, since, although they had not exercised the rights deriving from their status, they nonetheless possessed the substantive entitlement thereto and relied on the possibility of obtaining its formal recognition.
This legitimate expectation was frustrated when the Legislature retroactively amended the regime set forth in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of Law No. 91 of 1992.
8.5.Secondly, the contested provision appears to violate the principle of substantive equality, which is likewise afforded constitutional protection under Article 3 of the Constitution.
In fact, Article 3-bis, paragraph 1, letters (a), (a-bis), and (b) of Law No. 91 of 1992 treats differently individuals who are in the same factual circumstances — namely, foreign nationals born to parents (or ascendants) who were Italian citizens prior to the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 34 of 2025 — by subjecting the recognition of citizenship to arbitrary conditions beyond the individual’s control, including, in particular, the date of submission of the documentation for obtaining citizenship to the competent consular office or mayor, or the date of filing a judicial petition for the determination of citizenship jure sanguinis.
8.6.It cannot be overlooked that, regardless of the will of the parties concerned, the practical possibility of submitting to the consular offices, to the mayor, or to the judicial authority the documentation suitable to prove the transmission of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis is uncertain in terms of timing, as it also depends on bureaucratic and procedural factors, preliminary to the filing of the application, which are entirely beyond the citizen’s control.
From this perspective, the difference in treatment between those who filed a judicial application or an application with the competent consular offices or the mayor before March 28, 2025, and those who did so thereafter, appears entirely arbitrary.
9. Grounds of Conflict with Article 2 of the Constitution
9.1.The Panel considers that the provision at issue, in its retroactive application to individuals born before its entry into force, also raises issues of violation of Article 2 of the Constitution, as it arbitrarily and unreasonably affects an inviolable human right.
9.2.As previously noted, the right to citizenship jure sanguinis, based on descent from an Italian citizen, does not arise from a concession by the State, but already exists in the individual, being an original, natural, and imprescriptible right.
Conversely, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 treats this right — even for those who had already acquired it by virtue of being born before the entry into force of the current legislation — as a benefit to be obtained upon application within a fixed deadline, thereby transforming a recognized right into a privilege to be claimed.
10. Grounds of Conflict with Article 24 of the Constitution
10.1. At the same time, the contested provisions violate Article 24 of the Constitution, insofar as they unreasonably hinder and restrict — including from a temporal standpoint — the access to judicial protection of the subjective right to citizenship for individuals who had already acquired Italian citizenship ab origine.
Indeed, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 fails to introduce any rules of intertemporal law, omitting to establish a reasonable period following the entry into force of the provision during which those concerned could act before the competent administrative or judicial authorities in order to obtain recognition of the citizenship already acquired jure sanguinis.
11. Grounds of Conflict with Articles 1 paragraph 2, 57 and 58 of the Constitution
12. Furthermore, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 — introduced by Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of 2025 — by retroactively excluding or limiting the recognition of Italian citizenship for foreign nationals who had already acquired it jure sanguinis, also conflicts with Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of popular sovereignty, as well as with Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution, which establish the right to vote reserved to citizens.
Indeed, Italian citizenship constitutes the indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of both active and passive political rights, in particular the right to vote for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic (Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution), as well as for referendums pursuant to Article 75 of the Constitution.
13. Grounds of Conflict with Articles 72 and 77 of the Constitution
13.1. Lastly, further doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of the contested provisions arise from the use of the emergency decree procedure (decretazione d’urgenza) for the enactment of the legislation at issue.
13.2. The Panel considers that the matter of citizenship is subject to a formal legislative reservation, or more precisely — from a procedural standpoint — to a reservation of parliamentary assembly, pursuant to Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution. Accordingly, it may be regulated only by an ordinary statute adopted by Parliament and not by other acts having the force of law, such as decree-laws.
13.3. Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution identifies specific matters whose legislative regulation must necessarily follow “the ordinary procedure of examination and direct approval by the chamber.”
The purpose of the parliamentary reservation of law is to ensure that certain bills of major political or institutional importance are debated in a forum that, by its very nature, guarantees public proceedings and the full representation of all political groups — safeguards that cannot be ensured elsewhere.
Therefore, if the connection between formal legislative reservation and parliamentary reservation were to be denied, the requirement of direct examination and approval by the assembly would lose its meaning, since it could be easily circumvented by simply altering the type of legislative act, thereby eluding even direct parliamentary involvement.
13.4. On this premise, it must be noted that the matters covered by the parliamentary reservation under Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution include “constitutional matters” and “electoral matters.”
Both categories are interpreted broadly: the former encompasses all bills of particular relevance concerning the institutional framework, while the latter covers every aspect of the regulation of the electoral function, including the conditions governing the attribution of active and passive electoral capacity.
13.5. On this basis, it may therefore be held that the subject matter concerning status civitatis falls within the scope of the parliamentary reservation (and, consequently, also within that of the formal legislative reservation), since it pertains to a field that can be subsumed both under constitutional matters and, in a broader sense, under electoral matters.
Indeed, the determination of who constitutes the people of a State directly affects a fundamental element of the State itself and the structure of political representation.
It is therefore evident that the legislation at issue, which concerns a matter defining the democratic form of the State, directly impacts the composition of the electorate and the nature of political representation, given that citizenship determines membership and participation in the political and social life of the community.
Italian citizenship, as previously noted, does not merely constitute an individual legal status, but rather represents the indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of active and passive political rights, in particular, the right to vote for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic (Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution), as well as for referendums pursuant to Article 75 of the Constitution.
Consequently, any legislative measure that modifies the conditions for acquiring citizenship jure sanguinis by retroactively restricting its criteria or excluding individuals previously entitled thereto, entails an implicit alteration of the electorate — that is, of the subjective base on which democratic sovereignty rests — and therefore requires recourse to the “ordinary” legislative procedure under Article 72 of the Constitution.
13.6. In any event, even assuming that the matter were to be considered outside the scope of those subject to a parliamentary reservation of law, it appears difficult to acknowledge, in the present case, the existence of the extraordinary necessity and urgency required by Article 77 of the Constitution that would allow the Government to act by means of a decree-law.
13.7. In this respect, the Panel observes that, according to the preamble of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, the Government’s stated objective was to contain “the continuous and exponential increase in the number of potential Italian citizens residing outside the national territory who, also due to their possession of one or more citizenships other than Italian, are primarily bound to other States by strong ties of culture, identity, and allegiance,” since “the absence of effective bonds with the Republic on the part of a growing number of citizens — a number that could equal or even exceed the resident population — constitutes a serious and current risk to national security and, by virtue of Italy’s membership in the European Union, also to the other Member States and to the Schengen Area.”
The Government therefore considered that extraordinary necessity and urgency existed “to avoid, pending the approval of an organic reform of citizenship law, an exceptional and uncontrolled influx of applications for the recognition of citizenship, such as to prevent the proper functioning of consular offices abroad, municipalities, and judicial offices.”
13.8. However, the issue of the excessive workload of courts and consular offices arising from applications for the recognition of citizenship by Italians residing abroad — even by those lacking genuine ties with the Italian Republic — is well known and long-standing.
This circumstance gives rise to serious doubts as to the existence of the actual conditions that could justify the use of the emergency decree procedure. While the need for a comprehensive and coherent legislative reform in this field cannot be denied — a need also emphasized by the Constitutional Court itself (see Judgment No. 142 of 2025, reasoning) — such a reform must necessarily involve both chambers of Parliament, given the scope and impact of the matter.
The Panel thus concludes that no real circumstances of extraordinariness, unpredictability, or urgency exist that could justify legislative intervention through a decree-law — particularly one introducing retroactive and more restrictive provisions affecting individuals who had already acquired Italian citizenship jure sanguinis by birth.
14. Grounds of Conflict with Article 117, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution
15. In light of all the foregoing, the provisions at issue are also in conflict with Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, in relation to Italy’s international obligations and to the observance of the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
16. Conclusions
16.1. For all the reasons set forth above, the ordinary legislation introduced by Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of 2025 — which inserted Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992 — appears constitutionally illegitimate insofar as it retroactively applies the restrictive effects on citizenship status to a time preceding the entry into force of the law itself. Specifically, by making the right to the recognition of Italian citizenship “by birth” conditional — under letters (a), (a-bis), and (b) of the aforementioned Article 3-bis — upon new requirements introduced ex novo, the legislation limits the exercise of a right previously recognized and constitutionally protected.
The legislative choice introduced by Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 must therefore be regarded, as extensively demonstrated, as amounting to a retroactive revocation of an acquired right, depriving individuals who must be deemed Italian citizens by birth of such status, without even providing for a reasonable period — running from the entry into force of the provision — within which an application for recognition of Italian citizenship could be submitted, upon the expiration of which the loss of citizenship status would be triggered.
16.2. Moreover, as already observed in Order No. 167 of 2025 of the Court of Turin (published in the Official Gazette No. 38 of September 17, 2025), in which the same provisions were challenged with reference to partially identical constitutional parameters, a declaration of partial unconstitutionality of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, on the grounds set forth above, would make it possible to preserve the useful effect of the legislative reform — namely, the implementation of the international principle of “genuine link,” recently reaffirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Judgment of April 29, 2025, Case C-181/23) — while at the same time eliminating the prejudicial consequences arising from the retroactive application (to all persons already born) of the new provisions.
By removing from Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 the passages expressly providing for retroactive application, a constitutionally consistent interpretation of the new citizenship provisions would remain possible — namely, the interpretation limiting the applicability of the said article solely to persons born after the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025. For all others, the general rule laid down in Article 11 of the Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code (preleggi) would continue to apply, according to which “the law has effect only for the future.”
FOR THESE REASONS
The Court of Mantua, sitting as a Panel, having regard to Article 134 of the Constitution, Article 1 of Constitutional Law No. 1 of February 9, 1948, and Article 23 of Law No. 87 of March 1, 1953, having found the relevance and non-manifest unfoundedness of the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New provisions on citizenship), introduced by Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis, and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent provisions on Italian citizenship), converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025, insofar as it provides that the provision shall apply “any person born abroad, even prior to the date of entry into force of this Article” and under the conditions laid down in letters (a), (a-bis), and (b), in reference to Articles 1, 2, 3, 22, 24, 56, 58, 72, 77, and 117 of the Constitution, the latter with reference to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
orders the suspension of the current proceedings;
orders the immediate transmission of the case file to the Constitutional Court;
orders that, under the responsibility of the Clerk’s Office, this order be served on the parties to the case and on the Prime Minister, and be communicated to the Presidents of both Houses of Parliament.
Thus decided in the Chamber of Council of the Civil Section of the Court of Mantua, on October 23, 2025.