http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/ Coco Ruggeri & Associates - Blog RSS Feed 2.0 en-us Fri, 24 Apr 2026 11:54:20 GMT Fri, 24 Apr 2026 11:54:20 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23377/Last-news--Minor-issue- blog Yesterday, the United Section of the Supreme Court held a highly anticipated hearing addressing key issues in Italian citizenship by descent.  The discussion focused on the potential retroactive application of recent restrictions, limits on the transmission of citizenship across generations, and the relationship between citizenship and an individual's effective connection to the State. The concerns already identified in the previous hearing were, in fact, confirmed once again yesterday. What clearly emerged was a significant expansion of the scope of review, also as a result of arguments raised by certain practitioners, which broadened the field of inquiry beyond the specific legal questions at hand. While this highlights the importance of the issues involved, it also raises concerns. When the scope of analysis becomes too broad, there is a real risk of narrowing the interpretive space that has, over time, allowed for the effective protection of individual rights. In citizenship law, balance is essential. Rights are not granted all at once, nor established through abstract principles alone. They are built progressively,through judicial decisions, consistent interpretation, and case-by-case development. The hope is that the breadth of the issues considered will not lead to an overly rigid system, but instead preserve a proper balance between general principles and the concrete protection of rights. We will continue to monitor developments closely and keep our clients and all interested parties fully updated. Wed, 15 Apr 2026 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23377/Last-news--Minor-issue- http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23373/Italian-Citizenship-Litigation--Constitutional-Challenge-to-Decree-Law-No--26-2025-and-Conversion-Law-No--74-2025 blog In the course of my professional activity in the field of Italian citizenship by descent, I have prepared a legal brief that includes a detailed and structured constitutional challenge to Decree-Law No. 26/2025 and its conversion into Law No. 74/2025. This challenge addresses critical issues concerning the protection of fundamental civil rights, which, under the current legislative framework, appear to be significantly restricted, particularly with respect to individuals seeking recognition of Italian citizenship through judicial proceedings. I firmly believe that the role of an attorney, especially when confronting matters of constitutional relevance and systemic impact, should not be confined to the defense of individual cases, but should extend to the broader promotion of justice and the circulation of effective legal strategies. For this reason, I have decided to make this legal brief freely available to anyone who may have an interest in it, attorneys, scholars, legal practitioners, and affected individuals, expressly authorizing its use, in whole or in part. The purpose of this initiative is to: facilitate access to a well-founded constitutional argument against Decree-Law No. 26/2025 and Law No. 74/2025; support and strengthen similar legal actions in Italian courts; contribute to a broader and more effective protection of the rights of individuals seeking recognition of Italian citizenship. Anyone is therefore free to use, adapt, and further develop the contents of this brief according to their own legal strategy, with the sole aim of advancing the protection of civil rights and ensuring proper constitutional scrutiny of the current legislative framework. Click here to download the full legal brief This decision reflects a clear conviction: when fundamental rights are at stake, legal knowledge should not remain confined, but should be shared as a tool of collective protection and legal progress. I remain available for any further discussion or professional exchange on this matter. Avvocato Adriana Maria Ruggeri   Legal Disclaimer This material is provided for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, nor does it create an attorney-client relationship between the author and any reader or user.The shared legal brief reflects a specific legal strategy developed in relation to particular factual and legal circumstances. Its applicability may vary significantly depending on the individual case, jurisdiction, procedural posture, and subsequent legislative or jurisprudential developments.While permission is granted to use, reproduce, and adapt the content, in whole or in part, any such use is undertaken at the sole responsibility of the user. No representations or warranties, express or implied, are made as to the completeness, accuracy, or current validity of the material.Users are strongly encouraged to conduct their own independent legal analysis and to seek qualified legal counsel before relying on or implementing any portion of this document.To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, the author disclaims any and all liability for actions taken or not taken based on the contents of this material.   Sat, 21 Mar 2026 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23373/Italian-Citizenship-Litigation--Constitutional-Challenge-to-Decree-Law-No--26-2025-and-Conversion-Law-No--74-2025 http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23372/Update-Constitutional-Court-Regarding-Decree-Law-No--36-2025----Turin-Court-question-- blog A press release issued on March 12, 2026 by the Italian Constitutional Court has generated significant discussion and also some confusion, largely due to the fact that the Court's full reasoning has not yet been published. At this stage we know the outcome summarized in the press release, but not yet the legal reasoning behind the decision. The Court examined only the specific constitutional questions raised by the Tribunal of Turin and addressed them within the limits in which they were formulated by that court. In particular, the Turin court asked the Constitutional Court to examine only part of the new provisions introduced by Law 74/2025, specifically their application to individuals who were already born as of March 28, 2025, with reference to Article 1, letters a), a-bis) and b). According to the judges of Turin, those provisions could potentially violate the following principles: Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, which protects equality before the law, the principle of legitimate expectations and the protection of vested rights, and prohibits arbitrary distinctions between individuals. The Court declared this objection unfounded. Article 117, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, in relation to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Turin court argued that the new law could violate the principle of proportionality developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, because it does not allow an individual examination of the consequences of losing citizenship and does not provide any prior notice allowing individuals to preserve it. The Constitutional Court declared this objection unfounded. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality. This question was declared inadmissible. Article 3 of the Fourth Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits preventing a citizen from entering the territory of his or her own country. This question was also declared inadmissible. At this stage it is necessary to wait for the publication of the full judgment in order to understand the precise legal grounds upon which the Court based its decision. Most importantly, three additional constitutional challenges concerning the same legislation are already pending before the Constitutional Court. These questions were referred by the Tribunals of Mantova and Campobasso. The first hearing is scheduled for June, while the dates of the other two hearings have not yet been set. Mantova – hearing scheduled for June 9, 2026. The Tribunal of Mantova has referred a constitutional question asking the Court to declare that the entire Article 3-bis of Law 91/1992 should not apply retroactively to individuals who were already born as of March 28, 2025. The case concerns a minor child whose mother was recognized as an Italian citizen by a final court judgment in June 2025. The municipality refused to recognize citizenship for the child on the basis of the new legislation. The Mantova court raises broader constitutional concerns regarding violations of: Article 2 of the Constitution, which protects the inviolable rights of the person; Article 3, which guarantees equality before the law, legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations; Article 22, which prohibits deprivation of citizenship for political reasons; Articles 72 and 77 of the Constitution, which regulate the use of emergency decree-laws; Article 117, in relation to international human rights obligations. Campobasso – two additional constitutional referrals. Two separate cases from the Tribunal of Campobasso (Judge Carissimi and Judge Casillo) are also pending before the Constitutional Court. The hearing has not been released. The Judge Casillo has referred a constitutional question asking the Court to declare that Article 3-bis letters a, a bis e b of Law 91/1992 should not apply retroactively to individuals who were already born as of March 28, 2025. The alleged constitutional violations raised in those cases are: Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, concerning equality, proportionality and the protection of legitimate expectations; Article 22, concerning the prohibition of deprivation of citizenship for political reasons; Articles 72 and 77, concerning the abuse of emergency decree legislation; Article 117, in relation to obligations arising from European Union law and international human rights law. Another issue that may remain open concerns the so-called "1948 cases", namely citizenship claims through the maternal line prior to 1948. None of the constitutional questions examined so far appears to address this issue directly. In my opinion, applying the new law to those cases could potentially raise new constitutional questions related to gender discrimination, given the long-standing jurisprudence recognizing that women were historically prevented from transmitting Italian citizenship due to unconstitutional gender-based rules. For applicants, this means that the situation is still evolving. The Constitutional Court has examined one set of constitutional arguments, but several others remain under consideration. Eligibility must therefore continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and the legal landscape may continue to evolve as further constitutional decisions are issued. The upcoming hearings before the Constitutional Court in the Mantova and Campobasso cases will be important in determining the future development of Italian citizenship by descent. In the coming days we will also make available our pro-forma constitutional challenge, including additional legal arguments, for those who may wish to use it as a reference in their own proceedings. For the moment, one point is clear: the constitutional debate is still open. The challenge has just begun. Thu, 12 Mar 2026 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23372/Update-Constitutional-Court-Regarding-Decree-Law-No--36-2025----Turin-Court-question-- http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23367/Minor-issue-news blog One of the most recently debated obstacles in Italian citizenship by descent cases is the so-called "minor issue." This issue arises when an Italian ancestor naturalized as a foreign citizen while his child was still a minor. Over the past two years, certain Italian Consulates and lower Italian Courts have interpreted this circumstance as interrupting the transmission of Italian citizenship, arguing that the minor automatically followed the father's new nationality. This restrictive interpretation developed following two rulings of the Italian Court of Cassation, which significantly influenced administrative practice. This interpretation is now being increasingly challenged before the Italian judiciary, and the matter has reached the Court of Cassation sitting in Joint Sections (Sezioni Unite), which is expected to provide authoritative guidance and clarify the legal framework. Our firm is currently handling litigation on this issue, and a new hearing has been scheduled for April 14, 2026 before the Court of Cassation, Joint Sections, confirming that the legal debate remains active and evolving. Unfortunately, the Court has also been asked to address additional questions, including the applicability of the new legislative framework. This has led to a further postponement, and it is our hope that these collateral issues will not divert attention from the central legal question at stake. Given the complexity and ongoing jurisprudential developments, each case must be carefully evaluated to determine the most strategic legal path forward. We sincerely hope that all applicants may ultimately find their path toward recognition. Wed, 11 Feb 2026 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23367/Minor-issue-news http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23365/March-22-23--2026--Referendum-in-Italy- blog What Is the Referendum About? In March 22–23, 2026, italian citizens are called to confirm or reject a significant  reform of the Constitution. This is a confirmative referendum, meaning no quorum is required: the outcome is valid regardless of how many people vote. A majority of "Yes" votes will confirm the reform; a majority of "No" votes will maintain the current constitutional setup. How to Vote from the U.S. and Other American Countries: Guidance for AIRE Citizens Italian citizens living abroad and registered with AIRE (Anagrafe degli Italiani Residenti all'Estero) can vote by mail for the March 2026 referendum. In fact, you will automatically receive a ballot package by mail from your Consulate of jurisdiction.  Italian citizens who are ordinarily resident in Italy, but are temporarily abroad for at least three months (for work, study, or medical reasons), including cohabiting family members, may also vote by mail if they submit a formal request by Wednesday, February 18, 2026. The Justice Reform: What Are Italians Voting On? At the heart of the referendum is a sweeping restructuring of how judges (giudici) and public prosecutors (pubblici ministeri) are governed within the Italian judiciary. Now, how Italy Selects Judges and how they are governed National public exam organized by the Ministry of Justice. Applicants must have a law degree and advanced legal training. Candidates face rigorous written and oral exams. Selected candidates become judicial trainees before assignment. The Italian Constitution entrusts the High Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, C.S.M.) is a organ of judicial self-governance, safeguarding the autonomy and independence of the judiciary. It is a single body, composed of: Two-thirds judges and public prosecutors (members of the judiciary) elected by their peers (i.e., judges and prosecutors). Judicial members are generally elected from among members of various associative groups, known as "correnti" (currents), which reflect different interpretations of judicial independence and autonomy.  One-third lawyers and university professors in legal disciplines, elected by Parliament in joint session  by qualified majority vote, ensuring a balance between majority and minority political forces. This system ensures professional competence and aims to preserve impartiality and judicial independence by avoiding political interference. The Council is vested with three key powers related to the Judicial function: Normative (regulatory) Administrative and Disciplinary (first instance). A "Yes" Vote Means: Creation of two distinct High Councils to be selected by lottery instead of vote between judges or in the Parliament. One for judges. One for prosecutors. Introduction of a third Council, the Constitutional Disciplinary Court to manage all disciplinary proceedings. Currently, the disciplinary section of the High Council of the Judiciary (C.S.M.) includes one public prosecutor and two lay members, who together represent 50% of its composition. These members do not take part in decisions on appeals, which are presently adjudicated by the United Sections (Sezioni Unite) of the Court of Cassation, the highest judicial authority in Italy. Under the proposed reform, disciplinary proceedings involving judges would fall under the jurisdiction of a special court composed of only 15 members. This body would consist of nearly two-thirds public prosecutors, lawyers, and university professors (so-called lay members), and one-third judges of the Court of Cassation. The public prosecutors and lay members would thus represent 60% of the disciplinary court, and, notably, they would also participate in the decision-making process during appeals, which would take place before the same High Disciplinary Court. If the current system remains unchanged, as is likely, the disciplinary prosecution will continue to be exercised by the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation, i.e., the highest-ranking figure within the public prosecution service, and therefore an authority external to the judiciary. The public prosecutor (PM) will be a constitutionally distinct magistrate from the judge. The prosecutor will be subject to a different High Council of the Judiciary and to a different set of laws governing the judicial system than those applicable to judges. As a result, the prosecutor will no longer be "subject only to the law", as judges are, but may instead become subject to rules imposed by the executive branch. Abolishment of elections within the High Councils; members  Structural separation of prosecutorial and judicial governance A "No" Vote Means: Preservation of the single, unified High Council of the Judiciary (C.S.M.). Continued elected representation of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and professors. Maintenance of the current disciplinary process under the C.S.M. with contained influence of the executive branch. Thu, 15 Jan 2026 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23365/March-22-23--2026--Referendum-in-Italy- http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23357/Dr--Francesco-Coco-Scholarship blog Coco Ruggeri Law Associated is proud to support the Dr. Francesco Coco Scholarship, a legal award aimed at recognizing outstanding academic work in criminal law and criminal procedure. This initiative, promoted in collaboration with ELSA Cagliari, honors the memory of Dr. Francesco Coco, an Italian magistrate known for his integrity, professionalism, and courage in the fight for justice. What Is the Dr. Francesco Coco Scholarship? The Dr. Francesco Coco Scholarship is a prestigious award for recent law graduates from universities in Sardinia, Italy, who have completed a thesis in criminal law or criminal procedure. The scholarship is open to students who graduated during the academic years 2022/2023, 2023/2024, and 2024/2025. By rewarding excellence in legal research, the scholarship supports young lawyers as they begin their careers in criminal defense, prosecution, or judicial preparation.  Who Was Dr. Francesco Coco? Dr. Francesco Coco was a highly respected Prosecutor General in Genoa who made history by standing firm against terrorism during the politically turbulent 1970s in Italy. He refused to negotiate with the Red Brigades during the kidnapping of Judge Mario Sossi and was tragically assassinated in 1976. His death marked the first political killing of a magistrate in Italy by domestic terrorism. You may read more on our webiste. This scholarship pays tribute to his legacy by promoting legal integrity, ethical values, and civic responsibility among young jurists. Eligibility Requirements To apply for the Dr. Francesco Coco Legal Scholarship, candidates must: Have graduated from a university in Sardinia; Have completed a thesis focused on criminal law or criminal procedure; Belong to one of the following academic years: 2022/23, 2023/24, or 2024/25. How to Apply Applications are submitted through ELSA Cagliari, a branch of The European Law Students' Association. The official application form and full eligibility criteria are available on their website.  The application period remains open for 30 days from the publication of the call. Submissions are evaluated based on academic merit and the relevance of the research topic. For more information, candidates can contact:  academicactivities.cagliari@it.elsa.org Why Coco Ruggeri Law Supports This Criminal Law Scholarship As a law firm deeply engaged in matters of criminal law, judicial advocacy, and legal education, Coco Ruggeri Law Associated believes in fostering the talents of future legal professionals. Supporting the Dr. Francesco Coco Scholarship is part of our broader mission to invest in legal excellence, social justice, and the rule of law in Italy and abroad. We encourage all eligible students and recent graduates to apply for this important opportunity and continue the legacy of legal professionals who made a lasting impact on the justice system. Thu, 11 Dec 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23357/Dr--Francesco-Coco-Scholarship http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23355/Property-Tax--IMU--Exemption-for-Italians-Abroad blog The Italian Chamber of Deputies has just passed an important new law offering significant property tax relief for Italians residing abroad and registered with AIRE (Anagrafe degli Italiani Residenti all'Estero). Known as the "Ricciardi Law," named after the bill's sponsor, MP Toni Ricciardi (PD – elected abroad), the law introduces a tiered exemption system for IMU (municipal property tax) and reductions in waste collection fees (TARI) for properties located in Italian municipalities with fewer than 5,000 residents. The measure passed unanimously in the Chamber and will now move to the Senate for final approval.  Who qualifies and how much is the exemption? The tax benefits are based on the official cadastral value (rendita catastale) of the property and include: ✅ 100% IMU exemption for properties with a cadastral value up to €200; ✅ 60% IMU reduction for properties valued between €201 and €300; ✅ 33% IMU reduction for properties with a value between €301 and €500. In addition, TARI (waste collection tax) will be reduced by 50%, with the option for municipalities to maintain a two-thirds reduction where already in effect. Supporting Italians who maintain ties with their hometowns "We introduced a transparent and fair system of tax relief based on the cadastral value of properties, providing meaningful reductions for owners of small and mid-sized homes, particularly in the smaller towns and villages where many of our citizens abroad maintain family homes or inherited properties." What happens next? The bill is now pending before the Senate, and if approved, will become law. The measure is expected to impact approximately 100,000 properties owned by AIRE-registered Italians — a significant win for the diaspora community and a long-awaited recognition of the ties that many continue to nurture with Italy despite living abroad. At Coco Ruggeri Law Associated, we closely monitor legislation that affects Italian citizens abroad, especially laws impacting property ownership and related taxation. Fri, 05 Dec 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23355/Property-Tax--IMU--Exemption-for-Italians-Abroad http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23341/A-SECOND-GLIMPSE-OF-CONSTITUTIONAL-SCRUTINY-ON-DECREE---LAW-36-2025 blog On October 23, 2025, the Ordinary Court of Mantua referred to the Constitutional Court a new challenge against the latest amendments to Italian citizenship law, specifically Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, introduced by Decree-Law No. 36/2025 and later converted into Law No. 74/2025. The case stems from a denied request to record the birth certificate of a child born abroad to an Italian mother. Under the previous legal framework, the child would have automatically acquired Italian citizenship at birth. However, the new law introduces retroactive restrictions, requiring formal applications to be submitted by a fixed deadline—even for individuals born before the law came into effect. The Court raised serious concerns about the constitutional legitimacy of these retroactive limitations, which effectively strip citizenship rights from individuals who had already acquired them by birth. The panel of judges emphasized that the legislation may violate multiple constitutional principles, including the protection of acquired rights, equal treatment, and access to justice. The matter is now pending before the Constitutional Court, which will evaluate whether the new rules unjustly deprive thousands of descendants of Italian citizens—many of whom reside abroad—of their status as Italian nationals. Key Takeaways from the Judges' Reasoning:  Citizenship acquired at birth cannot be undone retroactively — the law cannot cancel the status of individuals who already met all legal conditions at the time of their birth. Citizenship is a right, not a privilege — it is imprescriptible and cannot depend on filing an application within a deadline arbitrarily imposed after the fact. The law creates unfair and arbitrary distinctions — people in identical situations are treated differently based solely on bureaucratic timing or procedural delays beyond their control.                           ORDINARY COURT of MANTUA (TRIBUNALE ORDINARIO)                                                                                                    Civil Division This Court, sitting as a panel composed of the following judges:                                                                                     Presiding Judge                                                                                     Judge                                                                                     Reporting Judge in the proceedings pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000 (Case No.            /2025, General Docket), initiated by                                                                                                                          , in their capacity as legal guardians of the minor, represented jointly and severally by Professor and Attorney                    and Attorney               against THE ACTING MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANNETO SULL'OGLIO (Tax Code 81001310200), in their capacity as Civil Registrar, and the MUNICIPALITY OF CANNETO SULL'OGLIO (Tax Code 81001310200, VAT number 00603980202), represented by its acting Mayor; has issued the following ORDER pursuant to Art. 1 of Law No. 1 of February 9, 1948 and Art. 23 of Law No. 87 of March 1, 1953 1.     The applicants filed an appeal pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000 against the decision of the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Canneto sull'Oglio rejecting their request to record the birth certificate of their minor son,                                    , born in Brazil to a mother who is an Italian citizen jure sanguinis, born and residing abroad, as recognized by Judgment No.              /2024, issued on April 11, 2025, by the Ordinary Court of Brescia and now final, as certified by the Court on June 18, 2025. In particular, the applicants claimed that the minor was automatically granted Italian citizenship by operation of law (ope legis) pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 91 of 1992, since the constitutive element of citizenship status is the mere fact of being born to an Italian parent. Consequently, from the standpoint of substantive law, any formal, administrative, or judicial procedure is irrelevant. According to the applicants' argument, the transcription of the birth certificate is likewise irrelevant, as it is merely declaratory in nature and not constitutive. The child's right to Italian citizenship exists from birth (ab origine), by virtue of a complete and self-executing legal provision, and therefore does not require any procedure or application, since the law provides for no condition precedent or additional manifestation of intent for its attribution. The applicants therefore challenged the lawfulness of the refusal issued by the Civil Registrar, arguing that Law No. 74 of 2025, relied upon by the Registrar in denying the transcription of the minor's birth certificate, is not applicable ratione temporis to the present case. Moreover, that Law does not establish any ground for the automatic loss of citizenship — a necessary prerequisite for the application of any provision limiting citizenship status — since citizenship, once acquired as an original right, remains vested in the individual and cannot be automatically or retroactively revoked or denied. Alternatively, they requested that a question of constitutional legitimacy be raised concerning Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis, and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025 (converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, which introduced Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992), for violation of Articles 1(2), 2, 3, 22, 24, 29, 56, 58, 72, 77, and 117(1) of the Constitution. 2.     The Public Prosecutor expressed an opinion against granting the appeal, considering the refusal to record the birth certificate to be lawful under the legislation currently in force. 3.     The Acting Mayor of the Municipality of Canneto sull'Oglio submitted written observations, providing a reconstruction of the facts and of the applicable legal framework, and argued that the refusal to record the minor's birth certificate was issued following the determination that the child did not meet all the requirements set forth in Article 1, paragraph 1(a), in conjunction with Article 3-bis, paragraph 1(c) and (d), of Law No. 91 of 1992, for the acquisition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis. *** 4.    On the jurisdiction of the Court of Mantua 4.1. As a preliminary matter, the Panel notes that the Court of Mantua has jurisdiction over the present dispute, since the proceeding was initiated pursuant to Article 95 of Presidential Decree No. 396 of 2000, which provides that any person wishing to challenge a refusal by the Civil Registrar to perform a registration must file an application with the court having jurisdiction over the district in which the Office of the Civil Registrar holding, or requested to execute, the relevant record is located. 4.2.Since, in this case, the record is to be registered with the Municipality of Canneto sull'Oglio (Province of Mantua), the Court properly has jurisdiction over the matter. 5.    On the Relevance of the Constitutional Question Raised by the Applicants 5.1.On the merits, the constitutional question raised by the applicants must be considered relevant, since, under the legal framework in force prior to the entry into effect of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted into Law No. 74 of 2025, the applicants' claim would have been well-founded. 5.2.On the one hand, it is established that the minor,                          , was born in Brazil and holds Brazilian citizenship. It is also proven, on the basis of the documentation submitted by the applicants, that he descends, through the maternal line, from an Italian citizen (see Exhibit 3 – Judgment No.      /2024 declaring that his mother is an Italian citizen; Exhibit 4 – certificate of final judgment dated June 18, 2025; Exhibit 5 – full birth certificate of the minor, with certified translation and apostille). It is therefore undisputed that, under the previous legal framework and pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 91 of 1992, he would have acquired Italian citizenship jure sanguinis at birth, since his mother had been declared an Italian citizen by a final judgment. 5.3.On the other hand, it is equally undisputed that, in light of the plain wording of the law, the legislation applicable to the present case is that enacted after the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, which introduced Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992. Accordingly, in the present case, it is not possible to apply the previous legal framework, as primarily requested by the applicants. 5.4.The afore-mentioned Article 3-bis (Transitional Provisions on the Acquisition of Citizenship by Birth) provides as follows: 1.      By way of derogation from Articles 1, 2, 3, 14 and 20 of this Law, Article 5 of Law No. 123 of April 21, 1983, Articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 12 and 19 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912, as well as Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the Civil Code approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, any person born abroad, even prior to the date of entry into force of this Article, and who holds another citizenship, shall be considered as never having acquired Italian citizenship, unless one of the following conditions is met: a)     the individual's status as an Italian citizen is recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, following an application accompanied by the necessary documentation and submitted to the competent consular office or mayor no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on that same date; a-bis) the individual's status as an Italian citizen is recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, following an application accompanied by the necessary documentation and submitted to the competent consular office or mayor on the day indicated by an appointment communicated to the applicant by the competent office no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on March 27, 2025; b)     the individual's status as an Italian citizen is judicially recognized, in accordance with the legislation in force as of March 27, 2025, pursuant to a petition filed no later than 11:59 p.m. (Rome time) on that same date; c)     a first- or second-degree ascendant holds, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship; d)     a parent or adoptive parent has been resident in Italy for at least two consecutive years following the acquisition of Italian citizenship and prior to the child's birth or adoption. By express decision of the legislator, the provision — being an exception to the general rule — also applies to individuals born abroad prior to its entry into force, as is the case here. 5.5.Given the clarity of the statutory language, the provision cannot be interpreted in any other way, not even in a manner consistent with the Constitution. 5.6.Pursuant to the new legislative framework introduced by Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, it must be held that the minor never acquired Italian citizenship, as he does not fall within any of the exceptional clauses provided by the law, given that: no application was filed, either administratively or judicially, before 11:59 p.m. on March 27, 2025; there is no evidence that the minor's ascendants resided in Italy for two years prior to the child's birth; and the minor's ascendants did not hold exclusively Italian citizenship. 6.    On the Non-Manifest Unfoundedness of the Constitutional Question Raised by the Applicants 6.1.The constitutional question does not appear to be manifestly unfounded, at least with respect to the aspects raised by the applicants, as further detailed below. The Panel considers that there are well-founded grounds to doubt the constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, introduced by Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted, with amendments, into Law No. 74 of 2025, insofar as it retroactively restricts the rules governing the automatic acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis, including for those who had already been born at the time the provision entered into force, and, moreover, retroactively establishes a special regime for the acquisition of citizenship by a minor who is a foreign national or stateless person, through a declaration of intent made by the parent or legal guardian. Upon closer examination, the provision entails a restriction of the right to the recognition of Italian citizenship, introducing a special rule that derogates from the ordinary criteria governing the recognition of Italian citizenship, including for individuals born prior to its entry into force and who had therefore already acquired Italian citizenship automatically and from birth. 6.2.In this regard, it is useful to recall the recent ruling of the Joint Sections of the Court of Cassation (Judgment No. 25318 of 2022), which retraced the fundamental principles established by Law No. 91 of 1992 for determining the right to Italian citizenship, reaffirming that citizenship is a legal status conferred by law, denoting an individual's belonging to a State and entailing a set of corresponding rights and duties. The aforementioned ruling, in particular, states as follows: [...] the Italian legal system has traditionally maintained a conservative approach, with no substantial changes to the prevailing criterion of acquisition based on jure sanguinis, a principle that has remained virtually unchanged since the Civil Code of 1865 and was subsequently inherited by Law No. 555 of 1912 and, later, by the current Law No. 91 of 1992. Citizenship is fundamentally acquired by birth, as an original entitlement. Until 1992 this was equivalent to saying that an Italian citizen is one who is the child of a citizen father, or, when the father is unknown (or stateless), one who is the child of a citizen mother. Such a framework has, in substance, characterized the national legislation throughout the historical evolution relevant to this matter — namely, Articles 4 and 7 of the Civil Code of 1865 and Article 1 of Law No. 555 of 1912. The framework changed with Law No. 91 of 1992, as a result of a supervening constitutional maturity, but simply in the sense that a citizen by birth nowadays is the child of a citizen father or mother, or anyone born in the territory of the Republic if both parents are unknown or stateless [...]. It may be observed that the emphasis placed on blood ties — that is, iure sanguinis — as opposed to other indicators of connection between the individual and the territory (such as iure loci, or as it is more commonly known, iure soli, whether or not subject to additional requirements or conditions), has historically justified — and still partly justifies, under Law No. 91 of 1992 — a significant restriction on the possibility of acquiring citizenship for those who do not have Italian ancestry. At the same time, and due to the inherent contradiction that such an approach would otherwise entail, it has also led to a correspondingly strict limitation on the possibility of establishing cases in which Italian citizens residing abroad may lose their citizenship. It is an absolutely obvious fact, from this last point of view, that the loss of Italian citizenship can depend only on national legislation, according to the provisions found therein pro tempore, and never, on the other hand, on decisions implemented in a foreign legal framework. It is precisely from this rationale that the recognition of dual citizenship phenomena has arisen: these developments that are, moreover, consistent with the evolution of international law. Such cases, in fact, are addressed by the current legal framework (as set forth in the aforementioned Law No. 91 of 1992), which seeks primarily to resolve any resulting conflicts that may arise from dual nationality. t is worth underlying that the significance of these phenomena was acknowledged even at the time, including — as often recalled — in the well-known 1907 judgment of the Court of Cassation sitting in Naples. [...] The outcome of such a framework is quite straightforward. Citizenship by birth is acquired as an original entitlement. Citizenship status, once acquired, is permanent and imprescriptible. It is justiciable at any time on the basis of simple proof of the acquisitive fact integrated by birth as an Italian citizen. Hence the proof is in the transmission line. Only extinction by waiver remains unaffected (see already Cass. Sec. U No. 4466-09). It follows that, provided that there is no change in the legislation, where citizenship is claimed by a descendant, he is expected to prove only as follows: that he is indeed a descendant of an Italian citizen. It is responsibility of the other party, who has taken exception to this, to prove the interruptive event of the transmission line. (As stated by the Joint Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation in Judgment No. 25318 of 2022, consistent with Joint Sections Judgment No. 4466 of 2009, which reaffirmed the principles established by the Constitutional Court in Judgments No. 87 of 1975 and No. 30 of 1983.) 6.3.In application of the so-called "living law" therefore, it must be concluded that – at least in the regime prior to Decree-Law No. 36/2025 – foreign-born individuals who could prove their uninterrupted descent from an Italian citizen for this reason were only Italian citizens, as "Italian citizen" would mean an "essential quality of the person, characterized by absoluteness, originality, inalienability, and exemption from any statute of limitations" (Joint Sessions of the Court of Cassation, Order No. 4466/2009). The fact that such individuals had, or had not, brought legal action for the formal recognition of their citizenship status constituted merely a factual circumstance, irrelevant for the purposes of recognizing that right. It cannot be regarded as a "progressively formed" legal relationship, but rather as a perfect subjective right arising at birth, since the lack of judicial ascertainment of a subjective right does not extinguish its existence (see Joint Sections, Court of Cassation, Judgment No. 29459 of 2019, concerning the distinct issue of the retroactive application of restrictive provisions on humanitarian protection introduced by the 2020 amendment). 6.4.An alternative interpretation, however, would conflict with the interpretative approach adopted by well-established case law, as well as with the declaratory — rather than constitutive — nature, universally recognized to judgments determining citizenship jure sanguinis (unlike cases of citizenship acquired through so-called "naturalization"), which merely ascertain or declare a status already acquired at birth. 6.5.In light of the foregoing, the doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of the challenged provision are evident, since it introduces a form of deprivation of citizenship status already acquired by an individual born abroad to an Italian mother. Indeed, although in the Explanatory Report accompanying the bill for the conversion into law of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025 the legislature specified that the provision introduced by the new Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 (added by Article 1, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025) "is placed after Article 3 of the Law, since it does not concern a further case of loss of Italian citizenship in addition to those provided for by Article 13, but rather a preclusion, operating with retroactive effect (ex tunc), to the automatic acquisition of citizenship," thereby establishing "a case of non-acquisition ex tunc of citizenship and not of loss thereof" (see pp. 24–25), the Panel nevertheless finds it evident that the provision effectively determines the non-acquisition ab origine of a status which, in fact, had already been acquired at birth. Thus, in practical terms, the provision results in an automatic ex tunc loss of citizenship, or rather in a form of implicit revocation of citizenship, affecting all those who, having been born before the entry into force of the decree in question, had already acquired, by virtue of birth from an Italian citizen, the substantive entitlement to status civitatis, although they had not yet proceeded to the formal recognition of such entitlement through an express declaration of intent. 6.6.That being said, the provision appears to be in conflict with Articles 1, 2, 3, 22, 24, 56, and 58 of the Constitution, as well as with Articles 72, 77, and 117(1) thereof. 7.    Grounds of Conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution 7.1.First of all, the provision appears to be manifestly in conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution, which provides that "No one may be deprived, for political reasons, of legal capacity, citizenship, or name." 7.2.A systematic interpretation of the constitutional provision leads, in fact, to the conclusion that each citizen's right to the preservation of his or her status civitatis cannot be sacrificed for reasons connected to the public interests of the community. In this regard, the Panel observes that Article 22 of the Constitution cannot be interpreted solely as prohibiting the deprivation of citizenship as a means of repressing dissent, but must also be understood as encompassing any reason linked to "political" interests in a broad sense — that is, both those of the political forces in power at a given historical moment and those regarded as representing the interests of the national community as a whole. Otherwise, the provision would be deprived of its meaning, being reduced to a mere repetition of other constitutional principles, since the prohibition against depriving a person of citizenship on account of his or her beliefs could already be inferred from the principles of democracy, equality, and non-discrimination. Moreover, the very placement of the provision among the guarantees of civil rights, rather than among those relating to the "founding elements" of the State, underscores the link between citizenship and the protection of constitutional freedoms, suggesting that these essential aspects of personal identity cannot be sacrificed solely on the grounds of public interests deemed to be overriding. 7.3.In violation of this constitutional principle, the provision under examination deprives of Italian citizenship those citizens jure sanguinis who were born before the entry into force of the decree in question, on the grounds of alleged overriding public interests — namely, in this case, the regulation of the flow of applications for the recognition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis submitted by descendants of Italian citizens who emigrated abroad. 7.4.Accordingly, while the acquisition of a particular citizenship cannot, in itself, be regarded as a right — given the broad discretion of the Legislature in determining who forms part of its citizenry and under what conditions citizenship may be granted — such discretion cannot extend to situations in which citizenship status has already been acquired. In that case, citizenship constitutes a fundamental right of the individual and an essential personal attribute, absolute, original, inalienable, and imprescriptible, and therefore enforceable at any time (See, to this effect, Court of Cassation, Joint Sections, Judgment No. 4466 of 2006; and, more recently, Joint Sections, Judgments Nos. 25317 and 25318 of 2022). 8.    Grounds of Conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution 8.1.From this standpoint, the provision referred to the Court also appears to violate Article 3 of the Constitution, in two distinct aspects. 8.2.First of all, Article 3 of the Constitution embodies a principle of consistency, as an expression of legal certainty, and establishes the principle of legitimate expectation in the law, which operates as a limit on the legislature's power to alter ongoing legal relationships. 8.3.It must first be noted that, under our legal system, although the principle of non-retroactivity of the law applies pursuant to Article 11 of the Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code, a retroactive civil law cannot be deemed per se unlawful, provided that the specific limits identified by statute and by the case-law of the Constitutional Court are observed. On this point, constitutional case law has consistently recognized that the principle of legitimate expectation — which enjoys constitutional protection under Article 3 of the Constitution — does not preclude the Legislature from adopting provisions that unfavorably amend the regulation of legal relationships, "even when such relationships concern vested subjective rights." However, this may occur only on the condition "that such provisions do not degenerate into irrational regulation, thereby frustrating, with regard to substantive situations based on prior legislation, citizens' legitimate expectation of legal certainty, to be understood as a fundamental element of the rule of law." (See, among many others, Constitutional Court Judgments No. 54 of 2019; Nos. 216 and 56 of 2015; Nos. 219 and 154 of 2014; Nos. 310 and 83 of 2013; Nos. 166 of 2012 and 302 of 2010; and Order No. 31 of 2011.) The retroactive effect of legislation is therefore limited by the "principle of citizens' legitimate expectation in the certainty of the legal system," the violation of which results in unreasonableness and consequently entails the unconstitutionality of the retroactive provision (see Constitutional Court Judgment No. 69 of 2014, referring to Judgments Nos. 170 and 103 of 2013, Nos. 271 and 71 of 2011, and Nos. 236 and 206 of 2009, among others). 8.4.In the Panel's view, the decision to act retroactively on the recognition of status civitatis, in light of the foregoing, has violated the legitimate expectation — supported by well-established case law — of those who, having been born before the entry into force of the legislation at issue, had already acquired Italian citizenship at birth, even though they had not (yet) requested its formal recognition. As of March 27, 2025, these individuals were already to be regarded as Italian citizens for all purposes, since, although they had not exercised the rights deriving from their status, they nonetheless possessed the substantive entitlement thereto and relied on the possibility of obtaining its formal recognition. This legitimate expectation was frustrated when the Legislature retroactively amended the regime set forth in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of Law No. 91 of 1992. 8.5.Secondly, the contested provision appears to violate the principle of substantive equality, which is likewise afforded constitutional protection under Article 3 of the Constitution. In fact, Article 3-bis, paragraph 1, letters (a), (a-bis), and (b) of Law No. 91 of 1992 treats differently individuals who are in the same factual circumstances — namely, foreign nationals born to parents (or ascendants) who were Italian citizens prior to the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 34 of 2025 — by subjecting the recognition of citizenship to arbitrary conditions beyond the individual's control, including, in particular, the date of submission of the documentation for obtaining citizenship to the competent consular office or mayor, or the date of filing a judicial petition for the determination of citizenship jure sanguinis. 8.6.It cannot be overlooked that, regardless of the will of the parties concerned, the practical possibility of submitting to the consular offices, to the mayor, or to the judicial authority the documentation suitable to prove the transmission of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis is uncertain in terms of timing, as it also depends on bureaucratic and procedural factors, preliminary to the filing of the application, which are entirely beyond the citizen's control. From this perspective, the difference in treatment between those who filed a judicial application or an application with the competent consular offices or the mayor before March 28, 2025, and those who did so thereafter, appears entirely arbitrary. 9.    Grounds of Conflict with Article 2 of the Constitution 9.1.The Panel considers that the provision at issue, in its retroactive application to individuals born before its entry into force, also raises issues of violation of Article 2 of the Constitution, as it arbitrarily and unreasonably affects an inviolable human right. 9.2.As previously noted, the right to citizenship jure sanguinis, based on descent from an Italian citizen, does not arise from a concession by the State, but already exists in the individual, being an original, natural, and imprescriptible right. Conversely, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 treats this right — even for those who had already acquired it by virtue of being born before the entry into force of the current legislation — as a benefit to be obtained upon application within a fixed deadline, thereby transforming a recognized right into a privilege to be claimed. 10. Grounds of Conflict with Article 24 of the Constitution 10.1.                At the same time, the contested provisions violate Article 24 of the Constitution, insofar as they unreasonably hinder and restrict — including from a temporal standpoint — the access to judicial protection of the subjective right to citizenship for individuals who had already acquired Italian citizenship ab origine. Indeed, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 fails to introduce any rules of intertemporal law, omitting to establish a reasonable period following the entry into force of the provision during which those concerned could act before the competent administrative or judicial authorities in order to obtain recognition of the citizenship already acquired jure sanguinis. 11. Grounds of Conflict with Articles 1 paragraph 2, 57 and 58 of the Constitution 12.  Furthermore, Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 — introduced by Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of 2025 — by retroactively excluding or limiting the recognition of Italian citizenship for foreign nationals who had already acquired it jure sanguinis, also conflicts with Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of popular sovereignty, as well as with Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution, which establish the right to vote reserved to citizens. Indeed, Italian citizenship constitutes the indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of both active and passive political rights, in particular the right to vote for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic (Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution), as well as for referendums pursuant to Article 75 of the Constitution. 13. Grounds of Conflict with Articles 72 and 77 of the Constitution 13.1.                Lastly, further doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of the contested provisions arise from the use of the emergency decree procedure (decretazione d'urgenza) for the enactment of the legislation at issue. 13.2.                The Panel considers that the matter of citizenship is subject to a formal legislative reservation, or more precisely — from a procedural standpoint — to a reservation of parliamentary assembly, pursuant to Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution. Accordingly, it may be regulated only by an ordinary statute adopted by Parliament and not by other acts having the force of law, such as decree-laws. 13.3.                Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution identifies specific matters whose legislative regulation must necessarily follow "the ordinary procedure of examination and direct approval by the chamber." The purpose of the parliamentary reservation of law is to ensure that certain bills of major political or institutional importance are debated in a forum that, by its very nature, guarantees public proceedings and the full representation of all political groups — safeguards that cannot be ensured elsewhere. Therefore, if the connection between formal legislative reservation and parliamentary reservation were to be denied, the requirement of direct examination and approval by the assembly would lose its meaning, since it could be easily circumvented by simply altering the type of legislative act, thereby eluding even direct parliamentary involvement. 13.4.                On this premise, it must be noted that the matters covered by the parliamentary reservation under Article 72, paragraph 4, of the Constitution include "constitutional matters" and "electoral matters." Both categories are interpreted broadly: the former encompasses all bills of particular relevance concerning the institutional framework, while the latter covers every aspect of the regulation of the electoral function, including the conditions governing the attribution of active and passive electoral capacity. 13.5.                On this basis, it may therefore be held that the subject matter concerning status civitatis falls within the scope of the parliamentary reservation (and, consequently, also within that of the formal legislative reservation), since it pertains to a field that can be subsumed both under constitutional matters and, in a broader sense, under electoral matters. Indeed, the determination of who constitutes the people of a State directly affects a fundamental element of the State itself and the structure of political representation. It is therefore evident that the legislation at issue, which concerns a matter defining the democratic form of the State, directly impacts the composition of the electorate and the nature of political representation, given that citizenship determines membership and participation in the political and social life of the community. Italian citizenship, as previously noted, does not merely constitute an individual legal status, but rather represents the indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of active and passive political rights, in particular, the right to vote for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic (Articles 56 and 58 of the Constitution), as well as for referendums pursuant to Article 75 of the Constitution. Consequently, any legislative measure that modifies the conditions for acquiring citizenship jure sanguinis by retroactively restricting its criteria or excluding individuals previously entitled thereto, entails an implicit alteration of the electorate — that is, of the subjective base on which democratic sovereignty rests — and therefore requires recourse to the "ordinary" legislative procedure under Article 72 of the Constitution. 13.6.                In any event, even assuming that the matter were to be considered outside the scope of those subject to a parliamentary reservation of law, it appears difficult to acknowledge, in the present case, the existence of the extraordinary necessity and urgency required by Article 77 of the Constitution that would allow the Government to act by means of a decree-law. 13.7.                In this respect, the Panel observes that, according to the preamble of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, the Government's stated objective was to contain "the continuous and exponential increase in the number of potential Italian citizens residing outside the national territory who, also due to their possession of one or more citizenships other than Italian, are primarily bound to other States by strong ties of culture, identity, and allegiance," since "the absence of effective bonds with the Republic on the part of a growing number of citizens — a number that could equal or even exceed the resident population — constitutes a serious and current risk to national security and, by virtue of Italy's membership in the European Union, also to the other Member States and to the Schengen Area." The Government therefore considered that extraordinary necessity and urgency existed "to avoid, pending the approval of an organic reform of citizenship law, an exceptional and uncontrolled influx of applications for the recognition of citizenship, such as to prevent the proper functioning of consular offices abroad, municipalities, and judicial offices." 13.8.                However, the issue of the excessive workload of courts and consular offices arising from applications for the recognition of citizenship by Italians residing abroad — even by those lacking genuine ties with the Italian Republic — is well known and long-standing. This circumstance gives rise to serious doubts as to the existence of the actual conditions that could justify the use of the emergency decree procedure. While the need for a comprehensive and coherent legislative reform in this field cannot be denied — a need also emphasized by the Constitutional Court itself (see Judgment No. 142 of 2025, reasoning) — such a reform must necessarily involve both chambers of Parliament, given the scope and impact of the matter. The Panel thus concludes that no real circumstances of extraordinariness, unpredictability, or urgency exist that could justify legislative intervention through a decree-law — particularly one introducing retroactive and more restrictive provisions affecting individuals who had already acquired Italian citizenship jure sanguinis by birth. 14. Grounds of Conflict with Article 117, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution 15.  In light of all the foregoing, the provisions at issue are also in conflict with Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, in relation to Italy's international obligations and to the observance of the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 16. Conclusions 16.1.                For all the reasons set forth above, the ordinary legislation introduced by Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of 2025 — which inserted Article 3-bis into Law No. 91 of 1992 — appears constitutionally illegitimate insofar as it retroactively applies the restrictive effects on citizenship status to a time preceding the entry into force of the law itself. Specifically, by making the right to the recognition of Italian citizenship "by birth" conditional — under letters (a), (a-bis), and (b) of the aforementioned Article 3-bis — upon new requirements introduced ex novo, the legislation limits the exercise of a right previously recognized and constitutionally protected. The legislative choice introduced by Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 must therefore be regarded, as extensively demonstrated, as amounting to a retroactive revocation of an acquired right, depriving individuals who must be deemed Italian citizens by birth of such status, without even providing for a reasonable period — running from the entry into force of the provision — within which an application for recognition of Italian citizenship could be submitted, upon the expiration of which the loss of citizenship status would be triggered. 16.2.                Moreover, as already observed in Order No. 167 of 2025 of the Court of Turin (published in the Official Gazette No. 38 of September 17, 2025), in which the same provisions were challenged with reference to partially identical constitutional parameters, a declaration of partial unconstitutionality of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992, on the grounds set forth above, would make it possible to preserve the useful effect of the legislative reform — namely, the implementation of the international principle of "genuine link," recently reaffirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Judgment of April 29, 2025, Case C-181/23) — while at the same time eliminating the prejudicial consequences arising from the retroactive application (to all persons already born) of the new provisions. By removing from Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 the passages expressly providing for retroactive application, a constitutionally consistent interpretation of the new citizenship provisions would remain possible — namely, the interpretation limiting the applicability of the said article solely to persons born after the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025. For all others, the general rule laid down in Article 11 of the Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code (preleggi) would continue to apply, according to which "the law has effect only for the future." FOR THESE REASONS The Court of Mantua, sitting as a Panel, having regard to Article 134 of the Constitution, Article 1 of Constitutional Law No. 1 of February 9, 1948, and Article 23 of Law No. 87 of March 1, 1953, having found the relevance and non-manifest unfoundedness of the question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New provisions on citizenship), introduced by Article 1, paragraphs 1, 1-bis, and 1-ter of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent provisions on Italian citizenship), converted with amendments by Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025, insofar as it provides that the provision shall apply "any person born abroad, even prior to the date of entry into force of this Article" and under the conditions laid down in letters (a), (a-bis), and (b), in reference to Articles 1, 2, 3, 22, 24, 56, 58, 72, 77, and 117 of the Constitution, the latter with reference to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, orders the suspension of the current proceedings; orders the immediate transmission of the case file to the Constitutional Court; orders that, under the responsibility of the Clerk's Office, this order be served on the parties to the case and on the Prime Minister, and be communicated to the Presidents of both Houses of Parliament. Thus decided in the Chamber of Council of the Civil Section of the Court of Mantua, on October 23, 2025.   Mon, 03 Nov 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23341/A-SECOND-GLIMPSE-OF-CONSTITUTIONAL-SCRUTINY-ON-DECREE---LAW-36-2025 http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23334/Constitutional-Court----Ruling-n-124-2025-translated--- blog On July 31, 2025, the Italian Constitutional Court published Judgment No. 142/2025, responding to constitutional challenges raised by several trial courts—including those of Bologna, Milan, Florence, and Rome—regarding the unlimited application of jure sanguinis (citizenship by descent). The referring courts questioned the constitutional legitimacy of several key legal provisions: Art. 4 of the 1865 Italian Civil Code (Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865) Art. 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912 Art. 1, para. 1(a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 These laws establish that individuals born to an Italian citizen—regardless of generational distance—are entitled to Italian citizenship by blood (jure sanguinis), without limitations based on generation, residency, or cultural connection. The courts raised concerns about whether this broad, unrestricted application of jure sanguinis was compatible with Italy's Constitution (Articles 1, 3, and 117) and with European Union obligations, given that many descendants have no real link to Italy but can still claim citizenship across generations. The Constitutional Court rejected the challenges, declaring them either inadmissible or unfounded. It reaffirmed the legitimacy of the current legal framework, stating that: "The recognition of Italian citizenship by descent, even across multiple generations and without additional residency or cultural connection requirements, does not violate constitutional principles or European obligations." The Court emphasized that such recognition stems from Italy's historical migration patterns and is a legislative choice that does not show signs of irrationality or disproportionality under constitutional scrutiny. If you wish to explore the legal reasoning in more depth, we suggest starting from paragraph 8 of the judgment, as we have translated the Court's decision below Enjoy the read, and feel free to reach out if you'd like to discuss how this ruling may apply to your case. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT Judgment No. 142/2025 (ECLI:IT:COST:2025:142) Case: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF INCIDENTAL QUESTION Presiding Judge:                        – Reporting Judge:                           Public hearing held on June 24, 2025;              Decision rendered on June 24, 2025; Filed on July 31, 2025;          Published in the Official Gazette on August 6, 2025; Challenged provisions: Article 4 of the Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865; Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912; Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992. Headnotes: Decided cases: Orders No. 247 of 2024; Nos. 65, 66 and 86 of 2025 JUDGMENT NO. 142 YEAR 2025 THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC IN THE NAME OF ITALIAN PEOPLE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT consisting of: Presiding Judge                                                  ; Judges has rendered the following JUDGMENT in the constitutional review proceedings concerning Article 4 of the Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865; Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1992 (On Italian citizenship); Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship), brought by the Ordinary Court of Bologna, Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection and Free Movement of European Union Citizens, by order of November 26, 2024; by the Ordinary Court of Rome, Division for the Rights of the Person and Immigration, by order of March 21, 2025; by the Ordinary Court of Milan, Twelfth Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection and Free Movement of European Union Citizens, by order of March 3, 2025; and by the Ordinary Court of Florence, Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection and Free Movement of European Union Citizens, by order of March 7, 2025; said orders were registered respectively as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders and as Nos. 65, 66, and 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders, and published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic, First Special Series, Nos. 4, 16, and 18 of 2025. having examined the pleadings filed by                                                                                                                                                        , as well as the statements of intervention submitted by AUCI – "Avvocati Uniti per la Cittadinanza Italiana" (United Lawyers for Italian Citizenship) and by AGIS – "Associazione Giuristi Iure Sanguinis" (Association of Lawyers Iure Sanguinis), in the case registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders, and by Circolo Trentino of São Paulo (Brazil) and Circolo Domus Sardinia, in the case registered as No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders. heard the Reporting Judge                                during the public hearing of June 24, 2025; heard Attorneys                                                                 on behalf of                               and the other appearing parties, as well as Attorneys                                                                                                                                         on behalf of                                                           and the other appearing parties; decided in chambers on June 24, 2025 Findings of fact – By orders of November 26, 2024 (registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders), March 21, 2025 (registered as No. 65 in the 2025 Register of Orders), March 3, 2025 (registered as No. 66 in the 2025 Register of Orders), and March 7, 2025 (registered as No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders), the Ordinary Courts of Bologna (Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection, and Free Movement of European Union Citizens), of Rome (Division for the Rights of the Person and Immigration), of Milan (Twelfth Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection, and Free Movement of European Union Citizens), and of Florence (Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection, and Free Movement of European Union Citizens) raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship), insofar as it provides that "a citizen by birth is: (a) the child of a father or mother who are citizens," without establishing any limitation on the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis (by descent). – Only the Ordinary Court of Milan also challenged Article 4 of the Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, as well as Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912 (On Italian Citizenship), insofar as these provisions establish no limitation on the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis. – All referring courts consider that Articles 1, second paragraph, and 3 of the Constitution have been violated, the latter on the grounds of unreasonableness and disproportionality. The Ordinary Courts of Bologna, Milan, and Florence have also raised questions of constitutional legitimacy with reference to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to international obligations and to the constraints arising from Italy's membership in the European Union — the latters with regard to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Finally, the Courts of Rome and Milan consider the challenged provision to be in violation of Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, due to unreasonable disparity of treatment compared to different terms of comparison. – As to the facts of the case, the referring judges report that they must determine the Italian citizenship of the applicants, who were born abroad (specifically in Brazil and Uruguay) and reside there as citizens of those countries. The applicants claim an unbroken line of descent from Italian citizens born in Italy — namely, on April 27, 1874 in the Bologna case; on January 27, 1873 in the Rome case; on September 14, 1843 in the Milan case; and on January 11, 1903 in the Florence case. – As to the relevance of the constitutional questions, the referring courts state that they must apply the challenged provisions and are therefore required to recognize the Italian citizenship of all applicants, since they meet the sole requirement for the acquisition of citizenship under the applicable law. The referring court of Milan further expressly excludes any possibility of interpreting the challenged provisions in a manner consistent with the Constitution. – The referring courts then provide, with largely consistent reasoning, the grounds supporting the view that the raised questions of constitutional legitimacy are not manifestly unfounded. – As a preliminary matter, the referring courts discuss — with varying levels of detail and breadth — the contextual reasons that, in their view, justify the doubts concerning the constitutionality of the provision. – In particular, the Courts of Bologna and Florence provide an extensive account of the peculiar situation of Italy, characterized — especially over the past century — by a massive outward migration. Referring to various sources, they note that between 1870 and 1970 approximately 27 million Italian citizens left the country, and about half of them never returned. Their descendants are now presumed to outnumber the citizens residing in Italy. – Despite this background, the Italian legal system is said to be among the few that have not set any limits on the recognition of citizenship by descent (jure sanguinis). This situation is further aggravated, on one hand, by modern technologies that facilitate the reconstruction of family lineage, and on the other, by the attractiveness of Italian citizenship, given the severe economic crises affecting the countries that were the main destinations of past migration. Currently, Italian citizenship is particularly appealing as it allows its holders to relocate to any Member State of the European Union and to enter the United States without a visa. – The factual background outlined by the referring judges is completed by their observation of the inertia and "stalemate conditions of consulates abroad" (Orders registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders and No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders; see also Order No. 65 in the 2024 Register of Orders to similar effect), which has resulted in a proliferation of applications before Italian courts seeking judicial recognition of citizenship. – In light of this background, the referring judges consider that the challenged provisions simultaneously in conflict with the notion of "the people" under Article 1(2) of the Constitution and with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality set forth in Article 3 of the Constitution. – With respect to this first claim, the arguments set out by the four referring judges are essentially convergent and, in part, perfectly overlapping (especially those of the Courts of Bologna and Florence). According to the referring courts, Article 1(2) of the Constitution implies a "close correspondence between the people and sovereignty" (Order No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders), which would be distorted by Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, insofar as it grants "citizenship to tens of millions of people who have no effective connection with Italy" (ibid.). Although the Constitution provides that "sovereignty belongs to the people," it does not define the notion of "people." This, the referring judges argue, highlights the importance of the rules governing the acquisition, loss, and reacquisition of citizenship, which they regard as expressions of "a fundamental human right to participate — in accordance with the democratic principle — in the governance of the society in which one lives" (again, Order No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders). Some of the referring judges consider that the existence of a state legislative reserve in this matter is undisputed (see Orders Nos. 247 of 2024 and 86 of 2025). – According to the referring courts, the significance of the citizenship provisions in relation to the notion of "the people" implies the existence of constitutional limits on legislative discretion, since those categories cannot be regarded as "empty shells left to the absolute discretion of the legislature" (see Order No. 86 of 2025 and, to the same effect, Order No. 247 of 2024). Citizenship is "rich in content, consisting, beyond dispute, of the set of rights and duties recognized by constitutional provisions that lay down the principles on which the concept of the Italian 'people' is founded" (see Order No. 66 of 2025). It also exhibits "as structural and inherent features, the relational and integrative connection with the community of citizens and, consequently, it also implies and presupposes proximity to the people and to the territory" (see Order No. 65 of 2025). According to the referring courts, the challenged provisions sever the link between citizenship and "conditions of belonging, participation, relationality, integration, and proximity" with the Italian legal system, reducing it to "a purely abstract status pertaining to a merely individual sphere," thereby depriving it of its "communitarian and public dimension, as well as of substance and effectiveness" (Order No. 65 of 2025). In essence, the challenged provisions would include within the concept of the "people" — to whom sovereignty belongs — "individuals who are in fact totally extraneous to the national community" (Order No. 66 of 2025). – The referring judges further contend that the lineage-based connection cannot, by itself, suffice to dispel the doubts of constitutional legitimacy; invoking Article 29 of the Constitution is not sufficient, as that provision refers to a notion of family that presupposes a "necessary link to social reality" (Order No. 247 of 2024). Likewise, they exclude reliance on Article 35 of the Constitution to justify the challenged provisions, since the necessary protection of work abroad does not entail a "right to recognition of citizenship after generations" (Order No. 247 of 2024). – According to the referring judges, the alleged violation of Article 1(2) of the Constitution would become apparent when that principle is considered in conjunction with Article 3 of the Constitution, in terms of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality. It would indeed be unreasonable and disproportionate not to impose any limit on the mechanism for acquiring citizenship solely by descent. Nor could such a violation find an adequate corrective in the constitutional provisions whereby only eight of the four hundred members of the Chamber of Deputies (Article 56(2) of the Constitution) and four of the two hundred members of the Senate (Article 57(2) of the Constitution) may be elected in the "Overseas Constituency" (Article 1 of Law No. 459 of December 27, 2001, Rules for the Exercise of the Right to Vote of Italian Citizens Residing Abroad). That legislation does not neutralize the "obvious interference between the excessive expansion of the number of citizens and the exercise of popular sovereignty, both because of the possibility of registration on domestic electoral lists, and because of its impact on the voting quorum required for popular referendums under Article 75(4) of the Constitution, [...] as well as [...] on the functioning of the constitutional referendum under Article 138 of the Constitution" (Orders Nos. 247 of 2024 and 86 of 2025). – In order to remedy the alleged violation, the various referring orders propose different solutions. The Court of Bologna suggests, as a "reasonable point of equilibrium [...] a limit of two generations, unless it is proven that one of the ancestors or the person concerned has lived in Italy for at least two years"; alternatively, it invokes the possibility of "taking into account the longest period of oblivion provided for in the legal system, equal to twenty years, as in the case of the statute of limitations for the most serious crimes and for the acquisition of ownership of immovable property and real property rights through adverse possession." The Court of Rome considers that the acquisition of citizenship by birth should occur automatically "where the foreign applicant is able to prove directly the [Italian] citizenship of his or her parent(s)," whereas, if it is necessary to trace citizenship back to a second-degree ancestor, Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992 should apply — a provision in relation to which that same court also raises a question of constitutional legitimacy on grounds of unreasonable disparity of treatment. Furthermore, the Milan Court does not identify a direct remedy to redress the constitutional violation, except indirectly by also raising a question of constitutional legitimacy based on the unreasonable disparity of treatment between the challenged provisions and the rules governing the spouse of an Italian citizen. Finally, the Court of Florence merely notes the need to identify reasonable limitations capable of overcoming the doubts expressed. – With a second group of complaints, all the referring courts — with the exception of the Court of Rome — also allege a violation of Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation both to "international obligations" and to the "constraints arising from the Community legal order," the latter with reference to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). – With regard to the first allegation, the referring judges note that, although international law reserves the regulation of citizenship to the competence of States, it nevertheless requires them to respect the principle of effectiveness of the citizenship bond. Therefore, it is not possible "to take into account domestic law assessments that are not based on a real belonging of the individual to the social group" (Order No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders). The referring judges, distancing themselves from the judgment of the Court of Cassation No. 25317, Joint Civil Sessions of August 24, 2022, which held that "the bond of blood is certainly not a mere legal fiction", consider that the challenged legislation conflicts with international obligations, since any "claim by a State to regard as its own citizen a person who in fact has no effective social ties with it is internationally unfounded and, consequently, other States are not required to respect it" (ibid.). In this regard, the referring judges dwell extensively on the judgment of the International Court of Justice of April 6, 1955, Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, according to which citizenship implies "a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties." – Subsequently, still with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, the Courts of Bologna, Milan and Florence express doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, for conflict with the constraints imposed by European Union law through Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In particular, the Bologna and Florence orders recall that Article 9 TEU provides that "every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship," and that Article 20 TFEU states that "citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship." European Union law, while leaving the regulation of citizenship to the Member States, nonetheless requires respect for the principle of effectiveness and the genuine character of national citizenship. Indeed, European citizenship entails the attribution of a series of rights and duties (such as the freedom of movement and residence within the Union, together with the corresponding right to engage in work activities and to request family reunification), as well as political participation rights and the right to diplomatic protection by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State within the territory of a third country in which one's own State of origin is not represented. The Court of Milan also considers that European law implies, for the purposes of the free movement of EU citizens, "a territorial link between the citizen and the Member State of origin." Overall, the referring courts doubt that the challenged provision complies with the constraints imposed by European Union law and, specifically, with "the principle of proportionality," as developed in the case law of the Court of Justice (Orders Nos. 247 of 2024 and 86 of 2025 to that effect). – Finally, the Courts of Rome and Milan raise questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, alleging a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution, on the ground of unequal treatment identified with reference to other statutory regimes. – In particular, in the introductory order of the Court of Rome, a similarity is suggested between the situation of those who claim descent from a distant Italian ancestor and that of persons descending from someone who was once an Italian citizen but no longer holds such citizenship — the latter situation being addressed both by Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992, concerning the acquisition of citizenship on the basis of mere legal prerequisites, and by Article 9(1)(a) of the same Law, which governs the discretionary grant of citizenship. In both cases, the acquisition of citizenship would be limited to two degrees of ancestral lineage, and the concurrence of additional requirements "relating [...] to an effective relational connection between the applicant and the Italian State, territory, and people" would be necessary. Nevertheless, between the two statutory cases, according to the referring Roman court, the first would be "the more appropriately comparable" to the challenged provision. In both instances, citizenship is acquired ipso iure on the basis of the mere verification of the requisite conditions, thereby constituting a subjective right rather than a mere legitimate interest. In particular, according to the Court of Rome, there would be no "substantial difference – such as to justify a legal framework so markedly different as that between Article 4, paragraph 1, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a), of Law No. 91/1992 – between the situation of a person (who holds the citizenship of another state) descending from a parent or grandparent who was an Italian citizen but later lost citizenship (before the birth of the applicant, at least in the case of the parent, since otherwise it would fall under the more general case of the child of a citizen) and the situation of someone (also a foreign citizen) descending from parents, grandparents, and often more distant ancestors who have never (or who, in any case, have not been proven to have) ever claimed, exercised, or possessed the status of citizenship." In both cases, what would be lacking is the "effectiveness of citizenship." – As for the objections raised by the Court of Milan, that court likewise observes, in general, the different approach between the regime governing the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis and other legal provisions granting citizenship, which — as in the case of those concerning nationals of third countries — require "specific proof of their rootedness in the national territory." Specifically, the referring judge of Milan grounds the alleged unreasonable disparity of treatment under Article 3 of the Constitution on a tertium comparationis (third term of comparison) consisting in the rules allowing the acquisition of citizenship on the basis of marriage to an Italian citizen, whether male or female. Such rules require, in particular, proof either of an intermediate level of proficiency in the Italian language or, alternatively, the signing of an integration agreement. – By submissions filed on February 10, and on May 5 and 6, 2025, the following parties entered an appearance: nine applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Court of Bologna; all the applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Court of Milan; and all the applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Court of Rome, who, on June 17, 2025, also filed an additional memorandum out of time. Furthermore, on May 16, 2025, four applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Court of Florence entered an appearance, and on June 3, 2025, also filed an additional memorandum, while on May 20, 2025, another seven applicants in the same proceedings entered an appearance. – All the parties who entered an appearance have raised objections of inadmissibility against the questions submitted, advancing arguments that are in part overlapping or substantially identical. – According to the defenses of the applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Courts of Bologna, Florence, and Rome, the challenges are inadmissible because the referring judges raised doubts concerning a provision — Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992 — which would not be applicable to all the applicants, since some of them were born before that law entered into force. Furthermore, the referring judges allegedly misidentified the applicable provisions, as they failed to challenge those that were relevant ratione temporis to the various ancestors of the applicants — namely, the Civil Code of 1865, Law No. 555 of 1912, and Law No. 123 of April 21, 1983 ("Provisions on Citizenship"). – Subsequently, the defenses of all the applicants in the four main proceedings objected to the admissibility of the questions on the ground that the referring judges had not attempted an interpretation consistent with the Constitution. – Furthermore, the defenses of all the parties — with the exception of those applicants before the Court of Florence who entered an appearance on May 16, 2025 — argued that the questions are based on an assumption, namely that the applicants in the principal proceedings have no connection with Italy other than the bond of filiation, an assumption that is asserted rather than proven. The referring judges "did not gather any information concerning the life, culture, language, motivations, emotional factors, or any other elements that might have been relevant to ascertain the factual premise underlying the referring judge's reasoning — namely, the alleged lack of substantial belonging of the applicants to the Italian community" (pleadings filed on February 10, May 5, May 6, and May 20, 2025). The referring courts, they claim, "summarily concluded that the applicants were not 'effective' members of the Italian community — all this without any investigation, without any evidence, without any fact-finding." This argument is joined by the consideration that the underlying reason for the main proceedings does not stem from genuine doubts as to the constitutionality of the law, but rather from the need to respond to the overload of applications that have been filed before the Italian judicial authorities as a result of the failures and delays of the consular authorities. – The defenses of all the parties — again with the exception of those applicants before the Court of Florence who entered an appearance on May 16, 2025 — also challenged the admissibility of the questions, arguing that the reasoning on the not manifestly unfounded issues conflicts with the case law of this Court, with diritto vivente ("living law"), and with the established judicial practice in the courts before which the principal cases are pending. In particular, according to those defenses, constitutional case law has already addressed the ius sanguinis criterion, and if its operation "without additional conditions were unconstitutional, such an aspect could not have escaped even indirect scrutiny by this Honorable Court" (pleadings filed on February 10 and May 5, 6, and 20, 2025). They further observe that no court has ever expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis. On the contrary, the Court of Cassation — also in recent decisions, sitting in Joint Civil Sessions (specifically, Cass., No. 25317 of 2022 and Court of Cassation, Joint Civil Sessions, judgment of August 24, 2022, No. 25318) — has emphasized that the aforementioned criterion "is intimately linked to Italian history and to the specific, constant, century-long choice of the Italian legislator to maintain — through the bond of blood — the relationship between Italy and its 'children,' wherever they may be born or reside" (pleadings cited above). The same parties therefore conclude that "as of today, there exists an undeniable and firmly established 'living law' affirming the constitutional legitimacy of the right to transmit citizenship by descent, which has never been called into question, not even in recent times." – All the parties have further raised objections of inadmissibility, arguing that the subject matter falls within the discretionary competence of the legislature. In particular, the defenses referred to in the preceding paragraph maintain that this Court cannot "call into question what has been, and continues to be, a legislative choice in the field of citizenship, the result of a deliberate exercise of legislative discretion." They therefore consider that any acceptance of the constitutional challenges would amount to "a violation of Article 70 of the Constitution with respect to the holder of legislative power, of Article 71 of the Constitution regarding those entitled to initiate legislation, and of Article 134 of the Constitution concerning the functions of this Honorable Constitutional Court." – The defenses of all the parties further objected that the type of systemic intervention requested from this Court is of a manipulative nature, and that the challenges are generic and unsupported. In the defenses of the parties referred to in paragraph 9.4, this objection is argued on the ground that the requested intervention would amount to a suggestion to introduce a legislative reform that would include "new statutory conditions, not contained in the current legislative text and never adopted by the Italian State in one hundred and sixty years of citizenship legislation." Furthermore, according to those defenses, the referring courts' submissions are "generic, hypothetical, and abstract." In the pleading filed by certain applicants before the Court of Florence on May 16, 2025, a more specific objection is made that, in a field characterized by broad legislative discretion, the requested intervention "entails systemic assessments entrusted to the legislature's appreciation and fundamental choices among alternative policy options," thereby limiting "the criterion for the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis by means of elements arbitrarily identified by the referring judge and entirely lacking any foundation in the legal order." Finally, this latter defense, although within the framework of its substantive arguments, highlights the generic nature of the claims seeking to identify the kind of genuine link that should consolidate the bond with Italy for those who were born and reside abroad. It is noted, in fact, that "the terms of such a connection are described by the referring judge in a vague and unclear manner (what does a 'connection with the community' mean? Residence in the territory? For how long? Is it a 'cultural' connection? And in what sense? Proficiency in the language? At what level?)" – Finally, again in the pleading filed on May 16, 2025, inadmissibility is also alleged on the grounds of insufficient reasoning as to the not manifestly unfounded questions, irrelevance of the invoked parameters, and, with respect to the challenge based on Article 117(1) of the Constitution concerning international obligations, failure to indicate any "specific source of international law that would prohibit providing for the acquisition of citizenship by descent without the limitations hypothesized by the referring court." – On the merits, all the defenses of the parties consider the questions raised to be unfounded, advancing arguments of a similar tenor, with reasoning that is at times overlapping or substantially identical. – First and foremost, there would be no violation of Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution, under the aspects of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality. – The defenses recall, preliminarily, that the challenged legislation represents the criterion for the attribution of citizenship that has been applied in Italy for one hundred and sixty years. Its operation as a criterion for acquiring citizenship status, without additional requirements, reflects the legislature's political choice to preserve a link with Italian emigrants and their descendants. This bond has allegedly produced significant benefits for Italy, since "the remittances of Italians emigrated abroad" are said to have supported the Italian economy, reaching "almost four percent of Italy's GDP in certain years." Moreover, during dramatic historical events such as the two world wars, many emigrants "returned from their respective countries of emigration and placed their lives at the service of the Italian army [in] defense of the homeland." Likewise, whenever Italy has been struck by natural disasters or other grave events — including the COVID-19 public health emergency — the Italian communities composed of descendants of emigrants "have immediately reacted with unparalleled solidarity," as evidenced by the establishment of numerous solidarity funds cited in the defenses. In addition, it is emphasized that Italian communities abroad promote Italian culture in their respective countries. The legislative choice to preserve the purity of the ius sanguinis criterion would not be unreasonable or disproportionate, since an Italian citizen residing abroad does not burden the State, not having access to the Italian welfare system. Furthermore, there would be no threat to the integrity of the democratic principle, given that Italian citizens residing abroad are entitled to elect only two percent of the members of Parliament, thereby exercising limited political influence. Moreover, the Constitution itself grants special protection to emigrants and to Italian citizens residing abroad (Articles 35 and 48 of the Constitution are cited in this regard). – In addition to the foregoing, the defense of the parties that entered an appearance on May 16, 2025, adds that the referring judges' assertion — namely, that citizenship presupposes a notion of "the people" — is based on a misconception. It is argued, in fact, that "the 'people' to whom Article 1 of the Constitution attributes sovereignty consists of the totality of citizens; therefore, it is the 'people' that presupposes the normative definition of citizenship, and not the other way around." That same defense further observes that "the Constituent Assembly did not intend to include in the Constitution the criteria for the acquisition and loss of citizenship, except for the prohibition of deprivation for political reasons under Article 22 of the Constitution." Consequently, "Articles 1 and 22 of the Constitution do not impose upon the legislature any positive limitation in defining the set of rules that determine the acquisition and transmission of citizenship." Finally, an inconsistency is observed in the referring judges' statements. They fail to recognize that the original nature of the acquisition of citizenship, together with its justiciability through a declaratory rather than a constitutive judgment, implies that the relevant link is not with a distant ancestor, but rather with the immediate parent, given the "uninterrupted line of transmission" of citizenship. – Linked to the foregoing is the argument put forward by the defense of the applicants in the Bologna proceedings, according to which the petition seeking to limit the acquisition of citizenship iure sanguinis for persons born abroad to two generations — unless proof of residence in Italy is provided — would be a source of discrimination and could not be applied retroactively. – The defenses of the parties further deny that there has been any violation of Article 117(1) of the Constitution. They not only contest the improper use of the concept of the "effectiveness of citizenship," which, they argue, has no basis in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union cited by the referring courts, but also point out that it has not been demonstrated that the alleged principle should be interpreted "as preventing States, in principle, from providing for the acquisition of citizenship by descent." – Lastly, the parties who entered an appearance on May 16, 2025, note that, during the pendency of the present proceedings, Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent Provisions on Citizenship), not yet converted into law at that time, was enacted. Subsequently, in the additional memorandum filed on June 3, 2025 (after the conversion, with amendments, of the aforementioned decree-law into Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025), the same defense argued that the new provisions do not apply to the proceedings from which the constitutional questions originate, as the new rules concern only proceedings initiated on or after March 28, 2025. Therefore, the parties emphasize that the principle of acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis is rooted in the Italian legal tradition since the Civil Code of 1865. They also point out that this principle is shared by several Member States of the European Union, as the transmission of status civitatis through status filiationis expresses family continuity, regardless of the place of birth. According to that defense, acceptance of the questions raised would result in the retroactive mass loss of citizenship, which would conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution and with European Union law, particularly with regard to the principle of proportionality and the principle of adversarial proceedings, and with international law, which provides for a prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality. – The parties who entered an appearance on May 20, 2025, likewise address Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, and — assuming that this legislation also applies to the main proceedings — argue that its provisions introduce retroactive limits on the recognition of citizenship jure sanguinis, in violation of numerous constitutional principles (including, among others, Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 22, 24, 25, 29, 35, and 117 of the Constitution). The defense therefore requests that this Court raise, before itself, questions of constitutionality concerning the provisions set forth in Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted into law; or, in the alternative, that it refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union in order to assess the compatibility of the new legislation with European Union law. – On June 4, 2025, the parties to the main proceedings in the case originating from Order No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders filed an additional memorandum out of time. – By submissions filed on February 11, 2025, AUCI – Avvocati Uniti per la Cittadinanza Italiana (United Lawyers for Italian Citizenship) and AGIS – Associazione Giuristi Iure Sanguinis (Association of Iure Sanguinis Jurists) requested leave to intervene ad opponendum (in opposition) in the case registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders, submitting arguments in support of the admissibility of their interventions. On June 3, 2025, AUCI and AGIS filed supplemental memoranda of identical tenor, reiterating the arguments already presented in their statements of intervention. – On February 11, 2025, the Associazione USEF Brasil – Unione Siciliana Emigrati e Famiglie (Sicilian Union of Emigrants and Families) filed a brief as amicus curiae, which was admitted by presidential decree on May 20, 2025. In that submission, USEF argues that the questions raised are inadmissible, as they do not present a constitutionally necessary solution but instead fall within an area reserved to legislative discretion. Moreover, the submission notes that the European legal parameters allegedly violated are not precisely identified, rendering the challenge based on Article 117 of the Constitution generic and unfounded. Furthermore, upholding the constitutional questions is argued to compromise rights already acquired by millions of Italian descendants in Brazil, in violation of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, and in contrast with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the field of citizenship law. The brief also emphasizes the importance of the Italo-Brazilian community, composed of approximately 25–30 million individuals, which serves as a cultural bridge and represents a strategic resource for Italy. Economic studies are cited showing that dual citizenship fosters investment, trade exchanges, and international mobility. – By pleadings of identical tenor filed on May 20, 2025, Circolo Trentino di San Paolo del Brasile and Circolo Domus Sardinia also sought leave to intervene ad opponendum in the case registered as No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders. On May 27, 2025, they filed concise memoranda pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Supplementary Rules for Proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the content of which was essentially identical. – At the public hearing held on June 24, 2025, the parties reiterated the conclusions set out in their written pleadings. Reasons in law – By orders registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders, Nos. 65, 66 and 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders, the Courts of Bologna, Rome, Milan and Florence raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992, insofar as it provides that "a citizen by birth is: (a) the child of a father or mother who are citizens," without establishing any limitation on the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis. Only the Court of Milan also challenged Article 4 of the Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, as well as Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912, insofar as these provisions establish no limitation on the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis. – In particular, the referring judges, called upon to apply the challenged provisions to applicants who are descendants of Italian citizens, but who were born abroad, reside there, and hold the citizenship of another State, question the constitutional legitimacy of the cited provisions on multiple grounds. – All the referring courts consider that Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution have been violated, the latter under the aspects of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality. In particular, they argue that the recognition of citizenship in favor of persons who — while having the aforementioned connecting elements with the legal system of a foreign country — can claim only descent from an Italian citizen, without having any other ties with the domestic legal order, would profoundly distort the notion of "the people", affecting the very exercise of popular sovereignty and, ultimately, the functioning of democracy. – The Ordinary Courts of Bologna, Milan, and Florence also raise questions of constitutional legitimacy with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation to international obligations and the constraints deriving from Italy's membership in the European Union, the latter with specific regard to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). According to the referring judges, these international sources oblige States to adopt citizenship laws that attest to the existence of an effective link with the legal order conferring status civitatis. – Finally, the Courts of Rome and Milan consider the challenged provision to infringe Article 3 of the Constitution, due to an unreasonable disparity of treatment when compared with several other legal frameworks. The referring Court of Rome identifies Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992 — which governs the acquisition of citizenship by the descendant of a person who once possessed, but subsequently lost, the status of Italian citizen — as the tertium comparationis (term of comparison). The referring Milan court, by contrast, considers it unreasonable the existence of a disparity of treatment when compared with the legislation governing the acquisition of citizenship by the spouse of an Italian citizen, male or female.        – Thus summarized, the questions raised in the various proceedings must be joined and decided by a single judgment, since they concern identical or analogous provisions and are based on challenges and parameters that are largely coincident (see, among others, Judgments Nos. 72 of 2025, 171 of 2024, and 220 of 2023). – In the joined proceedings, submissions to intervene have been filed by several associations, whose participation as parties must be deemed inadmissible. – In particular, the interventions ad opponendum filed by Circolo Trentino di San Paolo del Brasile and Circolo Domus Sardinia in the case initiated by the order of the Court of Florence, registered as No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders, have already been declared inadmissible by Order No. 85 of 2025. – Likewise, the interventions filed in the case initiated by the order of the Court of Bologna, registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders, by the associations AUCI and AGIS, through pleadings of identical tenor filed on February 11, 2025, are inadmissible. – According to the settled case law of this Court, participation in incidental proceedings of constitutional review is reserved — in addition to the Prime Minister and, in the case of a regional law, the President of the Regional Government (Articles 3 and 4(1)–(2) of the Supplementary Rules) — to subjects holding a qualified interest, directly and immediately connected with the substantive legal relationship at issue, and not merely governed, like that of any other person, by the provision or provisions under challenge (see, among others, the orders annexed to Judgments Nos. 19 of 2025, 144 and 140 of 2024). With respect to entities representing collective or sectoral interests, such as the intervening associations in this case, this Court has repeatedly clarified that their intervention is inadmissible when they claim, in relation to the subject matter of the incidental constitutional review, only an indirect interest—one that is merely connected, in general terms, to their statutory purpose of protecting their members. This applies all the more so in light of Article 6 of the Supplementary Rules, which permits non-profit social entities and institutional bodies representing collective or diffuse interests related to the constitutional question to submit a written brief to this Court as amici curiae (see also the order annexed to Judgment No. 144 of 2024). – In the present case, the intervening associations do not hold a qualified interest directly and immediately connected to the substantive legal relationship under examination that would entitle them to intervene, since they are not holders of a legal position capable of being immediately and irreparably prejudiced by the outcome of the incidental proceedings. Conversely, they assert only an indirect interest in the subject matter of the incidental constitutional review of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, as such interest is generally linked to the statutory purposes of the two associations, which assist professionals engaged in representing clients in procedures for the recognition and acquisition of Italian citizenship. For these reasons, the interventions of AUCI and AGIS are inadmissible. – Conversely, several appellants in the referring proceedings have duly appeared before this Court, arguing that the constitutional questions raised are inadmissible and, in any case, unfounded. Some of them have noted that, while these proceedings were pending, Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, was enacted, amending the challenged legislation in a manner that is far from marginal. Specifically, the parties who entered an appearance by pleadings filed on May 20, 2025, maintain that the aforementioned decree-law applies to the present case, whereas those who appeared by pleadings filed on May 16, 2025, deny its applicability. Furthermore, the former have requested that this Court itself raise questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding the new legislation. – It is therefore necessary, as a preliminary matter, to examine the features of the legislative framework underlying the present questions and the amendments introduced by the aforementioned decree-law. – The challenged provision, Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, provides that "a person is a citizen by birth: (a) the child of a father or mother who are citizens." This rule automatically associates the acquisition of citizenship with status filiationis (legal parent-child relationship). This is confirmed by Articles 2, 3, and 14 of Law No. 91 of 1992, which respectively link the acquisition of status civitatis to the recognition of the child, to adoption, or to the existence of a filial bond that predates the acquisition or reacquisition of citizenship by the ancestor. Such a framework reiterates what had already been established — albeit within a context still impervious to the principle of gender equality — by Law No. 555 of 1912 (which, in Article 1(1), stated that "a person is a citizen by birth: (1) the child of a father who are citizens"), and, even earlier, by the Civil Code of 1865, which, in Article 4 of Book I, Title I, defined as "a citizen the child of a father who is a citizen," thereby incorporating the model of the Code Napoléon of 1804, according to which "[t]out enfant né d'un Français dans un pays étranger est Français" (Book I, Title I, Article 10). Following the removal of the discriminatory factor from Article 1(1) of Law No. 555 of 1912 by Judgment No. 30 of 1983 of this Court, the rule concerning citizenship acquisition through the bond of filiation was subsequently incorporated into Article 5(1) of Law No. 123 of 1983, which also provided in paragraph two that a dual-national child, upon reaching majority, had the duty to opt for one citizenship within one year. Thereafter, Law No. 91 of 1992, on one hand, repealed Law No. 123 of 1983 without reproducing the prescriptive content of the aforementioned Article 5(2). And, on the other hand, by means of the currently challenged provision, reaffirmed the automatic correlation between status civitatis (citizenship status) and status filiationis. – Consistent with the defining features of citizenship as a status derived from filiation, both the constitutional case law and the jurisprudence of legitimacy have characterized this mode of acquisition as "by origin" (see the aforementioned Judgment No. 30 of 1983; and Court of Cassation, Judgments Nos. 25317 and 25318 of 2022). At the same time, the diritto vivente has emphasized that the citizenship status founded upon filiation is "permanent and imprescriptible [and] can be asserted at any time on the simple proof of the acquisitive circumstance constituted by birth from an Italian citizen" (see the cited Judgments Nos. 25317 and 25318 of 2022). – Against this legislative background, Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, intervened during the pendency of the present proceedings, modifying the automatic correlation between citizenship and status filiationis in cases involving persons born abroad and holding another citizenship. In particular, Article 1(1) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, added to Law No. 91 of 1992 a new Article 3-bis, which provides that "By way of derogation from Articles 1, 2, 3, 14, and 20 of this Law; Article 5 of Law No. 123 of April 21, 1983; Articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 12, and 19 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912; as well as Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 of the Civil Code approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of 1865, any person born abroad, even before the entry into force of this Article, who holds another citizenship, shall be deemed never to have acquired Italian citizenship, unless one of the following conditions applies." In the filing with the competent authorities of an application for recognition of citizenship, accompanied by the required documentation and submitted "by 11:59 p.m., Rome time, on March 27, 2025", letters (a), (a-bis), and (b) identify the dividing line separating the continued applicability of the previous regime from the operation of the new conditions governing the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis. The latter are specified in subparagraphs (c) and (d), which establish that Italian citizenship may be acquired through filiation where: the ascendant of the first or second degree possessed, or at the time of death had possessed, only Italian citizenship; or where the parent or adoptive parent resided in Italy for at least two consecutive years after acquiring Italian citizenship and prior to the birth or adoption of the child. Further, Article 1(1-bis) and (1-ter) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted — which add paragraphs 1-bis and 1-ter to Article 4 of Law No. 91 of 1992 — set forth various cumulative conditions under which the minor child of an Italian parent, not falling within Article 3-bis, may acquire citizenship. In the case of acquisition or reacquisition of citizenship by the parent, the acquisition of status civitatis by the minor child requires the latter's lawful and continuous residence in Italy for two years, or, where the child is under two years old, from birth (Article 1(1-quater) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, supplementing Article 14(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992). Finally, the new provisions extend to the descendant of an Italian citizen the same rules applicable to the descendant of one who has lost Italian citizenship (Article 1(1-bis) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, extending the scope of Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992; and Article 1-bis(2) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, supplementing Article 9(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992). – Given this legislative framework, the new provisions — notwithstanding their similarity to certain hypotheses outlined in the referring orders — do not affect the relevance of the constitutional questions raised therein. All the proceedings in the main cases were, in fact, initiated on the basis of applications filed prior to March 27, 2025; therefore, pursuant to Article 3-bis(1)(b) of Law No. 91 of 1992, as introduced by Article 1(1) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, the previous legislation — which is the subject of the present constitutional challenges — remains applicable to the referring cases. Accordingly, there are no grounds to return the case files to the referring courts. – Likewise, the conditions under which this Court may raise questions of constitutional legitimacy do not exist in the present case. The new legislative provisions are not to be applied in the constitutional proceedings (Order No. 73 of 1965 and, most recently, Order No. 35 of 2024), nor is there a "relationship of logical presupposition" (rapporto di presupposizione) between those provisions and the one challenged by the referring judges such that an intervention limited to the latter would nonetheless fail to remove the alleged constitutional defect (Orders Nos. 94 of 2022 and 18 of 2021). Similarly, there are no grounds for recognizing circumstances of particular urgency (Order No. 73 of 1965) or for invoking the need to prevent this Court — the sole body competent to adjudicate questions of constitutionality of laws — from being required to apply unconstitutional legislation (Order No. 22 of 1960 and, most recently, Order No. 35 of 2024). – On this basis, the Court may now proceed to examine the various procedural objections (eccezioni di rito) raised by the parties, beginning with those that are manifestly unfounded. – Such are, first of all, the objections of inadmissibility asserting that the referring orders allegedly failed to provide adequate reasoning as to the non-manifest unfoundedness of the questions, on the ground that they would contradict the established case law of this Court, of the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione), and even of the referring courts themselves, which — according to the parties — would have already affirmed and confirmed the "constitutional legitimacy" of the contested provision in their introductory pleadings. It must first be noted that this Court has never before been called upon to address the specific doubts of constitutional legitimacy raised in the present cases. On prior occasions, it has ruled only on entirely different challenges concerning the same provision. In particular, the Court has addressed the absence of a rule allowing acquisition of citizenship through the maternal line (Judgment No. 30 of 1983), but never the absence of a rule limiting the jure sanguinis mechanism for persons born abroad, residing there, and holding another citizenship. However, it must above all be recalled that this Court — contrary to what is asserted by the parties — adjudicates only on the possible unconstitutionality of statutory provisions. Thus, even when the Court declares a question unfounded, it does not affirm the constitutionality of the challenged provision; rather, it merely excludes the existence of the constitutional violation specifically alleged. – Equally unfounded is the objection claiming the failure to attempt an interpretation consistent with the Constitution, raised in relation to the referring order of the Court of Milan, which explicitly ruled out the possibility of overcoming the constitutional doubts through interpretative construction. The same objection, raised with regard to the orders of the other referring courts, is likewise unfounded. It is, in fact, self-evident that the referring judges, in requesting an additive and manipulative intervention on Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, implicitly considered that its textual wording could not encompass the complex and numerous additions they themselves proposed. A judge is under no obligation to state expressly what is already manifest from the literal wording of the provision. This Court has repeatedly affirmed, particularly in recent decisions, that the textual data of a statute constitutes an insurmountable limit beyond which interpretative conformity must necessarily yield to constitutional review (see, among many others, Judgments Nos. 88 of 2025, 44 of 2024, 193 of 2022, and 221 of 2019). – Proceeding now in the logical order of the objections, the Court shall next examine those concerning the alleged lack of relevance. – First of all, the objection of irrelevance raised by some parties is unfounded. It is based on the assumption that the referring courts of Bologna, Rome, and Florence challenged only Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, and not also the preceding laws governing the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis by their ancestors (namely, Law No. 123 of 1983, Law No. 555 of 1912, and, earlier still, the Civil Code of 1865), even though some of the applicants were born prior to the entry into force of Law No. 91 of 1992. Such an objection is without merit, since under Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, Italian citizenship belongs to anyone who is the child of an Italian citizen, male or female, regardless of any different rule in force at the time the bond of filiation arose. Birth, indeed, constitutes the factual prerequisite for status filiationis (like recognition or adoption), but it is the status of child, as such, that forms the legal basis for the acquisition of status civitatis. – Conversely, the Court must ex officio declare inadmissible, for lack of relevance, the questions raised by the Court of Milan concerning the entire sequence of prior laws mentioned above, specifically Article 4 of the Civil Code of 1865 and Article 1 of Law No. 555 of 1912. The main proceedings do not concern the laws conferring Italian citizenship upon the applicants' ancestors, which at most — and only indirectly — may be invoked as evidence supporting the Italian citizenship of the parent of a person seeking recognition of his or her own status. On the contrary, the subject matter of the main proceedings is the set of rules governing the acquisition of Italian citizenship by the applicants themselves; and these applicants, pursuant to Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, are Italian citizens by virtue of being children of Italian citizens, even if born before 1992. – As to the objection disputing the relevance of the questions on the ground that the referring judges allegedly failed to demonstrate that the applicants lack effective ties with the Italian legal order, it shall be examined together with the objection alleging the manipulative nature of the proposed introduction of such requirements (infra, paragraph 12 of the Reasons in law). – The Court must now address the objection of inadmissibility based on the argument that the matter lies within the exclusive discretion of the legislature, an objection raised by all the parties' defenses. In particular, some parties contend that this Court cannot "call into question what has been, and remains, a legislative choice" in matters of citizenship, the result of a deliberate "discretionary" assessment by Parliament. They therefore consider that any upholding of the constitutional challenges would amount to a "violation of Article 70 of the Constitution, concerning the holder of legislative power; of Article 71, concerning those entitled to legislative initiative; and of Article 134, concerning the functions of this Honorable Constitutional Court." This objection, as thus formulated, is unfounded. – This Court recognizes that "the legislature enjoys broad discretion in regulating the attribution of citizenship" (Judgment No. 25 of 2025). Nevertheless, legislative provisions in this field — no less than in other areas marked by significant discretion — "are not thereby exempt from constitutional review, since they must in any case be enacted in accordance with the canons of non-manifest unfoundedness and proportionality in relation to the purposes pursued" (inter alia, Judgments Nos. 88 of 2023, 194 of 2019, 202 of 2013, and 245 of 2011) (Judgment No. 25 of 2025; see also Judgment No. 195 of 2022). In particular, constitutional case law has excluded that any foundational criterion of citizenship may be discriminatory in nature (see the aforementioned Judgment No. 30 of 1983, which found a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution in a rule that provided "for original acquisition of citizenship only through the father," without recognizing the same through the mother). Subsequently, this Court has held manifestly unreasonable and disproportionate — when applied to persons suffering from physical or mental disabilities — citizenship provisions requiring the demonstration of knowledge or the performance of acts that such persons could not reasonably be expected to fulfill (Judgments Nos. 25 of 2025 and 258 of 2017). It has also declared unconstitutional a rule that, among the grounds barring recognition of citizenship, unreasonably included the death of the applicant's spouse occurring while the administrative term for completion of the procedure was still pending (Judgment No. 195 of 2022). – This Court is not unaware of the distinctive nature of the challenge raised with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution, which alleges failure to respect the notion of "the people" as reflected in the constitutional provisions concerning citizenship. It must be emphasized that the Constitution does not define the term "people"; rather, it outlines aspects of citizenship interwoven throughout the broader constitutional text. The Constitution primarily associates citizenship with political participation and political rights (Title IV of Part I of the Constitution). It further attributes to citizens the possession of rights and duties (including the duty to defend the homeland, the duty to contribute to public expenses, and the duty of loyalty). Yet this attribution of rights and duties is situated within a source — the Constitution itself — whose fundamental principles guarantee every person's inviolable rights and equality (see Judgment No. 120 of 1967 and, most recently, Judgment No. 53 of 2024) and which also extends certain duties of solidarity to non-citizens. One might recall, for example, the duty to contribute to public expenses, which Article 53 of the Constitution assigns to "all," or the possibility of performing national civil service, which this Court has extended to foreign nationals, describing such service as "the fulfillment of a duty of solidarity and an opportunity for integration and civic formation" (Judgment No. 119 of 2015). The Constitution refers to the idea of citizenship as belonging to a community with shared cultural and linguistic roots. At the same time, it defines a community open to pluralism and that protects minorities. Finally, the constitutional provisions evoke a correlation between citizenship and the territory of the State, as a place that reflects a common cultural heritage and the sharing of constitutional principles. In view of the articulated and multifaceted constitutional references to citizenship, it is, therefore, up to the legislature, which enjoys particularly broad discretion, to determine the prerequisites for acquiring the status. Nevertheless, it falls to this Court to verify, according to the standard of non-manifest unreasonableness and disproportionality, that the statutory criteria for acquiring status civitatis are not entirely alien to constitutional principles or to the multiple features that, as noted above, characterize citizenship. The legislature remains free to concretely define the content of citizenship in the light of constitutional principles. – The above observation is consistent with the approach adopted by the Court of Justice regarding the constraints imposed on nationality matters by European Union law, particularly by Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU. In general terms, the Court of Justice has recognized that "[t]he determination of the ways of acquiring and losing citizenship falls, in accordance with international law, within the competence of each Member State" (Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C-369/90, Micheletti and others, paragraph 10). At the same time, however, the Court has clarified that such competence "must be exercised in compliance with European Union law" (Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, Judgments of 29 April 2025, Case C-181/23, European Commission v Republic of Malta, paras. 42, 95 and 98; 5 September 2023, Case C-689/21, Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, para. 30; 18 January 2022, Case C-118/20, JY, para. 49; 2 March 2010, Case C-135/08, Rottmann, para. 45; and Micheletti, para. 10). In an initial phase, it thus came to criticize national regulations that determined the loss of citizenship status with respect to a Member State and, by extension, with respect to the European Union. Specifically, it maintained that the provisions contained in the EU Treaties on citizenship preclude such regimes where they allow "no possibility for an individual examination of the consequences of that loss for the persons concerned under EU law" (Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 17 March 2019, Case C-221/17, Tjebbes and Others; to the same effect, Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, and, regarding cases producing statelessness, JY, paras. 58, 59, 73; and Rottmann, para. 55). In a more recent phase, the Court has extended its scrutiny to the rules governing citizenship acquisition, finding that "the exercise of Member States' competence in defining the conditions for the conferral of nationality of a Member State is not unlimited, just as their competence in defining the conditions for loss of nationality is not" (European Commission v Republic of Malta, para. 95). From this perspective, it emphasized that Union citizenship is founded "on the common values set out in Article 2 TEU and on the mutual trust among Member States that none will exercise this competence in a manner manifestly incompatible with the very nature of Union citizenship" (European Commission v Republic of Malta, para. 95). The Court of Justice further noted that the EU Treaties define the content of Union citizenship: guaranteeing to citizens and their family members freedom of movement, freedom to provide services, and freedom of establishment within the Union; granting political rights; and affording the right to diplomatic and consular protection by other Member States under the same conditions as their own nationals (ibid., paras. 84–90). On that basis, the Court of Justice concluded that national rules on nationality must not be exercised "in a manner manifestly incompatible with the very nature of Union citizenship" (ibid., para. 95). Consequently, it found incompatible with EU law any "naturalization plan" granting nationality in return for payments or investments made in a Member State, as such schemes are "akin to the commercialization of the conferral of Member State nationality and, by extension, of Union citizenship" (ibid., para. 100). – In light of the foregoing, the objection raised by the parties is unfounded, insofar as it seeks to exclude a priori, on the basis of legislative discretion, the admissibility of a challenge alleging that a rule on citizenship is alien both to constitutional principles and to the provisions of the TEU and TFEU as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union. – However, the Court must now note that the referring judges, in raising the questions with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution — on the grounds of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality — as well as to Article 117(1), in relation to Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU, do not dispute that the bond of filiation, as a prerequisite for acquisition of citizenship, corresponds in itself to the features that define status civitatis under the Constitution and the sources of EU law. Their challenges do not question the general idea that belonging to a family community, which forms part of the national community, may also entail belonging to the latter — a criterion on which, indeed, the status civitatis of most Italian citizens rests. Rather, what the referring judges doubt is that, in the presence of factors linking the applicant to foreign legal orders, and in the absence of any connection with the Italian legal order other than ius sanguinis, the bond of filiation alone may suffice to perform its function as the foundation of citizenship. In such circumstances — they argue — the family community would no longer be capable of transmitting a sense of belonging to the national community. – In relation to this specific challenge, the parties have raised further, more detailed objections of inadmissibility. Firstly, they argue that this Court cannot, through a systemic manipulative judgment, substitute the legislature in determining a plurality of prerequisites. On one hand, it would have to identify the foreign-law connecting factors whose presence would irreparably weaken the function of ius sanguinis; on the other, it would have to define, in a combined and systematic manner, the domestic-law connecting factors whose absence would prevent filiation from fulfilling its function as a basis for acquisition of citizenship. This objection aligns with the further contention that the referring objections are generic, insofar as some courts suggest multiple alternative solutions while others fail to indicate how the alleged constitutional violation might be remedied. Moreover, according to the parties that entered an appearance on May 16, 2024, the vagueness of the challenges is such that they fail even to account for the diversity of situations that any intervention by this Court would affect. Finally, connected to the foregoing objections is that alleging the irrelevance of the challenges, since the referring judges are said to have assumed without proof or opportunity for rebuttal that the applicants lack any other ties with the Italian legal order that could obviate the alleged constitutional defect. – These objections are well-founded. – Even the mere identification of possible correlations with foreign legal systems that would weaken the function of status filiationis as the basis of status civitatis entails discretionary choices among multiple options. Not surprisingly, the referral orders merely describe, in general terms, the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings — persons born abroad, citizens of another State, and resident therein. This Court would therefore have to decide whether to give weight to birth abroad, and whether that circumstance must be combined with one or both of the other factors; it would then have to determine whether to consider the foreign residence of the ascendant, the descendant, or both, and at what point in time; finally, it would have to assess the significance of dual citizenship, which may vary depending on whether it pertains to the descendant or also to the ascendant. Moreover, intervening on each of these elements entails not only discretionary assessments, but also significant implications for the system. – The systemic and manipulative nature of the intervention, as envisaged by the referring judges, becomes even more evident when one considers that this Court would be called upon to determine which among the many defining aspects of citizenship could adequately demonstrate that, notwithstanding the existence of links with a foreign legal order, membership in the family unit continues to justify belonging to the national community. The Court would thus have to substitute the legislature in deciding whether to prioritize cultural and linguistic ties to the national community, taking into account the condition of citizens residing abroad, or, conversely, to prioritize a connection with the territory. It is therefore unsurprising that the referring judges' own proposals range across multiple and divergent solutions. The vagueness and manipulative character of the challenges are further confirmed by the fact that the referring courts do not address the wide variety of situations that the requested intervention would potentially affect: those who have already applied for recognition of citizenship; those who have not yet applied but possess status filiationis; and those who will acquire such status in the future. – In conclusion, what is requested of this Court is an exceedingly complex manipulative intervention involving a wide spectrum of options, the selection among which would entail discretionary choices with significant systemic repercussions. For the reasons set forth above, the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised with reference to Articles 1(2), 3, and 117(1) of the Constitution — the latter in relation to Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU — are inadmissible. – Equally inadmissible — for failure to identify the specific international norm serving as the interposed parameter — is the question of constitutional legitimacy alleging a violation of Article 117(1) of the Constitution in relation to international obligations. The referring courts do not specify which source of international law is said to have been infringed, or from which the alleged non-compliance with international obligations would derive. No international conventions, whether directly or indirectly concerning citizenship, are invoked. Nor is any rule of customary international law cited — which, moreover, would have required the additional invocation of Article 10 of the Constitution. Finally, there are no references to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, which, under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, constitute sources of international law. Conversely, the referring judges merely recall the Liechtenstein v. Guatemala case (ICJ, Judgment of 6 April 1955), improperly conflating the criteria for attribution of nationality with the distinct question of the international effectiveness of nationality — that is, its capacity to be relied upon in international relations. Only for such purposes does that judgment, as well as the more recent Qatar v. United Arab Emirates (ICJ, Judgment of 4 February 2021), presuppose the existence of an effective and genuine link with the State. Accordingly, the challenge raised with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, concerning international obligations, is inadmissible. – By contrast, the questions raised by the Courts of Rome and Milan, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution under the profile of unreasonable disparity of treatment, are admissible. The referring judges, though initially drawing rather general comparisons between the challenged provision — as applied to persons in the position of the applicants — and various other citizenship regimes, ultimately identified with sufficient precision two specific third term of comparison. – In particular, the referring Court of Rome considers that Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, as applied to persons born and residing abroad and holding the citizenship of a foreign State, entails an unreasonable disparity of treatment when compared with Article 4(1) of the same Law, which, among the several provisions considered, it regards as "the most appropriately comparable." In both cases — according to the referring judge — citizenship is acquired ipso iure on the basis of recognition of the requisite conditions, thereby constituting a subjective right rather than a legitimate interest. – The Court of Milan, for its part, after comparing the challenged provision with several others conferring citizenship, identifies as its third term of comparison the regime governing acquisition of citizenship by the foreign spouse of an Italian citizen, which requires proof of an intermediate level of proficiency in the Italian language or, alternatively, the signing of an integration agreement. – On the merits, these questions are unfounded. A challenge of unreasonable disparity of treatment requires this Court, first and foremost, to verify, in light of the rationale of the regulation, the consistency between the situations being compared. According to settled case law, a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution exists "only where substantively identical situations are governed in an unjustifiably different manner, and not where differences in regulation correspond to situations that are not comparable" (see, among many others, Judgments Nos. 171 of 2022, 71 of 2021, 85 of 2020, 13 of 2018, and 71 of 2015). – Such essential identity is lacking, first of all, in the challenge raised by the Court of Rome. Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992 concerns the acquisition of status civitatis by foreign nationals who are the children of persons who have lost Italian citizenship. By contrast, the challenged provision governs the jure sanguinis acquisition of citizenship by the descendants of persons who are Italian citizens. The lack of homogeneity between the situations compared is therefore decisive. – The prerequisite of homogeneity is likewise absent in the challenge brought by the Court of Milan. Acquisition of citizenship through marriage to an Italian citizen rests on a bond — that of marriage — which is not comparable to the bond of filiation, even having regard to the purpose of the legislation. This challenge is therefore likewise unfounded. – In conclusion, the challenges brought by the Court of Milan concerning Article 4 of the Civil Code of 1865 and Article 1 of Law No. 555 of 1912 are inadmissible. Equally inadmissible are the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, raised with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution on grounds of unreasonableness and disproportionality, as well as to Article 117(1) in relation to international obligations and to the constraints arising from Italy's membership in the European Union — the latter specifically under Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU. Finally, the questions of constitutional legitimacy of the same provision, raised with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution on grounds of unreasonable disparity of treatment, are unfounded. FOR THESE REASONS THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT having joined the cases, 1.Declares inadmissible the interventions of AUCI – Avvocati uniti per la cittadinanza italiana and AGIS – Associazione giuristi iure sanguinis, made in the proceedings concerning the order registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders; 2. Declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 4 of the Civil Code of 1865, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, and of Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912 (On Italian Citizenship), raised by the Ordinary Court of Milan, Twelfth Division specialized in immigration, international protection and free movement of European Union citizens, with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution — the latter under the dual aspect of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality, as well as of unreasonable disparity of treatment — and with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation both to international obligations and to the constraints arising from Italy's membership in the European Union, the latter with regard to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by the order indicated in the heading; 3.Declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New Rules on Citizenship), raised by the Ordinary Courts of Bologna, Milan, Rome, and Florence — respectively the Divisions specialized in immigration, international protection and free movement of EU citizens, and in Rome the Division for personal rights and immigration — with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution, the latter under the profile of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality, by the orders indicated in the heading; and likewise the questions raised by the Ordinary Courts of Bologna, Milan, and Florence — each Division specialized in immigration, international protection and free movement of EU citizens — with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation to international obligations and to the constraints arising from Italy's membership in the European Union, the latter with regard to Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU, by the orders indicated in the heading;  4. Declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, raised with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, under the profile of unreasonable disparity of treatment, by the Ordinary Courts of Rome (Division for personal rights and immigration) and Milan (Twelfth Division specialized in immigration, international protection and free movement of European Union citizens), by the orders indicated in the heading. Thus decided in Rome, at the headquarters of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 24 June 2025. Signed:                                          , President                                          , Reporting Judge                                          , Director of the Registry Filed in the Registry on July 31, 2025 The Director of the Registry Signed: The anonymized version is consistent, in the text, with the original. Judgments and orders of the Constitutional Court are published in the first special series of the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic (pursuant to Articles 3 of Law No. 839 of December 11, 1984, and 21 of the Presidential Decree No. 1092 of December 28, 1985) and in the Official Collection of Judgments and Orders of the Constitutional Court (pursuant to Article 29 of the Supplementary Rules for proceedings before the Constitutional Court, approved by the Constitutional Court on March 16, 1956). The text published in the Official Gazette is fully authoritative and prevails in case of divergence.   Thu, 23 Oct 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23334/Constitutional-Court----Ruling-n-124-2025-translated--- http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23332/Minor-issue-news blog As part of our continued updates on the "minor issue" in Italian citizenship law, we are pleased to share a significant procedural development. The United Sections (Sezioni Unite) of the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) have officially scheduled a hearing. At the beginning was indicate the date of January 13, 2026. Now, has been moved. We do not know yet the exact date, it should be around Spring 2026. In any case, this marks a crucial step forward. The referral to the United Sections—announced on July 18, 2025—reflected the Court's recognition of conflicting interpretations among its divisions regarding Articles 7 and 12 of Law No. 555/1912. By scheduling the hearing with the United Section, the Court is moving toward a definitive and authoritative resolution. This development aligns with the broader line of legal reasoning that has been raised in various recent proceedings including the one on April 1, 2025 oral hearing before the First Civil Division in Case No. RG 11785/2024, during which we presented arguments challenging the automatic loss of Italian citizenship by minors in cases of parental naturalization. Notably, the Advocate General supported our position, underscoring the constitutional and systemic implications of the current legal interpretation. These are the two questions referred to the Court, quoted exactly as stated: i) whether, pursuant to Law no. 555 of 1912, the child of an Italian citizen born abroad—being able to acquire simultaneously Italian citizenship iure sanguinis and the citizenship of the place of birth iure soli—was, as a rule, entitled—under Article 7—to retain dual citizenship, thus remaining in all respects an Italian citizen, unless he/she renounced it upon reaching the age of majority, unless the cohabiting father, by application of the provisions set forth in Article 12, paragraph 2, lost Italian citizenship through a voluntary act while the child was still a minor, with acquisition of another citizenship by naturalization (by virtue of a decision which, having been made by the head of the family holding patria potestas, within the legal framework applicable ratione temporis, produced effects also within the legal sphere of the minor children subject to him); ii) whether, on the contrary, within the overall context of the provisions of Law no. 555 of 1912, Article 12, paragraph 2—referring to minors who "acquire the citizenship of a foreign State" as a result of the loss of citizenship by the parent exercising patria potestas—must be understood as a general provision, from which the rule set forth in Article 7 represents an exception for individuals holding dual nationality from birth, thereby establishing a special and different regime for the loss of citizenship, such that the naturalization abroad of the Italian parent subsequent to the child's birth did not entail the loss of Italian citizenship by the child, who was a dual citizen, born and residing in a foreign State which regarded him/her as its own citizen by birth (iure soli), while still a minor. The scheduled hearing indicates the Court's willingness to address these unresolved questions and bring clarity to a matter affecting thousands of individuals worldwide. We will continue to monitor the docket closely and submit further materials to ensure that all relevant legal intersections—including the implications for 1948 cases—are brought to the Court's attention. We will provide additional updates as we know. Wed, 15 Oct 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23332/Minor-issue-news http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/userfiles/1516/images/524766680%5F1333855275409488%5F8799465079031871596%5Fn%2Ejpg http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/ http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23313/Italian-Passport---US-Passport---How-to-use-them-- blog Traveling from the U.S. to Italy: At U.S. airport check-in: present your U.S. passport. At security screening: present your U.S. passport. At boarding (flight to Italy/EU): present your U.S. passport. Upon arrival in Italy (EU immigration): present your Italian passport. Traveling from Italy to U.S.: At Italian airport check-in: present your U.S. passport. At Italian exit immigration: present your Italian passport. At boarding (flight to U.S.): present your U.S. passport. Upon arrival in the United States (U.S. immigration): present your U.S. passport. Sun, 07 Sep 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23313/Italian-Passport---US-Passport---How-to-use-them-- http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23307/Outcome-of-the-June-24-Hearing-Before-the-Italian-Constitutional-Court--No-Retroactive-Limits-on-Citizenship-by-Descent-before-the-reform blog On June 24, 2025, the Italian Constitutional Court issued a highly anticipated decision regarding the recognition of Italian citizenship by descent (jure sanguinis) without generational limits and without requiring an "effective link" to Italy, such as residence, language proficiency, or cultural integration. Some lower courts in Bologna, Rome, Milan, and Florence had questioned the constitutionality of this approach, arguing that it allows recognition of citizenship for individuals with no real connection to the Italian community, potentially conflicting with the constitutional concept of "the people" and with European and international law principles. The Court rejected the question. It did not rule on the merits of whether limiting citizenship by descent is appropriate. Instead, it declared the challenges inadmissible on procedural grounds, emphasizing that the rules on citizenship fall within the exclusive authority of the Italian Parliament, which enjoys broad discretion in this field however, having always respect to the supreme legal principle. Any decision to impose generational caps, require residence, or introduce language tests would amount to creating new law—something only Parliament can do, not the Court. The Court also found the challenges too vague and broad to allow for a precise ruling without effectively rewriting the entire legal framework. Regarding claims of "unequal treatment" between those acquiring citizenship by descent and those obtaining it through marriage—who face stricter requirements such as residency and language tests—the Court rejected the argument. It explained that these are legally different situations: jure sanguinis is considered an "original" acquisition based on bloodline, while citizenship by marriage has a different legal foundation and purpose. The Court also acknowledged that, while the case was pending, Parliament passed Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, introducing limits to jure sanguinis for future applicants. However, it made clear that this new law does not apply to applications filed before it came into force, and the Court did not evaluate the constitutionality of the new law in this ruling. Bottom line: The Court's decision preserves the status quo for all existing and past jure sanguinis applications submitted under the previous unlimited framework. Parliament has the authority to set new rules for the future, but the Court will not impose retroactive restrictions. This ruling provides legal certainty for thousands of descendants of Italian citizens whose applications were filed before the recent reform. Fri, 08 Aug 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23307/Outcome-of-the-June-24-Hearing-Before-the-Italian-Constitutional-Court--No-Retroactive-Limits-on-Citizenship-by-Descent-before-the-reform http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23305/Update---Italian-Supreme-Court-Refers-the--Minor-Issue--to-the-United-Sections--A-Turning-Point-in-Citizenship-Law blog As part of our continued updates on the "minor issue" in Italian citizenship law, we are pleased to announce a significant development that could reshape the legal landscape for applicants born abroad to Italian parents who naturalized in a foreign country while the applicant was still a minor and born abroad. Background: Oral Hearing Before the Supreme Court On April 1, 2025, I had the honor of presenting oral arguments before the First Civil Division of the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) in Case No. RG 11785/2024, which addressed the so-called minor issue. This legal challenge questions the automatic loss of Italian citizenship by minors following the voluntary naturalization of their parent, as governed by Law No. 555/1912. Notably, the Advocate General of the Supreme Court, representing the public interest, formally requested that the petition be granted. The Advocate General's opinion strongly supported our legal interpretation, underlining constitutional and systemic concerns with the current approach to loss of citizenship in these cases. The Turning Point: Referral to the United Sections On July 18, 2025, the Supreme Court issued a landmark order: the minor issue has now been referred to the United Sections (Sezioni Unite) of the Corte di Cassazione. This decision reflects the recognition that conflicting interpretations have emerged among individual divisions of the Court regarding the correct application of Law No. 555/1912, particularly Articles 7 and 12. Given the legal uncertainty and broad implications for thousands of applicants worldwide, the Court concluded that the matter must be resolved definitively by its highest interpretative body. This referral should be seen as a positive sign: had the Court intended to confirm the most recent interpretation—the one that created the so-called minor issue—it could have simply followed that precedent. Instead, by referring the matter to the United Sections, the Court has opened the door to a possible reversal and definitive clarification. Legal Questions Submitted to the United Sections The Court posed the following critical questions of exceptional importance: Dual Citizenship Preservation for Minors Whether, under Law No. 555/1912, a child born abroad to an Italian parent—who thereby acquires dual citizenship iure sanguinis and iure soli—retains Italian citizenship by default under Article 7, unless they voluntarily renounce it upon reaching adulthood, except in cases where the father, while the child was a minor and cohabiting with him, voluntarily lost Italian citizenship by naturalization. In such cases, under Article 12(2), the father's decision would legally extend to the minor child due to the paternal authority (patria potestas) regime in force at the time. Interpretative Supremacy of Article 7 vs. Article 12 Or, conversely, whether Article 12(2) of the 1912 law should be seen as a general rule applying to all minors whose parent loses Italian citizenship and acquires another nationality. In this view, only those minors born with dual citizenship from birth might fall under the special regime of Article 7, thereby not automatically losing Italian citizenship due to the parent's naturalization abroad during their minority. This referral signals the Supreme Court's intent to bring coherence and legal certainty to a field that has seen divergent judicial outcomes. A ruling from the United Sections will carry binding authority and guide all future decisions on this matter. What's Next? We are awaiting the scheduling of the United Sections hearing. In the meantime, our team is preparing further submissions to ensure the Court also addresses how this issue intersects with "1948 cases"—those involving maternal lineage before January 1, 1948—which remain an area of open debate and may be formally raised in the upcoming wave of petitions. For questions about how this development may impact your Italian citizenship claim—or if you were denied recognition in the past due to your parent's naturalization while you were a minor—please contact us at cocoruggerilawassociated.com or email info@cocoruggerilawassociated.com. We are committed to defending your right to Italian citizenship with clarity, expertise, and determination. Sun, 20 Jul 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23305/Update---Italian-Supreme-Court-Refers-the--Minor-Issue--to-the-United-Sections--A-Turning-Point-in-Citizenship-Law http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23301/A-First-Glimpse-of-Constitutional-Scrutiny-on-Decree-Law-36-2025 blog A few days ago, the Court of Turin submitted a question of constitutional legitimacy regarding Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, later converted into law. This represents a significant development: for the first time, a judicial authority has acknowledged the potential conflict between the new legislation and fundamental principles enshrined in the Italian Constitution. As anticipated, Decree-Law No. 36/2025, as converted into law, has raised concerns about its compatibility with fundamental constitutional principles. The Constitutional Court is now called upon to evaluate, as a preliminary matter, whether the question raised is admissible and not manifestly unfounded. This initiative in Turin may well be the first of several similar actions, especially in light of growing debate and legal arguments emerging across the profession. The discussion has only just begun, and the Court's future decision could have far-reaching consequences for all individuals currently affected by this controversial legislation. To encourage broader international understanding and access to this critical constitutional development, we are pleased to share the English translation of the constitutional challenge filed before the Turin Court. Click here to download the translated constitutional challenge. Last news: We are pleased to inform you that the hearing before the Italian Constitutional Court regarding the legitimacy of the Decree Law (DL) has been officially scheduled for March 18, 2026. We will continue to monitor the case closely and provide timely updates. Should you have any questions or need further assistance, please don't hesitate to contact us.   Sun, 29 Jun 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23301/A-First-Glimpse-of-Constitutional-Scrutiny-on-Decree-Law-36-2025 http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23286/Constitutional-Court-Hearing-Set-for-June-24--2025 blog Constitutional Court Hearing Set for June 24, 2025 On June 24, 2025, the Italian Constitutional Court will hear a pivotal case  concerning the rules governing judicial recognition of Italian citizenship by descent. The case stems from a constitutional challenge raised by the Court of Bologna before the government enacted new legislation (via Decree-Law in March/May 2025) that changed the procedural framework for these citizenship cases. Although our firm and clients are not direct parties in the Constitutional Court proceedings, Coco Ruggeri Law has submitted a legal brief (memoria difensiva) in cases where regional courts in Italy have requested a suspension of proceedings, pending the outcome of this constitutional ruling. What's in Our Brief — and Why It Matters Our legal team challenges the validity and timing of the constitutional question itself. Our brief demonstrates that: The constitutional doubts were raised before the new law came into effect, making parts of the question arguably outdated or inapplicable. The rules in place at the time of the constitutional challenge already met the standards set by the Italian Constitution, including: Equal treatment (Article 3) Alignment with international obligations (Article 117) The right to citizenship by descent is inherent, not discretionary — and must remain judicially accessible. We support these points through thorough analysis of constitutional jurisprudence, Supreme Court precedents, and comparative citizenship law.  Why This Affects Our Clients — Even Indirectly Many regional courts are pausing citizenship proceedings due to the pending constitutional ruling. Our brief aims to support judges in continuing to move cases forward, especially now that the legal framework has changed with the March/May 2025 Decree-Law. We are actively defending your rights—even in cases where you're not directly involved in the constitutional challenge. The Legal Brief is available for download here below: Coco Ruggeri Law Legal Brief Constitutional Court 24th of June 2025 Want to Learn More? If you're a legal professional, immigration advocate, journalist, or affected individual, contact us to learn more about this case and how it may impact your citizenship recognition process. Email us: info@cocoruggerilawassociated.com   Mon, 16 Jun 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23286/Constitutional-Court-Hearing-Set-for-June-24--2025 http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23278/Circular-No--26185--May-28--2025----English-Translation blog On May 28, 2025, the Italian Ministry of the Interior issued Circular No. 26185, which provides key operational instructions regarding significant changes to citizenship recognition procedures, with implications for applicants, legal professionals, and administrative personnel involved in citizenship matters. In an effort to support transparency and accessibility for international audiences, we are providing an English translation of the circular. Please note that while this translation aims to reflect the original content as accurately as possible, it is for informational purposes only and not a substitute for the official Italian text, also available for download below. If you believe this circular may affect your case or would like a legal evaluation based on its contents, please contact us directly for personalized legal assistance. Circolare Ministero Interno 28/05/2025 n.26185 - Italian Original Circolare Ministero interno 28/05/2025 n.26185 - English Translation Mon, 02 Jun 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23278/Circular-No--26185--May-28--2025----English-Translation http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23275/Blood-Is-Not-Water blog DL 36/2025:  Judicial Action as a Necessary Response - Profiles of Illegality and Unconstitutionality - With the conversion of Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 into Law, the legal framework concerning the recognition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis has undergone a transformation. The decree introduces limitations, imposing restrictive criteria with retroactive effects, raising serious constitutional and legal concerns. The Right to Citizenship: A Living, Not Immutable Principle It is essential to remember that Italian citizenship law, like all laws, is not static but has been subject over time to numerous interventions — including judicial ones — that have expanded its scope. Many rights recognized today, particularly in cases of maternal descent or interrupted genealogical lines, have been secured thanks to the initiative of the courts and the advocacy of attorneys. Law is not a rigid set of rules but a dynamic system that evolves in response to political, social, and cultural contexts. The law changes, it is interpreted, it is contested: it is always subject to revision, correction, and even to conflicts with the fundamental principles guaranteed by the Constitution. For this reason, despite the entry into force of Decree-Law 36/2025, the judicial route remains open as a potential means to challenge exclusion from the right to Italian citizenship — particularly in cases where the new legislation blocks or restricts access to the administrative process compared to previous practice. Profiles of Illegitimacy and Unconstitutionality in DL 36/2025 Among the main critical issues found in the decree, we highlight: Retroactive application of new restrictions, in violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of laws that worsen legal positions (Art. 11 of the Preliminary Provisions); Conflicts with international treaties and EU norms, especially regarding the rights of descendants and the free movement of persons, based on the principle of proportionality; Disruption of jus sanguinis by decree, violating democratic principles; Abuse of emergency decree power (Art. 77 Const.): the subject matter does not meet the constitutional requirements of "necessity and urgency." This appears to be a political maneuver of structural restriction, masked as an emergency, which undermines protections and limits access to a fundamental right without the necessary parliamentary debate; Violation of Art. 3 of the Constitution (principle of equality): the new regulation creates unreasonable disparities between individuals within the same family, who now face different opportunities for acquiring citizenship solely based on arbitrary factors such as the timing of application or processing status. Siblings, cousins, or children of the same genealogical line are treated differently, in clear violation of substantial equality; "1948 Cases"  Excluded from the Decree, but Always Excluded from Consulates An important clarification concerns the so-called "1948 cases", meaning those in which the Italian ancestor was a woman who gave birth to a child before January 1, 1948. According to Attorney Adriana Coco Ruggeri, although such cases are formally included within the scope of Decree-Law 36/2025 — unless the lineage involves a "Parent" or "Great-Parent" as defined under the decree — it will be argued in court that these cases should not fall under the application of the new law, based on both substantive legal grounds and judicial precedent. In fact, "1948 cases" have never been recognized by Italian consular or municipal authorities, as these administrative bodies have historically refused to apply the favorable interpretation of the Italian Supreme Court, beginning with the landmark ruling No. 4466/2009. Since the outset, these applicants have had no administrative recourse, and the only legal avenue available to them has been judicial proceedings, beginning — significantly late — only in 2009. In this context, applying Decree-Law 36/2025 retroactively to these cases would result in an additional form of prejudice, deepening an already recognized gender-based inequality that the judiciary has progressively worked to redress. Accordingly, the argument to be advanced in court will include: That "1948 cases" constitute a legally distinct category, separate from standard administrative citizenship claims; That judicial recognition has only been available since 2009, and therefore retroactive restrictions would constitute unfair and disproportionate harm; That the effect of the decree in these instances would be to reinforce a form of gender discrimination, already declared unconstitutional in spirit by prior rulings. This position will be supported by relevant case law, constitutional doctrine, and other authoritative sources, demonstrating that an automatic extension of Decree-Law 36/2025 to such cases is legally and ethically indefensible. Our Commitment to the "Minor Issue" Before the Italian Supreme Court Another distinctive element of our firm is its commitment to the so-called "minor issue," referring to cases where citizenship is transmitted by Italian mothers who were minors at the time of the child's birth. Our firm have addressed this matter before the Italian Supreme Court (corte di Cassazione) during the hearing held on April 1, 2025, obtaining an exceptional result: The favorable opinion of the Public Prosecutor for the acceptance of the appeal. Unfortunately, the ruling has not yet been published, but we believe this position confirms the strong legal foundation of our interpretation and sends a significant signal to all petitioners involved in similar cases. The Firm's Strategy: From Consulates to Courts In light of all the above, Coco Ruggeri Law Associated has adopted a clear strategic position: To convert into judicial actions all claims from individuals seeking recognition of citizenship who, due to the new decree, can no longer proceed through consular channels (plus 1948 cases). This approach protects our clients' rights and offers a concrete, legitimate alternative to assert their Italian heritage and acquire citizenship. Italian courts are not automatically bound to apply every law: in light of precedent rulings from the Court of Cassation and trial courts, and provided the laws are in line with constitutional and international (not only European) principles, the judiciary can resist and remedy legislative excesses. Pursuing the judicial path, while not without risks, remains a viable and well-founded strategy. If the applicant's intent is sincere and determined, we have the legal tools and experience to take on the challenge. An Experienced Guide in Italian Courtrooms Attorney Adriana Ruggeri brings over thirty years of experience as a litigation attorney in Italy, with a career built directly before Italian Courts and Tribunals, including the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione). This deep procedural expertise within the Italian judicial system is a decisive advantage for those who now must turn to the courts as the only effective path to justice and recognition. We don't just process applications — we litigate for rights, in the venues where decisions are truly made. Coco Ruggeri Law Associated – Defending your rights, wherever you are.   Fri, 23 May 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23275/Blood-Is-Not-Water http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23264/Decreto-Legge-36-2025 blog Dear All, A note to explain the recent Decreto Legge No. 36 (DL 36/2025) and how our law firm intends to respond. On Friday, March 28, the Italian Government issued an emergency decree (DL 36/2025) which, if converted into law in its current form, would limit eligibility for Italian citizenship by descent. Specifically: Citizenship claims based on an Italian grandparent would still be permitted; Claims based on great-grandparents or earlier ancestors would be excluded; For claims based on an Italian parent, the decree requires proof that the parent resided in Italy for at least two years prior to the applicant's birth; It also places the burden of proving non-naturalization of the Italian ancestor squarely on the applicant. At this stage, the decree is immediately effective, but not final. It must be converted into law by Parliament within 60 days, by May 27, 2025. During that period, it can be modified, approved as-is, or rejected. Our team is monitoring the situation closely, and Attorney Adriana Coco Ruggeri is already preparing to challenge the decree as it contains multiple provisions that appear unconstitutional and legally unsound. Let us be absolutely clear: this is not a legislative reform we can accept in silence. There will be structured and sustained legal opposition, and our law firm will be at the forefront of that challenge—because defending constitutional principles and legal continuity is not only our professional responsibility, but the very foundation of a functioning legal system. Critical Legal Milestones Ahead: On April 1st, 2025, Attorney Adriana Coco Ruggeri appeared before the Italian Supreme Court (Cassazione) in a case focused on the long-contested "minor issue", a legal interpretation that has long denied citizenship recognition to thousands of applicants. We are pleased to inform you that the Procura Generale issued a favorable opinion, which can be found [here – insert link or attachment if applicable]. In this opinion, the Procura adhered to the legal arguments advanced by Atty. Ruggeri invoking a new interpretive approach based on her submissions. While the final decision of the Court is pending, and the timeline for a ruling remains indeterminate, this represents a groundbreaking advancement and reopens hope for many whose claims were previously denied under the minor-age rule. The timing for a final decision by the Court remains undetermined. Before May 27, Parliament must vote on whether to convert DL 36 into law. We are currently contacting relevant Members of Parliament, highlighting both the unconstitutional aspects of DL 36 and its serious legal and practical consequences for Italian communities abroad. We are also making it clear that the italian descendent AIRE electorate—nearly 1 million people in North and South America—will express their disapproval at the ballot box. To date, the parties confirmed to be supporting the decree include Fratelli d'Italia (Giorgia Meloni) and Forza Italia (Antonio Tajani). We will continue to update you as the political landscape evolves.  On June 24, the Italian Constitutional Court will have a (first) hearing  on whether claims through ancestors beyond the grandparent level (e.g., great-grandparents) remain constitutionally valid. The timing for a final decision by the Court remains undetermined. This legal landscape is evolving rapidly—but also actively and successfully being contested by Atty Ruggeri and a broader network of attorneys across Italy. It's important to note that this Decree does not reflect any hostility from the Italian people toward those seeking to reclaim their heritage. Rather, it seems to arise from financial limitations and political mismanagement, especially the government's failure to establish efficient, scalable processes for handling citizenship applications. With nearly thirty years of litigation experience, Attorney Ruggeri is already dissecting the decree and developing a comprehensive legal strategy to defeat it. This is precisely the type of high-level litigation where she excels, and she will lead this response with unwavering determination. Our Strategy: We will coninue as planned with Clients the filings with the Court in Italy; We will suggest to Clients with an administrative path to proceed judicially; We will suggest Clients with family member connect to grandfather to jump in the process; We are prepared to appeal any unjust rulings, And, if necessary, to take the matter to the Italian Constitutional Court and even the European Court. This is our legal path—and if you want be a part of it you can count on us.  Attorney Adriana Coco Ruggeri Coco Ruggeri Law Associated Tue, 01 Apr 2025 06:00:00 GMT http://cocoruggerilawassociated.com/blog/23264/Decreto-Legge-36-2025