Constitutional Court - Ruling n.124/2025 translated

On July 31, 2025, the Italian Constitutional Court published Judgment No. 142/2025, responding to constitutional challenges raised by several trial courts—including those of Bologna, Milan, Florence, and Rome—regarding the unlimited application of jure sanguinis (citizenship by descent).

The referring courts questioned the constitutional legitimacy of several key legal provisions:

• Art. 4 of the 1865 Italian Civil Code (Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865)

• Art. 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912

• Art. 1, para. 1(a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992

These laws establish that individuals born to an Italian citizen—regardless of generational distance—are entitled to Italian citizenship by blood (jure sanguinis), without limitations based on generation, residency, or cultural connection.

The courts raised concerns about whether this broad, unrestricted application of jure sanguinis was compatible with Italy’s Constitution (Articles 1, 3, and 117) and with European Union obligations, given that many descendants have no real link to Italy but can still claim citizenship across generations.
The Constitutional Court rejected the challenges, declaring them either inadmissible or unfounded. It reaffirmed the legitimacy of the current legal framework, stating that:

“The recognition of Italian citizenship by descent, even across multiple generations and without additional residency or cultural connection requirements, does not violate constitutional principles or European obligations.”

The Court emphasized that such recognition stems from Italy’s historical migration patterns and is a legislative choice that does not show signs of irrationality or disproportionality under constitutional scrutiny.

If you wish to explore the legal reasoning in more depth, we suggest starting from paragraph 8 of the judgment, as we have translated the Court’s decision below
Enjoy the read,

and feel free to reach out if you’d like to discuss how this ruling may apply to your case.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Judgment No. 142/2025 (ECLI:IT:COST:2025:142)
Case: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF INCIDENTAL QUESTION
Presiding Judge:                        – Reporting Judge:                          
Public hearing held on June 24, 2025;              Decision rendered on June 24, 2025;
Filed on July 31, 2025;          Published in the Official Gazette on August 6, 2025;
Challenged provisions: Article 4 of the Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865; Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912; Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992.
Headnotes:
Decided cases: Orders No. 247 of 2024; Nos. 65, 66 and 86 of 2025

JUDGMENT NO. 142

YEAR 2025

THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

consisting of: Presiding Judge                                                  ; Judges
has rendered the following

JUDGMENT
in the constitutional review proceedings concerning Article 4 of the Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865; Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1992 (On Italian citizenship); Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship), brought by the Ordinary Court of Bologna, Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection and Free Movement of European Union Citizens, by order of November 26, 2024; by the Ordinary Court of Rome, Division for the Rights of the Person and Immigration, by order of March 21, 2025; by the Ordinary Court of Milan, Twelfth Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection and Free Movement of European Union Citizens, by order of March 3, 2025; and by the Ordinary Court of Florence, Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection and Free Movement of European Union Citizens, by order of March 7, 2025; said orders were registered respectively as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders and as Nos. 65, 66, and 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders, and published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic, First Special Series, Nos. 4, 16, and 18 of 2025.

having examined the pleadings filed by                                                                                                                                                        , as well as the statements of intervention submitted by AUCI – “Avvocati Uniti per la Cittadinanza Italiana” (United Lawyers for Italian Citizenship) and by AGIS – “Associazione Giuristi Iure Sanguinis” (Association of Lawyers Iure Sanguinis), in the case registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders, and by Circolo Trentino of São Paulo (Brazil) and Circolo Domus Sardinia, in the case registered as No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders.

heard the Reporting Judge                                during the public hearing of June 24, 2025;

heard Attorneys                                                                 on behalf of                               and the other appearing parties, as well as Attorneys                                                                                                                                         on behalf of                                                           and the other appearing parties;

decided in chambers on June 24, 2025


Findings of fact

1. – By orders of November 26, 2024 (registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders), March 21, 2025 (registered as No. 65 in the 2025 Register of Orders), March 3, 2025 (registered as No. 66 in the 2025 Register of Orders), and March 7, 2025 (registered as No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders), the Ordinary Courts of Bologna (Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection, and Free Movement of European Union Citizens), of Rome (Division for the Rights of the Person and Immigration), of Milan (Twelfth Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection, and Free Movement of European Union Citizens), and of Florence (Specialized Division for Immigration, International Protection, and Free Movement of European Union Citizens) raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992 (New rules on citizenship), insofar as it provides that “a citizen by birth is: (a) the child of a father or mother who are citizens,” without establishing any limitation on the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis (by descent).
2. 1. – Only the Ordinary Court of Milan also challenged Article 4 of the Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, as well as Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912 (On Italian Citizenship), insofar as these provisions establish no limitation on the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis.
3. 2. – All referring courts consider that Articles 1, second paragraph, and 3 of the Constitution have been violated, the latter on the grounds of unreasonableness and disproportionality.

The Ordinary Courts of Bologna, Milan, and Florence have also raised questions of constitutional legitimacy with reference to Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to international obligations and to the constraints arising from Italy’s membership in the European Union — the latters with regard to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Finally, the Courts of Rome and Milan consider the challenged provision to be in violation of Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, due to unreasonable disparity of treatment compared to different terms of comparison.

2. – As to the facts of the case, the referring judges report that they must determine the Italian citizenship of the applicants, who were born abroad (specifically in Brazil and Uruguay) and reside there as citizens of those countries. The applicants claim an unbroken line of descent from Italian citizens born in Italy — namely, on April 27, 1874 in the Bologna case; on January 27, 1873 in the Rome case; on September 14, 1843 in the Milan case; and on January 11, 1903 in the Florence case.
3. – As to the relevance of the constitutional questions, the referring courts state that they must apply the challenged provisions and are therefore required to recognize the Italian citizenship of all applicants, since they meet the sole requirement for the acquisition of citizenship under the applicable law.

The referring court of Milan further expressly excludes any possibility of interpreting the challenged provisions in a manner consistent with the Constitution.

4. – The referring courts then provide, with largely consistent reasoning, the grounds supporting the view that the raised questions of constitutional legitimacy are not manifestly unfounded.
5. 1. – As a preliminary matter, the referring courts discuss — with varying levels of detail and breadth — the contextual reasons that, in their view, justify the doubts concerning the constitutionality of the provision.
6. 1. 1. – In particular, the Courts of Bologna and Florence provide an extensive account of the peculiar situation of Italy, characterized — especially over the past century — by a massive outward migration. Referring to various sources, they note that between 1870 and 1970 approximately 27 million Italian citizens left the country, and about half of them never returned. Their descendants are now presumed to outnumber the citizens residing in Italy.
7. 1. 2. – Despite this background, the Italian legal system is said to be among the few that have not set any limits on the recognition of citizenship by descent (jure sanguinis).

This situation is further aggravated, on one hand, by modern technologies that facilitate the reconstruction of family lineage, and on the other, by the attractiveness of Italian citizenship, given the severe economic crises affecting the countries that were the main destinations of past migration. Currently, Italian citizenship is particularly appealing as it allows its holders to relocate to any Member State of the European Union and to enter the United States without a visa.

1. 1. 3. – The factual background outlined by the referring judges is completed by their observation of the inertia and “stalemate conditions of consulates abroad” (Orders registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders and No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders; see also Order No. 65 in the 2024 Register of Orders to similar effect), which has resulted in a proliferation of applications before Italian courts seeking judicial recognition of citizenship.
2. – In light of this background, the referring judges consider that the challenged provisions simultaneously in conflict with the notion of “the people” under Article 1(2) of the Constitution and with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality set forth in Article 3 of the Constitution.
3. 1. – With respect to this first claim, the arguments set out by the four referring judges are essentially convergent and, in part, perfectly overlapping (especially those of the Courts of Bologna and Florence).

According to the referring courts, Article 1(2) of the Constitution implies a “close correspondence between the people and sovereignty” (Order No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders), which would be distorted by Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, insofar as it grants “citizenship to tens of millions of people who have no effective connection with Italy” (ibid.).

Although the Constitution provides that “sovereignty belongs to the people,” it does not define the notion of “people.” This, the referring judges argue, highlights the importance of the rules governing the acquisition, loss, and reacquisition of citizenship, which they regard as expressions of “a fundamental human right to participate — in accordance with the democratic principle — in the governance of the society in which one lives” (again, Order No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders). Some of the referring judges consider that the existence of a state legislative reserve in this matter is undisputed (see Orders Nos. 247 of 2024 and 86 of 2025).

1. 2. – According to the referring courts, the significance of the citizenship provisions in relation to the notion of “the people” implies the existence of constitutional limits on legislative discretion, since those categories cannot be regarded as “empty shells left to the absolute discretion of the legislature” (see Order No. 86 of 2025 and, to the same effect, Order No. 247 of 2024).

Citizenship is “rich in content, consisting, beyond dispute, of the set of rights and duties recognized by constitutional provisions that lay down the principles on which the concept of the Italian ‘people’ is founded” (see Order No. 66 of 2025). It also exhibits “as structural and inherent features, the relational and integrative connection with the community of citizens and, consequently, it also implies and presupposes proximity to the people and to the territory” (see Order No. 65 of 2025).

According to the referring courts, the challenged provisions sever the link between citizenship and “conditions of belonging, participation, relationality, integration, and proximity” with the Italian legal system, reducing it to “a purely abstract status pertaining to a merely individual sphere,” thereby depriving it of its “communitarian and public dimension, as well as of substance and effectiveness” (Order No. 65 of 2025).

In essence, the challenged provisions would include within the concept of the “people” — to whom sovereignty belongs — “individuals who are in fact totally extraneous to the national community” (Order No. 66 of 2025).

1. 3. – The referring judges further contend that the lineage-based connection cannot, by itself, suffice to dispel the doubts of constitutional legitimacy; invoking Article 29 of the Constitution is not sufficient, as that provision refers to a notion of family that presupposes a “necessary link to social reality” (Order No. 247 of 2024).

Likewise, they exclude reliance on Article 35 of the Constitution to justify the challenged provisions, since the necessary protection of work abroad does not entail a “right to recognition of citizenship after generations” (Order No. 247 of 2024).

1. 4. – According to the referring judges, the alleged violation of Article 1(2) of the Constitution would become apparent when that principle is considered in conjunction with Article 3 of the Constitution, in terms of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality.

It would indeed be unreasonable and disproportionate not to impose any limit on the mechanism for acquiring citizenship solely by descent.

Nor could such a violation find an adequate corrective in the constitutional provisions whereby only eight of the four hundred members of the Chamber of Deputies (Article 56(2) of the Constitution) and four of the two hundred members of the Senate (Article 57(2) of the Constitution) may be elected in the “Overseas Constituency” (Article 1 of Law No. 459 of December 27, 2001, Rules for the Exercise of the Right to Vote of Italian Citizens Residing Abroad). That legislation does not neutralize the “obvious interference between the excessive expansion of the number of citizens and the exercise of popular sovereignty, both because of the possibility of registration on domestic electoral lists, and because of its impact on the voting quorum required for popular referendums under Article 75(4) of the Constitution, […] as well as […] on the functioning of the constitutional referendum under Article 138 of the Constitution” (Orders Nos. 247 of 2024 and 86 of 2025).

1. 5. – In order to remedy the alleged violation, the various referring orders propose different solutions.

The Court of Bologna suggests, as a “reasonable point of equilibrium […] a limit of two generations, unless it is proven that one of the ancestors or the person concerned has lived in Italy for at least two years”; alternatively, it invokes the possibility of “taking into account the longest period of oblivion provided for in the legal system, equal to twenty years, as in the case of the statute of limitations for the most serious crimes and for the acquisition of ownership of immovable property and real property rights through adverse possession.”

The Court of Rome considers that the acquisition of citizenship by birth should occur automatically “where the foreign applicant is able to prove directly the [Italian] citizenship of his or her parent(s),” whereas, if it is necessary to trace citizenship back to a second-degree ancestor, Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992 should apply — a provision in relation to which that same court also raises a question of constitutional legitimacy on grounds of unreasonable disparity of treatment.

Furthermore, the Milan Court does not identify a direct remedy to redress the constitutional violation, except indirectly by also raising a question of constitutional legitimacy based on the unreasonable disparity of treatment between the challenged provisions and the rules governing the spouse of an Italian citizen.

Finally, the Court of Florence merely notes the need to identify reasonable limitations capable of overcoming the doubts expressed.

6. – With a second group of complaints, all the referring courts — with the exception of the Court of Rome — also allege a violation of Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation both to “international obligations” and to the “constraints arising from the Community legal order,” the latter with reference to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
7. 1. – With regard to the first allegation, the referring judges note that, although international law reserves the regulation of citizenship to the competence of States, it nevertheless requires them to respect the principle of effectiveness of the citizenship bond. Therefore, it is not possible “to take into account domestic law assessments that are not based on a real belonging of the individual to the social group” (Order No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders).

The referring judges, distancing themselves from the judgment of the Court of Cassation No. 25317, Joint Civil Sessions of August 24, 2022, which held that “the bond of blood is certainly not a mere legal fiction”, consider that the challenged legislation conflicts with international obligations, since any “claim by a State to regard as its own citizen a person who in fact has no effective social ties with it is internationally unfounded and, consequently, other States are not required to respect it” (ibid.).
In this regard, the referring judges dwell extensively on the judgment of the International Court of Justice of April 6, 1955, Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, according to which citizenship implies “a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”

1. 2. – Subsequently, still with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, the Courts of Bologna, Milan and Florence express doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, for conflict with the constraints imposed by European Union law through Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

In particular, the Bologna and Florence orders recall that Article 9 TEU provides that “every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship,” and that Article 20 TFEU states that “citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.”

European Union law, while leaving the regulation of citizenship to the Member States, nonetheless requires respect for the principle of effectiveness and the genuine character of national citizenship. Indeed, European citizenship entails the attribution of a series of rights and duties (such as the freedom of movement and residence within the Union, together with the corresponding right to engage in work activities and to request family reunification), as well as political participation rights and the right to diplomatic protection by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State within the territory of a third country in which one’s own State of origin is not represented.

The Court of Milan also considers that European law implies, for the purposes of the free movement of EU citizens, “a territorial link between the citizen and the Member State of origin.”

Overall, the referring courts doubt that the challenged provision complies with the constraints imposed by European Union law and, specifically, with “the principle of proportionality,” as developed in the case law of the Court of Justice (Orders Nos. 247 of 2024 and 86 of 2025 to that effect).

7. – Finally, the Courts of Rome and Milan raise questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, alleging a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution, on the ground of unequal treatment identified with reference to other statutory regimes.
8. 1. – In particular, in the introductory order of the Court of Rome, a similarity is suggested between the situation of those who claim descent from a distant Italian ancestor and that of persons descending from someone who was once an Italian citizen but no longer holds such citizenship — the latter situation being addressed both by Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992, concerning the acquisition of citizenship on the basis of mere legal prerequisites, and by Article 9(1)(a) of the same Law, which governs the discretionary grant of citizenship.

In both cases, the acquisition of citizenship would be limited to two degrees of ancestral lineage, and the concurrence of additional requirements “relating […] to an effective relational connection between the applicant and the Italian State, territory, and people” would be necessary.
Nevertheless, between the two statutory cases, according to the referring Roman court, the first would be “the more appropriately comparable” to the challenged provision. In both instances, citizenship is acquired ipso iure on the basis of the mere verification of the requisite conditions, thereby constituting a subjective right rather than a mere legitimate interest.
In particular, according to the Court of Rome, there would be no “substantial difference – such as to justify a legal framework so markedly different as that between Article 4, paragraph 1, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Article 1, paragraph 1, letter a), of Law No. 91/1992 – between the situation of a person (who holds the citizenship of another state) descending from a parent or grandparent who was an Italian citizen but later lost citizenship (before the birth of the applicant, at least in the case of the parent, since otherwise it would fall under the more general case of the child of a citizen) and the situation of someone (also a foreign citizen) descending from parents, grandparents, and often more distant ancestors who have never (or who, in any case, have not been proven to have) ever claimed, exercised, or possessed the status of citizenship.”
In both cases, what would be lacking is the “effectiveness of citizenship.”

1. 2. – As for the objections raised by the Court of Milan, that court likewise observes, in general, the different approach between the regime governing the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis and other legal provisions granting citizenship, which — as in the case of those concerning nationals of third countries — require “specific proof of their rootedness in the national territory.”

Specifically, the referring judge of Milan grounds the alleged unreasonable disparity of treatment under Article 3 of the Constitution on a tertium comparationis (third term of comparison) consisting in the rules allowing the acquisition of citizenship on the basis of marriage to an Italian citizen, whether male or female. Such rules require, in particular, proof either of an intermediate level of proficiency in the Italian language or, alternatively, the signing of an integration agreement.

8. – By submissions filed on February 10, and on May 5 and 6, 2025, the following parties entered an appearance: nine applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Court of Bologna; all the applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Court of Milan; and all the applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Court of Rome, who, on June 17, 2025, also filed an additional memorandum out of time.

Furthermore, on May 16, 2025, four applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Court of Florence entered an appearance, and on June 3, 2025, also filed an additional memorandum, while on May 20, 2025, another seven applicants in the same proceedings entered an appearance.

9. – All the parties who entered an appearance have raised objections of inadmissibility against the questions submitted, advancing arguments that are in part overlapping or substantially identical.
10. 1. – According to the defenses of the applicants in the main proceedings pending before the Courts of Bologna, Florence, and Rome, the challenges are inadmissible because the referring judges raised doubts concerning a provision — Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992 — which would not be applicable to all the applicants, since some of them were born before that law entered into force.

Furthermore, the referring judges allegedly misidentified the applicable provisions, as they failed to challenge those that were relevant ratione temporis to the various ancestors of the applicants — namely, the Civil Code of 1865, Law No. 555 of 1912, and Law No. 123 of April 21, 1983 (“Provisions on Citizenship”).

1. 2. – Subsequently, the defenses of all the applicants in the four main proceedings objected to the admissibility of the questions on the ground that the referring judges had not attempted an interpretation consistent with the Constitution.
2. 3. – Furthermore, the defenses of all the parties — with the exception of those applicants before the Court of Florence who entered an appearance on May 16, 2025 — argued that the questions are based on an assumption, namely that the applicants in the principal proceedings have no connection with Italy other than the bond of filiation, an assumption that is asserted rather than proven. The referring judges “did not gather any information concerning the life, culture, language, motivations, emotional factors, or any other elements that might have been relevant to ascertain the factual premise underlying the referring judge’s reasoning — namely, the alleged lack of substantial belonging of the applicants to the Italian community” (pleadings filed on February 10, May 5, May 6, and May 20, 2025). The referring courts, they claim, “summarily concluded that the applicants were not ‘effective’ members of the Italian community — all this without any investigation, without any evidence, without any fact-finding.”

This argument is joined by the consideration that the underlying reason for the main proceedings does not stem from genuine doubts as to the constitutionality of the law, but rather from the need to respond to the overload of applications that have been filed before the Italian judicial authorities as a result of the failures and delays of the consular authorities.

1. 4. – The defenses of all the parties — again with the exception of those applicants before the Court of Florence who entered an appearance on May 16, 2025 — also challenged the admissibility of the questions, arguing that the reasoning on the not manifestly unfounded issues conflicts with the case law of this Court, with diritto vivente (“living law”), and with the established judicial practice in the courts before which the principal cases are pending.

In particular, according to those defenses, constitutional case law has already addressed the ius sanguinis criterion, and if its operation “without additional conditions were unconstitutional, such an aspect could not have escaped even indirect scrutiny by this Honorable Court” (pleadings filed on February 10 and May 5, 6, and 20, 2025).
They further observe that no court has ever expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis. On the contrary, the Court of Cassation — also in recent decisions, sitting in Joint Civil Sessions (specifically, Cass., No. 25317 of 2022 and Court of Cassation, Joint Civil Sessions, judgment of August 24, 2022, No. 25318) — has emphasized that the aforementioned criterion “is intimately linked to Italian history and to the specific, constant, century-long choice of the Italian legislator to maintain — through the bond of blood — the relationship between Italy and its ‘children,’ wherever they may be born or reside” (pleadings cited above).
The same parties therefore conclude that “as of today, there exists an undeniable and firmly established ‘living law’ affirming the constitutional legitimacy of the right to transmit citizenship by descent, which has never been called into question, not even in recent times.”

1. 5. – All the parties have further raised objections of inadmissibility, arguing that the subject matter falls within the discretionary competence of the legislature.

In particular, the defenses referred to in the preceding paragraph maintain that this Court cannot “call into question what has been, and continues to be, a legislative choice in the field of citizenship, the result of a deliberate exercise of legislative discretion.”

They therefore consider that any acceptance of the constitutional challenges would amount to “a violation of Article 70 of the Constitution with respect to the holder of legislative power, of Article 71 of the Constitution regarding those entitled to initiate legislation, and of Article 134 of the Constitution concerning the functions of this Honorable Constitutional Court.”

1. 6. – The defenses of all the parties further objected that the type of systemic intervention requested from this Court is of a manipulative nature, and that the challenges are generic and unsupported.

In the defenses of the parties referred to in paragraph 9.4, this objection is argued on the ground that the requested intervention would amount to a suggestion to introduce a legislative reform that would include “new statutory conditions, not contained in the current legislative text and never adopted by the Italian State in one hundred and sixty years of citizenship legislation.” Furthermore, according to those defenses, the referring courts’ submissions are “generic, hypothetical, and abstract.”

In the pleading filed by certain applicants before the Court of Florence on May 16, 2025, a more specific objection is made that, in a field characterized by broad legislative discretion, the requested intervention “entails systemic assessments entrusted to the legislature’s appreciation and fundamental choices among alternative policy options,” thereby limiting “the criterion for the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis by means of elements arbitrarily identified by the referring judge and entirely lacking any foundation in the legal order.”

Finally, this latter defense, although within the framework of its substantive arguments, highlights the generic nature of the claims seeking to identify the kind of genuine link that should consolidate the bond with Italy for those who were born and reside abroad. It is noted, in fact, that “the terms of such a connection are described by the referring judge in a vague and unclear manner (what does a ‘connection with the community’ mean? Residence in the territory? For how long? Is it a ‘cultural’ connection? And in what sense? Proficiency in the language? At what level?)”

1. 7. – Finally, again in the pleading filed on May 16, 2025, inadmissibility is also alleged on the grounds of insufficient reasoning as to the not manifestly unfounded questions, irrelevance of the invoked parameters, and, with respect to the challenge based on Article 117(1) of the Constitution concerning international obligations, failure to indicate any “specific source of international law that would prohibit providing for the acquisition of citizenship by descent without the limitations hypothesized by the referring court.”
2. – On the merits, all the defenses of the parties consider the questions raised to be unfounded, advancing arguments of a similar tenor, with reasoning that is at times overlapping or substantially identical.
3. 1. – First and foremost, there would be no violation of Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution, under the aspects of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality.
4. 1. 1. – The defenses recall, preliminarily, that the challenged legislation represents the criterion for the attribution of citizenship that has been applied in Italy for one hundred and sixty years.

Its operation as a criterion for acquiring citizenship status, without additional requirements, reflects the legislature’s political choice to preserve a link with Italian emigrants and their descendants.
This bond has allegedly produced significant benefits for Italy, since “the remittances of Italians emigrated abroad” are said to have supported the Italian economy, reaching “almost four percent of Italy’s GDP in certain years.” Moreover, during dramatic historical events such as the two world wars, many emigrants “returned from their respective countries of emigration and placed their lives at the service of the Italian army [in] defense of the homeland.” Likewise, whenever Italy has been struck by natural disasters or other grave events — including the COVID-19 public health emergency — the Italian communities composed of descendants of emigrants “have immediately reacted with unparalleled solidarity,” as evidenced by the establishment of numerous solidarity funds cited in the defenses.
In addition, it is emphasized that Italian communities abroad promote Italian culture in their respective countries.
The legislative choice to preserve the purity of the ius sanguinis criterion would not be unreasonable or disproportionate, since an Italian citizen residing abroad does not burden the State, not having access to the Italian welfare system. Furthermore, there would be no threat to the integrity of the democratic principle, given that Italian citizens residing abroad are entitled to elect only two percent of the members of Parliament, thereby exercising limited political influence.
Moreover, the Constitution itself grants special protection to emigrants and to Italian citizens residing abroad (Articles 35 and 48 of the Constitution are cited in this regard).

1. 1. 2. – In addition to the foregoing, the defense of the parties that entered an appearance on May 16, 2025, adds that the referring judges’ assertion — namely, that citizenship presupposes a notion of “the people” — is based on a misconception. It is argued, in fact, that “the ‘people’ to whom Article 1 of the Constitution attributes sovereignty consists of the totality of citizens; therefore, it is the ‘people’ that presupposes the normative definition of citizenship, and not the other way around.”

That same defense further observes that “the Constituent Assembly did not intend to include in the Constitution the criteria for the acquisition and loss of citizenship, except for the prohibition of deprivation for political reasons under Article 22 of the Constitution.” Consequently, “Articles 1 and 22 of the Constitution do not impose upon the legislature any positive limitation in defining the set of rules that determine the acquisition and transmission of citizenship.”

Finally, an inconsistency is observed in the referring judges’ statements. They fail to recognize that the original nature of the acquisition of citizenship, together with its justiciability through a declaratory rather than a constitutive judgment, implies that the relevant link is not with a distant ancestor, but rather with the immediate parent, given the “uninterrupted line of transmission” of citizenship.

1. 1. 3. – Linked to the foregoing is the argument put forward by the defense of the applicants in the Bologna proceedings, according to which the petition seeking to limit the acquisition of citizenship iure sanguinis for persons born abroad to two generations — unless proof of residence in Italy is provided — would be a source of discrimination and could not be applied retroactively.
2. 2. – The defenses of the parties further deny that there has been any violation of Article 117(1) of the Constitution.

They not only contest the improper use of the concept of the “effectiveness of citizenship,” which, they argue, has no basis in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union cited by the referring courts, but also point out that it has not been demonstrated that the alleged principle should be interpreted “as preventing States, in principle, from providing for the acquisition of citizenship by descent.”

1. 3. – Lastly, the parties who entered an appearance on May 16, 2025, note that, during the pendency of the present proceedings, Decree-Law No. 36 of March 28, 2025 (Urgent Provisions on Citizenship), not yet converted into law at that time, was enacted.

Subsequently, in the additional memorandum filed on June 3, 2025 (after the conversion, with amendments, of the aforementioned decree-law into Law No. 74 of May 23, 2025), the same defense argued that the new provisions do not apply to the proceedings from which the constitutional questions originate, as the new rules concern only proceedings initiated on or after March 28, 2025. Therefore, the parties emphasize that the principle of acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis is rooted in the Italian legal tradition since the Civil Code of 1865. They also point out that this principle is shared by several Member States of the European Union, as the transmission of status civitatis through status filiationis expresses family continuity, regardless of the place of birth.

According to that defense, acceptance of the questions raised would result in the retroactive mass loss of citizenship, which would conflict with Article 22 of the Constitution and with European Union law, particularly with regard to the principle of proportionality and the principle of adversarial proceedings, and with international law, which provides for a prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality.

1. 4. – The parties who entered an appearance on May 20, 2025, likewise address Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, and — assuming that this legislation also applies to the main proceedings — argue that its provisions introduce retroactive limits on the recognition of citizenship jure sanguinis, in violation of numerous constitutional principles (including, among others, Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 22, 24, 25, 29, 35, and 117 of the Constitution).

The defense therefore requests that this Court raise, before itself, questions of constitutionality concerning the provisions set forth in Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted into law; or, in the alternative, that it refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union in order to assess the compatibility of the new legislation with European Union law.

1. 5. – On June 4, 2025, the parties to the main proceedings in the case originating from Order No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders filed an additional memorandum out of time.
2. – By submissions filed on February 11, 2025, AUCI – Avvocati Uniti per la Cittadinanza Italiana (United Lawyers for Italian Citizenship) and AGIS – Associazione Giuristi Iure Sanguinis (Association of Iure Sanguinis Jurists) requested leave to intervene ad opponendum (in opposition) in the case registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders, submitting arguments in support of the admissibility of their interventions.

On June 3, 2025, AUCI and AGIS filed supplemental memoranda of identical tenor, reiterating the arguments already presented in their statements of intervention.

12. – On February 11, 2025, the Associazione USEF Brasil – Unione Siciliana Emigrati e Famiglie (Sicilian Union of Emigrants and Families) filed a brief as amicus curiae, which was admitted by presidential decree on May 20, 2025.

In that submission, USEF argues that the questions raised are inadmissible, as they do not present a constitutionally necessary solution but instead fall within an area reserved to legislative discretion. Moreover, the submission notes that the European legal parameters allegedly violated are not precisely identified, rendering the challenge based on Article 117 of the Constitution generic and unfounded.

Furthermore, upholding the constitutional questions is argued to compromise rights already acquired by millions of Italian descendants in Brazil, in violation of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, and in contrast with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the field of citizenship law.

The brief also emphasizes the importance of the Italo-Brazilian community, composed of approximately 25–30 million individuals, which serves as a cultural bridge and represents a strategic resource for Italy. Economic studies are cited showing that dual citizenship fosters investment, trade exchanges, and international mobility.

13. – By pleadings of identical tenor filed on May 20, 2025, Circolo Trentino di San Paolo del Brasile and Circolo Domus Sardinia also sought leave to intervene ad opponendum in the case registered as No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders. On May 27, 2025, they filed concise memoranda pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Supplementary Rules for Proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the content of which was essentially identical.
14. – At the public hearing held on June 24, 2025, the parties reiterated the conclusions set out in their written pleadings.

Reasons in law
– By orders registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders, Nos. 65, 66 and 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders, the Courts of Bologna, Rome, Milan and Florence raised questions of constitutional legitimacy concerning Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992, insofar as it provides that “a citizen by birth is: (a) the child of a father or mother who are citizens,” without establishing any limitation on the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis.
Only the Court of Milan also challenged Article 4 of the Civil Code, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, as well as Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912, insofar as these provisions establish no limitation on the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis.

2. – In particular, the referring judges, called upon to apply the challenged provisions to applicants who are descendants of Italian citizens, but who were born abroad, reside there, and hold the citizenship of another State, question the constitutional legitimacy of the cited provisions on multiple grounds.
3. 1. – All the referring courts consider that Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution have been violated, the latter under the aspects of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality.

In particular, they argue that the recognition of citizenship in favor of persons who — while having the aforementioned connecting elements with the legal system of a foreign country — can claim only descent from an Italian citizen, without having any other ties with the domestic legal order, would profoundly distort the notion of “the people”, affecting the very exercise of popular sovereignty and, ultimately, the functioning of democracy.

1. 2. – The Ordinary Courts of Bologna, Milan, and Florence also raise questions of constitutional legitimacy with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation to international obligations and the constraints deriving from Italy’s membership in the European Union, the latter with specific regard to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

According to the referring judges, these international sources oblige States to adopt citizenship laws that attest to the existence of an effective link with the legal order conferring status civitatis.

1. 3. – Finally, the Courts of Rome and Milan consider the challenged provision to infringe Article 3 of the Constitution, due to an unreasonable disparity of treatment when compared with several other legal frameworks.

The referring Court of Rome identifies Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992 — which governs the acquisition of citizenship by the descendant of a person who once possessed, but subsequently lost, the status of Italian citizen — as the tertium comparationis (term of comparison).
The referring Milan court, by contrast, considers it unreasonable the existence of a disparity of treatment when compared with the legislation governing the acquisition of citizenship by the spouse of an Italian citizen, male or female. 
      – Thus summarized, the questions raised in the various proceedings must be joined and decided by a single judgment, since they concern identical or analogous provisions and are based on challenges and parameters that are largely coincident (see, among others, Judgments Nos. 72 of 2025, 171 of 2024, and 220 of 2023).

4. – In the joined proceedings, submissions to intervene have been filed by several associations, whose participation as parties must be deemed inadmissible.
5. 1. – In particular, the interventions ad opponendum filed by Circolo Trentino di San Paolo del Brasile and Circolo Domus Sardinia in the case initiated by the order of the Court of Florence, registered as No. 86 in the 2025 Register of Orders, have already been declared inadmissible by Order No. 85 of 2025.
6. 2. – Likewise, the interventions filed in the case initiated by the order of the Court of Bologna, registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders, by the associations AUCI and AGIS, through pleadings of identical tenor filed on February 11, 2025, are inadmissible.
7. 1. 1. – According to the settled case law of this Court, participation in incidental proceedings of constitutional review is reserved — in addition to the Prime Minister and, in the case of a regional law, the President of the Regional Government (Articles 3 and 4(1)–(2) of the Supplementary Rules) — to subjects holding a qualified interest, directly and immediately connected with the substantive legal relationship at issue, and not merely governed, like that of any other person, by the provision or provisions under challenge (see, among others, the orders annexed to Judgments Nos. 19 of 2025, 144 and 140 of 2024).

With respect to entities representing collective or sectoral interests, such as the intervening associations in this case, this Court has repeatedly clarified that their intervention is inadmissible when they claim, in relation to the subject matter of the incidental constitutional review, only an indirect interest—one that is merely connected, in general terms, to their statutory purpose of protecting their members. This applies all the more so in light of Article 6 of the Supplementary Rules, which permits non-profit social entities and institutional bodies representing collective or diffuse interests related to the constitutional question to submit a written brief to this Court as amici curiae (see also the order annexed to Judgment No. 144 of 2024).

1. 1. 2. – In the present case, the intervening associations do not hold a qualified interest directly and immediately connected to the substantive legal relationship under examination that would entitle them to intervene, since they are not holders of a legal position capable of being immediately and irreparably prejudiced by the outcome of the incidental proceedings. Conversely, they assert only an indirect interest in the subject matter of the incidental constitutional review of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, as such interest is generally linked to the statutory purposes of the two associations, which assist professionals engaged in representing clients in procedures for the recognition and acquisition of Italian citizenship.

For these reasons, the interventions of AUCI and AGIS are inadmissible.

5. – Conversely, several appellants in the referring proceedings have duly appeared before this Court, arguing that the constitutional questions raised are inadmissible and, in any case, unfounded.

Some of them have noted that, while these proceedings were pending, Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, was enacted, amending the challenged legislation in a manner that is far from marginal.

Specifically, the parties who entered an appearance by pleadings filed on May 20, 2025, maintain that the aforementioned decree-law applies to the present case, whereas those who appeared by pleadings filed on May 16, 2025, deny its applicability. Furthermore, the former have requested that this Court itself raise questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding the new legislation.

6. – It is therefore necessary, as a preliminary matter, to examine the features of the legislative framework underlying the present questions and the amendments introduced by the aforementioned decree-law.
7. 1. – The challenged provision, Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, provides that “a person is a citizen by birth: (a) the child of a father or mother who are citizens.”

This rule automatically associates the acquisition of citizenship with status filiationis (legal parent-child relationship).
This is confirmed by Articles 2, 3, and 14 of Law No. 91 of 1992, which respectively link the acquisition of status civitatis to the recognition of the child, to adoption, or to the existence of a filial bond that predates the acquisition or reacquisition of citizenship by the ancestor.
Such a framework reiterates what had already been established — albeit within a context still impervious to the principle of gender equality — by Law No. 555 of 1912 (which, in Article 1(1), stated that “a person is a citizen by birth: (1) the child of a father who are citizens”), and, even earlier, by the Civil Code of 1865, which, in Article 4 of Book I, Title I, defined as “a citizen the child of a father who is a citizen,” thereby incorporating the model of the Code Napoléon of 1804, according to which “[t]out enfant né d’un Français dans un pays étranger est Français” (Book I, Title I, Article 10).
Following the removal of the discriminatory factor from Article 1(1) of Law No. 555 of 1912 by Judgment No. 30 of 1983 of this Court, the rule concerning citizenship acquisition through the bond of filiation was subsequently incorporated into Article 5(1) of Law No. 123 of 1983, which also provided in paragraph two that a dual-national child, upon reaching majority, had the duty to opt for one citizenship within one year.

Thereafter, Law No. 91 of 1992, on one hand, repealed Law No. 123 of 1983 without reproducing the prescriptive content of the aforementioned Article 5(2).

And, on the other hand, by means of the currently challenged provision, reaffirmed the automatic correlation between status civitatis (citizenship status) and status filiationis.

1. 2. – Consistent with the defining features of citizenship as a status derived from filiation, both the constitutional case law and the jurisprudence of legitimacy have characterized this mode of acquisition as “by origin” (see the aforementioned Judgment No. 30 of 1983; and Court of Cassation, Judgments Nos. 25317 and 25318 of 2022).

At the same time, the diritto vivente has emphasized that the citizenship status founded upon filiation is “permanent and imprescriptible [and] can be asserted at any time on the simple proof of the acquisitive circumstance constituted by birth from an Italian citizen” (see the cited Judgments Nos. 25317 and 25318 of 2022).

1. 3. – Against this legislative background, Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, intervened during the pendency of the present proceedings, modifying the automatic correlation between citizenship and status filiationis in cases involving persons born abroad and holding another citizenship.

In particular, Article 1(1) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, added to Law No. 91 of 1992 a new Article 3-bis, which provides that “By way of derogation from Articles 1, 2, 3, 14, and 20 of this Law; Article 5 of Law No. 123 of April 21, 1983; Articles 1, 2, 7, 10, 12, and 19 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912; as well as Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 of the Civil Code approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of 1865, any person born abroad, even before the entry into force of this Article, who holds another citizenship, shall be deemed never to have acquired Italian citizenship, unless one of the following conditions applies.”

In the filing with the competent authorities of an application for recognition of citizenship, accompanied by the required documentation and submitted “by 11:59 p.m., Rome time, on March 27, 2025”, letters (a), (a-bis), and (b) identify the dividing line separating the continued applicability of the previous regime from the operation of the new conditions governing the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis.

The latter are specified in subparagraphs (c) and (d), which establish that Italian citizenship may be acquired through filiation where: the ascendant of the first or second degree possessed, or at the time of death had possessed, only Italian citizenship; or where the parent or adoptive parent resided in Italy for at least two consecutive years after acquiring Italian citizenship and prior to the birth or adoption of the child.

Further, Article 1(1-bis) and (1-ter) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted — which add paragraphs 1-bis and 1-ter to Article 4 of Law No. 91 of 1992 — set forth various cumulative conditions under which the minor child of an Italian parent, not falling within Article 3-bis, may acquire citizenship. In the case of acquisition or reacquisition of citizenship by the parent, the acquisition of status civitatis by the minor child requires the latter’s lawful and continuous residence in Italy for two years, or, where the child is under two years old, from birth (Article 1(1-quater) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, supplementing Article 14(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992).

Finally, the new provisions extend to the descendant of an Italian citizen the same rules applicable to the descendant of one who has lost Italian citizenship (Article 1(1-bis) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, extending the scope of Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992; and Article 1-bis(2) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, supplementing Article 9(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992).

7. – Given this legislative framework, the new provisions — notwithstanding their similarity to certain hypotheses outlined in the referring orders — do not affect the relevance of the constitutional questions raised therein.

All the proceedings in the main cases were, in fact, initiated on the basis of applications filed prior to March 27, 2025; therefore, pursuant to Article 3-bis(1)(b) of Law No. 91 of 1992, as introduced by Article 1(1) of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, as converted, the previous legislation — which is the subject of the present constitutional challenges — remains applicable to the referring cases.
Accordingly, there are no grounds to return the case files to the referring courts.

8. – Likewise, the conditions under which this Court may raise questions of constitutional legitimacy do not exist in the present case.

The new legislative provisions are not to be applied in the constitutional proceedings (Order No. 73 of 1965 and, most recently, Order No. 35 of 2024), nor is there a “relationship of logical presupposition” (rapporto di presupposizione) between those provisions and the one challenged by the referring judges such that an intervention limited to the latter would nonetheless fail to remove the alleged constitutional defect (Orders Nos. 94 of 2022 and 18 of 2021). Similarly, there are no grounds for recognizing circumstances of particular urgency (Order No. 73 of 1965) or for invoking the need to prevent this Court — the sole body competent to adjudicate questions of constitutionality of laws — from being required to apply unconstitutional legislation (Order No. 22 of 1960 and, most recently, Order No. 35 of 2024).

9. – On this basis, the Court may now proceed to examine the various procedural objections (eccezioni di rito) raised by the parties, beginning with those that are manifestly unfounded.
10. 1. – Such are, first of all, the objections of inadmissibility asserting that the referring orders allegedly failed to provide adequate reasoning as to the non-manifest unfoundedness of the questions, on the ground that they would contradict the established case law of this Court, of the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione), and even of the referring courts themselves, which — according to the parties — would have already affirmed and confirmed the “constitutional legitimacy” of the contested provision in their introductory pleadings.

It must first be noted that this Court has never before been called upon to address the specific doubts of constitutional legitimacy raised in the present cases. On prior occasions, it has ruled only on entirely different challenges concerning the same provision. In particular, the Court has addressed the absence of a rule allowing acquisition of citizenship through the maternal line (Judgment No. 30 of 1983), but never the absence of a rule limiting the jure sanguinis mechanism for persons born abroad, residing there, and holding another citizenship.

However, it must above all be recalled that this Court — contrary to what is asserted by the parties — adjudicates only on the possible unconstitutionality of statutory provisions. Thus, even when the Court declares a question unfounded, it does not affirm the constitutionality of the challenged provision; rather, it merely excludes the existence of the constitutional violation specifically alleged.

1. 2. – Equally unfounded is the objection claiming the failure to attempt an interpretation consistent with the Constitution, raised in relation to the referring order of the Court of Milan, which explicitly ruled out the possibility of overcoming the constitutional doubts through interpretative construction.

The same objection, raised with regard to the orders of the other referring courts, is likewise unfounded.
It is, in fact, self-evident that the referring judges, in requesting an additive and manipulative intervention on Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, implicitly considered that its textual wording could not encompass the complex and numerous additions they themselves proposed.
A judge is under no obligation to state expressly what is already manifest from the literal wording of the provision.
This Court has repeatedly affirmed, particularly in recent decisions, that the textual data of a statute constitutes an insurmountable limit beyond which interpretative conformity must necessarily yield to constitutional review (see, among many others, Judgments Nos. 88 of 2025, 44 of 2024, 193 of 2022, and 221 of 2019).

10. – Proceeding now in the logical order of the objections, the Court shall next examine those concerning the alleged lack of relevance.
11. 1. – First of all, the objection of irrelevance raised by some parties is unfounded. It is based on the assumption that the referring courts of Bologna, Rome, and Florence challenged only Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, and not also the preceding laws governing the acquisition of citizenship jure sanguinis by their ancestors (namely, Law No. 123 of 1983, Law No. 555 of 1912, and, earlier still, the Civil Code of 1865), even though some of the applicants were born prior to the entry into force of Law No. 91 of 1992.

Such an objection is without merit, since under Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, Italian citizenship belongs to anyone who is the child of an Italian citizen, male or female, regardless of any different rule in force at the time the bond of filiation arose.
Birth, indeed, constitutes the factual prerequisite for status filiationis (like recognition or adoption), but it is the status of child, as such, that forms the legal basis for the acquisition of status civitatis.

1. 2. – Conversely, the Court must ex officio declare inadmissible, for lack of relevance, the questions raised by the Court of Milan concerning the entire sequence of prior laws mentioned above, specifically Article 4 of the Civil Code of 1865 and Article 1 of Law No. 555 of 1912.

The main proceedings do not concern the laws conferring Italian citizenship upon the applicants’ ancestors, which at most — and only indirectly — may be invoked as evidence supporting the Italian citizenship of the parent of a person seeking recognition of his or her own status.
On the contrary, the subject matter of the main proceedings is the set of rules governing the acquisition of Italian citizenship by the applicants themselves; and these applicants, pursuant to Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, are Italian citizens by virtue of being children of Italian citizens, even if born before 1992.

1. 3. – As to the objection disputing the relevance of the questions on the ground that the referring judges allegedly failed to demonstrate that the applicants lack effective ties with the Italian legal order, it shall be examined together with the objection alleging the manipulative nature of the proposed introduction of such requirements (infra, paragraph 12 of the Reasons in law).
2. – The Court must now address the objection of inadmissibility based on the argument that the matter lies within the exclusive discretion of the legislature, an objection raised by all the parties’ defenses.

In particular, some parties contend that this Court cannot “call into question what has been, and remains, a legislative choice” in matters of citizenship, the result of a deliberate “discretionary” assessment by Parliament.

They therefore consider that any upholding of the constitutional challenges would amount to a “violation of Article 70 of the Constitution, concerning the holder of legislative power; of Article 71, concerning those entitled to legislative initiative; and of Article 134, concerning the functions of this Honorable Constitutional Court.”

This objection, as thus formulated, is unfounded.

1. 1. – This Court recognizes that “the legislature enjoys broad discretion in regulating the attribution of citizenship” (Judgment No. 25 of 2025). Nevertheless, legislative provisions in this field — no less than in other areas marked by significant discretion — “are not thereby exempt from constitutional review, since they must in any case be enacted in accordance with the canons of non-manifest unfoundedness and proportionality in relation to the purposes pursued” (inter alia, Judgments Nos. 88 of 2023, 194 of 2019, 202 of 2013, and 245 of 2011) (Judgment No. 25 of 2025; see also Judgment No. 195 of 2022).

In particular, constitutional case law has excluded that any foundational criterion of citizenship may be discriminatory in nature (see the aforementioned Judgment No. 30 of 1983, which found a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution in a rule that provided “for original acquisition of citizenship only through the father,” without recognizing the same through the mother). Subsequently, this Court has held manifestly unreasonable and disproportionate — when applied to persons suffering from physical or mental disabilities — citizenship provisions requiring the demonstration of knowledge or the performance of acts that such persons could not reasonably be expected to fulfill (Judgments Nos. 25 of 2025 and 258 of 2017). It has also declared unconstitutional a rule that, among the grounds barring recognition of citizenship, unreasonably included the death of the applicant’s spouse occurring while the administrative term for completion of the procedure was still pending (Judgment No. 195 of 2022).

1. 2. – This Court is not unaware of the distinctive nature of the challenge raised with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution, which alleges failure to respect the notion of “the people” as reflected in the constitutional provisions concerning citizenship.

It must be emphasized that the Constitution does not define the term “people”; rather, it outlines aspects of citizenship interwoven throughout the broader constitutional text.

The Constitution primarily associates citizenship with political participation and political rights (Title IV of Part I of the Constitution).

It further attributes to citizens the possession of rights and duties (including the duty to defend the homeland, the duty to contribute to public expenses, and the duty of loyalty). Yet this attribution of rights and duties is situated within a source — the Constitution itself — whose fundamental principles guarantee every person’s inviolable rights and equality (see Judgment No. 120 of 1967 and, most recently, Judgment No. 53 of 2024) and which also extends certain duties of solidarity to non-citizens. One might recall, for example, the duty to contribute to public expenses, which Article 53 of the Constitution assigns to “all,” or the possibility of performing national civil service, which this Court has extended to foreign nationals, describing such service as “the fulfillment of a duty of solidarity and an opportunity for integration and civic formation” (Judgment No. 119 of 2015).

The Constitution refers to the idea of citizenship as belonging to a community with shared cultural and linguistic roots. At the same time, it defines a community open to pluralism and that protects minorities. Finally, the constitutional provisions evoke a correlation between citizenship and the territory of the State, as a place that reflects a common cultural heritage and the sharing of constitutional principles.

In view of the articulated and multifaceted constitutional references to citizenship, it is, therefore, up to the legislature, which enjoys particularly broad discretion, to determine the prerequisites for acquiring the status.

Nevertheless, it falls to this Court to verify, according to the standard of non-manifest unreasonableness and disproportionality, that the statutory criteria for acquiring status civitatis are not entirely alien to constitutional principles or to the multiple features that, as noted above, characterize citizenship.

The legislature remains free to concretely define the content of citizenship in the light of constitutional principles.

1. 3. – The above observation is consistent with the approach adopted by the Court of Justice regarding the constraints imposed on nationality matters by European Union law, particularly by Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU.

In general terms, the Court of Justice has recognized that “[t]he determination of the ways of acquiring and losing citizenship falls, in accordance with international law, within the competence of each Member State” (Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C-369/90, Micheletti and others, paragraph 10).

At the same time, however, the Court has clarified that such competence “must be exercised in compliance with European Union law” (Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, Judgments of 29 April 2025, Case C-181/23, European Commission v Republic of Malta, paras. 42, 95 and 98; 5 September 2023, Case C-689/21, Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, para. 30; 18 January 2022, Case C-118/20, JY, para. 49; 2 March 2010, Case C-135/08, Rottmann, para. 45; and Micheletti, para. 10).

In an initial phase, it thus came to criticize national regulations that determined the loss of citizenship status with respect to a Member State and, by extension, with respect to the European Union. Specifically, it maintained that the provisions contained in the EU Treaties on citizenship preclude such regimes where they allow “no possibility for an individual examination of the consequences of that loss for the persons concerned under EU law” (Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 17 March 2019, Case C-221/17, Tjebbes and Others; to the same effect, Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, and, regarding cases producing statelessness, JY, paras. 58, 59, 73; and Rottmann, para. 55).

In a more recent phase, the Court has extended its scrutiny to the rules governing citizenship acquisition, finding that “the exercise of Member States’ competence in defining the conditions for the conferral of nationality of a Member State is not unlimited, just as their competence in defining the conditions for loss of nationality is not” (European Commission v Republic of Malta, para. 95).

From this perspective, it emphasized that Union citizenship is founded “on the common values set out in Article 2 TEU and on the mutual trust among Member States that none will exercise this competence in a manner manifestly incompatible with the very nature of Union citizenship” (European Commission v Republic of Malta, para. 95).

The Court of Justice further noted that the EU Treaties define the content of Union citizenship: guaranteeing to citizens and their family members freedom of movement, freedom to provide services, and freedom of establishment within the Union; granting political rights; and affording the right to diplomatic and consular protection by other Member States under the same conditions as their own nationals (ibid., paras. 84–90).

On that basis, the Court of Justice concluded that national rules on nationality must not be exercised “in a manner manifestly incompatible with the very nature of Union citizenship” (ibid., para. 95). Consequently, it found incompatible with EU law any “naturalization plan” granting nationality in return for payments or investments made in a Member State, as such schemes are “akin to the commercialization of the conferral of Member State nationality and, by extension, of Union citizenship” (ibid., para. 100).

1. 4. – In light of the foregoing, the objection raised by the parties is unfounded, insofar as it seeks to exclude a priori, on the basis of legislative discretion, the admissibility of a challenge alleging that a rule on citizenship is alien both to constitutional principles and to the provisions of the TEU and TFEU as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2. – However, the Court must now note that the referring judges, in raising the questions with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution — on the grounds of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality — as well as to Article 117(1), in relation to Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU, do not dispute that the bond of filiation, as a prerequisite for acquisition of citizenship, corresponds in itself to the features that define status civitatis under the Constitution and the sources of EU law. Their challenges do not question the general idea that belonging to a family community, which forms part of the national community, may also entail belonging to the latter — a criterion on which, indeed, the status civitatis of most Italian citizens rests.

Rather, what the referring judges doubt is that, in the presence of factors linking the applicant to foreign legal orders, and in the absence of any connection with the Italian legal order other than ius sanguinis, the bond of filiation alone may suffice to perform its function as the foundation of citizenship. In such circumstances — they argue — the family community would no longer be capable of transmitting a sense of belonging to the national community.

1. 1. – In relation to this specific challenge, the parties have raised further, more detailed objections of inadmissibility.

Firstly, they argue that this Court cannot, through a systemic manipulative judgment, substitute the legislature in determining a plurality of prerequisites. On one hand, it would have to identify the foreign-law connecting factors whose presence would irreparably weaken the function of ius sanguinis; on the other, it would have to define, in a combined and systematic manner, the domestic-law connecting factors whose absence would prevent filiation from fulfilling its function as a basis for acquisition of citizenship.

This objection aligns with the further contention that the referring objections are generic, insofar as some courts suggest multiple alternative solutions while others fail to indicate how the alleged constitutional violation might be remedied. Moreover, according to the parties that entered an appearance on May 16, 2024, the vagueness of the challenges is such that they fail even to account for the diversity of situations that any intervention by this Court would affect.

Finally, connected to the foregoing objections is that alleging the irrelevance of the challenges, since the referring judges are said to have assumed without proof or opportunity for rebuttal that the applicants lack any other ties with the Italian legal order that could obviate the alleged constitutional defect.

1. 2. – These objections are well-founded.
2. 1. 1. – Even the mere identification of possible correlations with foreign legal systems that would weaken the function of status filiationis as the basis of status civitatis entails discretionary choices among multiple options.

Not surprisingly, the referral orders merely describe, in general terms, the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings — persons born abroad, citizens of another State, and resident therein.

This Court would therefore have to decide whether to give weight to birth abroad, and whether that circumstance must be combined with one or both of the other factors; it would then have to determine whether to consider the foreign residence of the ascendant, the descendant, or both, and at what point in time; finally, it would have to assess the significance of dual citizenship, which may vary depending on whether it pertains to the descendant or also to the ascendant.

Moreover, intervening on each of these elements entails not only discretionary assessments, but also significant implications for the system.

1. 1. 2. – The systemic and manipulative nature of the intervention, as envisaged by the referring judges, becomes even more evident when one considers that this Court would be called upon to determine which among the many defining aspects of citizenship could adequately demonstrate that, notwithstanding the existence of links with a foreign legal order, membership in the family unit continues to justify belonging to the national community.

The Court would thus have to substitute the legislature in deciding whether to prioritize cultural and linguistic ties to the national community, taking into account the condition of citizens residing abroad, or, conversely, to prioritize a connection with the territory.
It is therefore unsurprising that the referring judges’ own proposals range across multiple and divergent solutions.
The vagueness and manipulative character of the challenges are further confirmed by the fact that the referring courts do not address the wide variety of situations that the requested intervention would potentially affect: those who have already applied for recognition of citizenship; those who have not yet applied but possess status filiationis; and those who will acquire such status in the future.

1. 3. – In conclusion, what is requested of this Court is an exceedingly complex manipulative intervention involving a wide spectrum of options, the selection among which would entail discretionary choices with significant systemic repercussions.

For the reasons set forth above, the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised with reference to Articles 1(2), 3, and 117(1) of the Constitution — the latter in relation to Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU — are inadmissible.

13. – Equally inadmissible — for failure to identify the specific international norm serving as the interposed parameter — is the question of constitutional legitimacy alleging a violation of Article 117(1) of the Constitution in relation to international obligations.

The referring courts do not specify which source of international law is said to have been infringed, or from which the alleged non-compliance with international obligations would derive.

No international conventions, whether directly or indirectly concerning citizenship, are invoked. Nor is any rule of customary international law cited — which, moreover, would have required the additional invocation of Article 10 of the Constitution. Finally, there are no references to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, which, under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, constitute sources of international law.

Conversely, the referring judges merely recall the Liechtenstein v. Guatemala case (ICJ, Judgment of 6 April 1955), improperly conflating the criteria for attribution of nationality with the distinct question of the international effectiveness of nationality — that is, its capacity to be relied upon in international relations. Only for such purposes does that judgment, as well as the more recent Qatar v. United Arab Emirates (ICJ, Judgment of 4 February 2021), presuppose the existence of an effective and genuine link with the State.

Accordingly, the challenge raised with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, concerning international obligations, is inadmissible.

14. – By contrast, the questions raised by the Courts of Rome and Milan, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution under the profile of unreasonable disparity of treatment, are admissible.

The referring judges, though initially drawing rather general comparisons between the challenged provision — as applied to persons in the position of the applicants — and various other citizenship regimes, ultimately identified with sufficient precision two specific third term of comparison.

1. 1. – In particular, the referring Court of Rome considers that Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, as applied to persons born and residing abroad and holding the citizenship of a foreign State, entails an unreasonable disparity of treatment when compared with Article 4(1) of the same Law, which, among the several provisions considered, it regards as “the most appropriately comparable.” In both cases — according to the referring judge — citizenship is acquired ipso iure on the basis of recognition of the requisite conditions, thereby constituting a subjective right rather than a legitimate interest.
2. 2. – The Court of Milan, for its part, after comparing the challenged provision with several others conferring citizenship, identifies as its third term of comparison the regime governing acquisition of citizenship by the foreign spouse of an Italian citizen, which requires proof of an intermediate level of proficiency in the Italian language or, alternatively, the signing of an integration agreement.
3. – On the merits, these questions are unfounded.

A challenge of unreasonable disparity of treatment requires this Court, first and foremost, to verify, in light of the rationale of the regulation, the consistency between the situations being compared. According to settled case law, a violation of Article 3 of the Constitution exists “only where substantively identical situations are governed in an unjustifiably different manner, and not where differences in regulation correspond to situations that are not comparable” (see, among many others, Judgments Nos. 171 of 2022, 71 of 2021, 85 of 2020, 13 of 2018, and 71 of 2015).

1. 1. – Such essential identity is lacking, first of all, in the challenge raised by the Court of Rome.

Article 4(1) of Law No. 91 of 1992 concerns the acquisition of status civitatis by foreign nationals who are the children of persons who have lost Italian citizenship. By contrast, the challenged provision governs the jure sanguinis acquisition of citizenship by the descendants of persons who are Italian citizens.

The lack of homogeneity between the situations compared is therefore decisive.

1. 2. – The prerequisite of homogeneity is likewise absent in the challenge brought by the Court of Milan.

Acquisition of citizenship through marriage to an Italian citizen rests on a bond — that of marriage — which is not comparable to the bond of filiation, even having regard to the purpose of the legislation.

This challenge is therefore likewise unfounded.

16. – In conclusion, the challenges brought by the Court of Milan concerning Article 4 of the Civil Code of 1865 and Article 1 of Law No. 555 of 1912 are inadmissible.

Equally inadmissible are the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, raised with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution on grounds of unreasonableness and disproportionality, as well as to Article 117(1) in relation to international obligations and to the constraints arising from Italy’s membership in the European Union — the latter specifically under Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU.

Finally, the questions of constitutional legitimacy of the same provision, raised with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution on grounds of unreasonable disparity of treatment, are unfounded.

FOR THESE REASONS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

having joined the cases,
1.Declares inadmissible the interventions of AUCI – Avvocati uniti per la cittadinanza italiana and AGIS – Associazione giuristi iure sanguinis, made in the proceedings concerning the order registered as No. 247 in the 2024 Register of Orders;
2. Declares inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 4 of the Civil Code of 1865, approved by Royal Decree No. 2358 of June 25, 1865, and of Article 1 of Law No. 555 of June 13, 1912 (On Italian Citizenship), raised by the Ordinary Court of Milan, Twelfth Division specialized in immigration, international protection and free movement of European Union citizens, with reference to Articles 1(2) and 3 of the Constitution — the latter under the dual aspect of unreasonableness and lack of proportionality, as well as of unreasonable disparity of treatment — and with reference to Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation both to international obligations and to the constraints arising from Italy’s membership in the European Union, the latter with regard to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by the order indicated in the heading;  4. Declares unfounded the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of 1992, raised with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, under the profile of unreasonable disparity of treatment, by the Ordinary Courts of Rome (Division for personal rights and immigration) and Milan (Twelfth Division specialized in immigration, international protection and free movement of European Union citizens), by the orders indicated in the heading.
Thus decided in Rome, at the headquarters of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 24 June 2025.

Signed:
                                         , President
                                         , Reporting Judge
                                         , Director of the Registry
Filed in the Registry on July 31, 2025
The Director of the Registry
Signed:

Judgments and orders of the Constitutional Court are published in the first special series of the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic (pursuant to Articles 3 of Law No. 839 of December 11, 1984, and 21 of the Presidential Decree No. 1092 of December 28, 1985) and in the Official Collection of Judgments and Orders of the Constitutional Court (pursuant to Article 29 of the Supplementary Rules for proceedings before the Constitutional Court, approved by the Constitutional Court on March 16, 1956).

The text published in the Official Gazette is fully authoritative and prevails in case of divergence.